


RDSTF State Working Group

On Domestic Preparedness

Public Information and Joint Information System (JIS) and
Joint Information Center (JIC) Protocol



RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING FLORIDA RDSTF JOINT INFORMATION
CENTERS (JIC)

FLORIDA STATE WORKING GROUP ON DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS
RECOMMENDATIONS ON RDSFT JOINT INFORMATION GUIDELINES
APPROVED BY THE DOMESTIC SECURITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL: OCTOBER 12, 2005

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Introduction

Emergency events dictate an immediate response to the community. This protocol provides Public Information Officers (PIO) with a framework for crisis and risk communications planning. Further, this protocol is written to guide public information activities during extraordinary incidents where Incident Command has been established and the demand for public information will likely exceed the resources and capabilities of local jurisdictions.

Public communication is a critical response function following a terrorism incident, natural disaster, or other major emergency. Pre-incident planning, coordination, and preparation will improve the ability of local jurisdictions and Florida's emergency response network to promote effective public safety, public health, and healthcare communications with the public during the response and recovery to an emergency. Joint Information Centers (JIC) provides PIOs with a multi-agency support structure and tools for developing, approving, and communicating public information.

A major emergency will require incident commanders and other government officials to establish systems for communicating with the public during the emergency. The JIC model is in compliance with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) that defines public information systems as "the processes, procedures, and systems for communicating timely and accurate information to the public during crisis or emergency situations."¹

In such cases, response to support local jurisdictions from the emergency management community and the Regional Domestic Security Task Forces (RDSTF) must be swift and certain to address the critical tasks associated with providing accurate and reliable information to citizens and the media during or following a catastrophic incident.

The JIS/JIC guidelines contemplate the existing relationships and supports processes between local jurisdictions and local Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) and are developed to provide a recommended JIC structure and process for local jurisdictions, as well as, to address the role of the Regional Domestic Security Task Force (RDSTF) when it directed to establish a Multi-Agency Coordination (MAC) Group to support large-scale incidents. All emergency responses will be managed and supported consistent with the provisions of the Florida Comprehensive Management Plan (CEMP). Nothing in these guidelines is intended to supplant, replace or duplicate existing emergency management processes.

The guidelines contain numerous annexes to be used as reference material for local and RDSTF PIOs. The information contained in the annexes is derived, in part, from

¹ Department of Homeland Security, Incident Communications Planning

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the 15 National Planning Scenarios compiled by experts from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The planning assumptions associated with these threat-based scenarios suppose catastrophic damage to local infrastructure, large numbers of injuries and deaths to civilians and extraordinary demands for emergency services of all types. Additional annexes provide useful tools for PIOs, such as, pre-scripted press messages, resource templates and rosters of qualified public Information officers and other support personnel who are available to be called to support large-scale emergency events.

Public Information Officers at levels of government are responsible for communicating essential emergency information to local populations in two general forms, as follows:

Crisis Communication informs the public about the emergency, reviews the government's responses, directs the public to sources of assistance, and recommends protective actions.

Risk Communication is a critical component of crisis communications. Risk communication is the process of informing and influencing the public's actions to avoid risks. Risk communicators describe known risks; identify the probable negative outcomes associated with taking certain actions, and recommend ways of avoiding risk.

Public communication during a crisis or emergency is more challenging than normal or day-to-day communications. Factors contributing to the challenge of public communication in an emergency are:

- Multi-agency Coordination;
- Compressed timeframes;
- Situational uncertainty-especially in the early stages of a crisis; and
- A stressed and emotionally strained public.

Multi-Agency Coordination

The response to a public emergency will likely involve multiple public safety, public health, and health care organizations-with each one communicating with the public. Incident response may involve emergency personnel from multiple jurisdictions, including many state and federal government agencies.

As the number of agencies and organizations responding to an emergency increases, so will the number of agencies communicating with the public. Joint Information Centers

enable public affairs offices to pool personnel and other resources. The local and state EOC system and the Regional Domestic Security Task Forces (RDSTF) will support incidents that span contiguous jurisdictions or affect multiple jurisdictions within a region or throughout the state.

COMPRESSED TIMEFRAMES

Crises and emergencies are by nature fast-paced and rapidly evolving situations. They can compress the time available to PIOs and for receiving information, developing public messages, and providing these messages to the public. This compressed cycle increases the difficulty of managing public communications operations, the difficulty of communication between the incident managers and the crisis communicators, and the opportunities for making mistakes.

Additionally, a crisis is likely to compress the news cycle and increase competition between news organizations. As a result, news organizations will increase pressure on incident managers and communications officials for information. PIOs need to be responsive to the condensed news cycle and the increased demand for information. This may require frequent press conferences and media events, one-on-one contacts with journalists, arranging interviews with government experts and officials, and increasing the number of public affairs staff to support these increased operations.

SITUATIONAL UNCERTAINTY

Incident managers may face difficulties in maintaining situational awareness during emergencies-particularly in the initial stages. At the same time, the public's demand for information is likely to be highest during the initial stages of an emergency. Gaps in situational awareness can increase the difficulty of providing answers to many of the public's questions. Because of gaps in information and knowledge, officials and spokespeople are likely to make mistakes and provide inaccurate information. Crisis communications experts advise PIOs and government spokespeople to manage the public's expectations by openly discussing the likelihood that officials and spokespeople will make mistakes and will release inaccurate information.

EMOTIONALLY CHARGED SITUATIONS

In addition to providing the public with timely and accurate information, crisis communication experts stress the importance of appropriately framing information and messages. Spokespeople need to consider the style and format of their delivery as they provide information to the news media and the public. Experts encourage spokespeople and other officials to recognize the public's emotional state and demonstrate empathy, compassion, and understanding.

TERRORISM

Terrorism exacerbates many of the challenges inherent to crisis communications. A terrorist incident will evolve rapidly. A large number of organizations will participate in the response and recovery efforts to a terrorism incident-including local, state, and

federal government agencies and private sector interests. Incident managers and PIOs are likely to find it difficult to meet the overwhelming demand for information. Terrorism will heighten public concerns about safety and can produce widespread and sustained anxiety. An act of terrorism is likely to test the media relations and public communications skills of the most seasoned and experienced crisis communicators.

Terrorism poses unique challenges for risk communication. Effective risk communication can help the public understand and avoid the public safety risks created by an act of terrorism. This includes efforts to describe the physical effects of known terrorist incidents and raising public awareness of the threat of additional terrorist attacks. Risk communication starts with identification and assessments of risks generated by the act of terrorism.

Local and RDSTF spokespersons need to understand the nature of the risks facing the community before explaining these risks to the public. Included among the factors shaping the risks to the public resulting from a terrorism incident are:

- Type of weapon(s) used and the physical/physiological effects;
- Location of the attack(s);
- Modes or tactics of the attacks;
- Nature of the response; and
- Possibility of future attacks.

Assessing and communicating risks may be particularly difficult during terrorism incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons.

JOINT INFORMATION SYSTEM (JIS) AND JOINT INFORMATION CENTER (JIC) INTENT AND PURPOSE

The intent and purpose of organizing a JIC is to support impacted communities by providing public information *to protect citizens by providing information to help them make informed decisions and to avoid risks*. The RDSTF guidelines provide an organizational process and structure that pre-identifies trained and qualified PIOs from jurisdictions and disciplines, statewide, who, when requested or directed, may be deployed to support local jurisdictions in their efforts to coordinate press and public information during a emergency.

RDSTF MULTI-AGENCY COORDINATION GROUPS (MAC)

The principal functions and responsibilities of multi-agency coordination entities typically include the following:

- Ensure that each agency involved in incident management activities is providing appropriate situational awareness and resource status information;
- Establish priorities between incidents and/or Area Commands in concert with the IC or UC(s) involved;
- Acquire and allocate resources required by incident management personnel in concert with the priorities established by the IC or UC;
- Anticipate and identify future resource requirements;
- Coordinate and resolve policy issues arising from the incident(s); and
- Provide strategic coordination as required.

A Regional Multi-Agency Coordination (MAC) Group is comprised of the Regional Domestic Security Task Force (RDSTF) discipline leadership, usually consisting of the task force co-chairs representing the Law Enforcement, Fire Rescue, Emergency Management, and Health/Medical disciplines. The MAC Group or their designees will be organized in an Incident Command System (ICS) structure consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS), and will coordinate with the local Emergency Operations Center(s) (EOCs) to provide support to the local area incident commander(s).

MAC Group members will include RDSTF partners who are not responding to or directly impacted by the incident. The MAC Group may locate at an independent location or within an EOC in consultation with local emergency management. The MAC Group Coordinator will be the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) Special Agent in Charge (SAC) or designee. The MAC Group will be identified by the RDSTF region number (i.e., Region 3 MAC Group).

(For additional information please refer to the Regional Multi-Agency Coordination Group Standard Operations Guide, Annex 20)

The Regional MAC Group provides a forward coordination element for the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) to perform the following minimum functions:

- ACTIVATE and Operate in support of the incident,
- ASSESS the situational impact and need for resources,
- REPORT situational awareness to the SEOC,
- COORDINATE the regional response effort, and
- DEPLOY regional assets to augment local resources in coordination with local EOCs.

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The MAC Group, in conjunction with local emergency managers, will evaluate available resources in the affected area and coordinate the request and deployment of in-region assets. If the event exceeds the resources available at the regional level, the MAC Group shall coordinate requests for additional out-of-region resources with the local EOC and the State EOC. The MAC Group is not designed to replace tactical Incident Command or function as an Incident Management Team (IMT).

DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FOR THE MAC

On the authority of the Commissioner of FDLE and Director of Division of Emergency Management, the State Emergency Operations Center may initiate a mission-tasking message and subsequent Governor-issued Executive Order to empower a Regional MAC Group with Tasking Authority in the event of a terrorist act. The MAC Group will have immediate authority to assess needs and deploy in-region assets as necessary. All resource tasking will be performed in coordination with local EOCs using the SEOC's Resource Management System.

MISSION STATEMENT FOR THE MAC

The mission of the MAC Group is to function as a regional coordination entity to support local Incident Command in coordination with the local EOC(s) and the State EOC, by assisting with the deployment of regional resources needed to prevent, prepare for, or respond to an event involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and to prevent or mitigate additional attacks.

The group will be responsible for:

- tracking of tactical resource availability
- tactical information gathering and sharing (situational awareness);
- resource deployment and coordination
- coordination of regional public information and education

RECOMMENDED MAC GROUP STAFFING

Staffing will be dependent upon the nature and magnitude of the event and may include the following:

- FDLE SAC or designee - functions as the Regional MAC Group Coordinator.
- Designated RDSTF Liaison(s) will respond to the incident scene(s) and to the county EOC(s) as appropriate.

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- The regional Public Information Officer or a designee shall be available to provide support to the MAC Group Coordinator and coordinate the release of information with the Incident Commander.
- Personnel from Emergency Management, FDLE, Agriculture, Fire, Health/Medical, Hospitals, Education, the Regional Planning Council (RPC) or Local Emergency Planning Council (LEPC), and other appropriate disciplines, as needed, will be responsible for staffing the Operations, Planning, Logistics and Finance/Administration sections of the MAC Group.

RECOMMENDED REGIONAL MAC GROUP SUPPORT

Personnel from Emergency Management, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, and EM-deployed State Liaison Officers will provide technical (i.e. Resource Management System), analytical, and administrative support for the Regional MAC Group. Staff support from all regional discipline leadership entities will be specified in each Regional Response Plan. The Regional MAC Group should be located at an appropriately equipped facility capable of supporting Regional MAC Group operations.

Analyst and administrative support staff duties will include:

- Regional resource availability, deployment and tracking utilizing the SEOC's Resource Management System. Staff will ensure that messages are clearly stated.
- Maintaining an event log and time line to assist the Regional MAC Group Coordinator with situational awareness, decision-making, and communication during the event. Information and Planning analysts will maintain an event log and provide information regarding resource deployment and availability to assist in the development of consolidated Incident Action Plans (IAPs) and Situation Reports (Sit Reps).
- Coordination of intelligence information among the Regional MAC Group, RDSTF Investigation and Intelligence Unit, FDLE Office of Statewide Intelligence, and the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF).
- ThreatCom messaging - advisement/update of events and sharing of tactical information.
- Prepare briefs for leadership regarding the events and other information obtained.

REGIONAL ASSET DEPLOYMENT PHILOSOPHY

Regional assets will be deployed, as needed, to augment local response consistent with direction provided by the State's Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP). The MAC Group, in conjunction with local EOCs, will monitor the deployment of local assets or those requested through Mutual Aid in accordance with existing plans.

The MAC Group will also coordinate deployment of in-region assets with support of local EOCs in accordance with existing plans. Requests for out-of-region assets must be coordinated through the SEOC.

All resource requests to the State EOC must originate from one source to be determined by the Regional MAC Group in consultation with local Emergency Management.

Regional MAC Group Activation

A Regional MAC Group may be activated in any of the following ways:

- Through order by State Command in conjunction with an Executive Order by the Governor, or
- In advance of an event or incident to monitor and disseminate information (criminal intelligence and situational awareness) and to coordinate preparatory actions.
- At a monitoring, partial activation, or full activation level as determined by the Regional MAC Group Coordinator, or designee, or as directed by the Commissioner of FDLE.
- Upon actual or imminent attack.
- A Regional MAC Group from a region not impacted may be sent to an impacted region to provide full or partial staffing as mission-tasked by the SEOC.

Definition of the Joint Information System (JIS) and Joint Information Center (JIC)

The Public Information Joint Information System (JIS) is the organizational model and process for providing pre and post event emergency communications support for impacted communities. The system is designed to promote consolidated public information through inter-agency cooperation. The system, in Florida, is governed by the Florida Comprehensive Emergency Plan (CEMP) and, is comprised of local government, local and state Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) and the seven Regional Domestic Security Task Forces (RDSTF), as well as, federal agency representatives and is assigned the responsibility to handle public information needs that accompany large-scale incidents.

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The Joint Information Center (JIC) is the designated location from which public information is coordinated and released. The JIC may be established at any location as determined necessary by the local jurisdiction(s) involved but should always work closely with the local EOC and liaison(s) from the RDSTF. The JIC functions best when all components are co-located in a single location. The location of the JIC should be pre-determined, if possible, and the site should be evaluated to ensure that it is large enough accommodate sufficient staff, telecommunications equipment and computer support. If circumstances prohibit co-location, the JIC components can operate from different physical locations as long as the organizational integrity is maintained; operational support is available and the chain-of-command is adhered to.

The JIC is responsible for interfacing with the public and media and/or with other agencies with incident-related information requirements. The JIC develops accurate and complete information on the incident's cause, size, and current situation; resources committed; and other matters of general interest for both internal and external communication. The JIC may also perform a key public information-monitoring role.

Whether the organizational structure is command structure is a *single command* or a *unified command*, only one incident PIO should be designated as lead. Assistants may be assigned from other agencies or departments involved. The Lead JIC PIO, or designee, must approve the release of all incident-related information. MAC PIOs, if deployed, will provide coordination and staff support to the Local JIC PIO and coordinate messages on behalf of the MAC Group Coordinator.

The JIC provides an organized, integrated, and coordinated mechanism to ensure the delivery of understandable, timely, accurate, and consistent information to the public in a crisis. It includes the plans, protocols, and structures used to provide information to the public during incident operations, and encompasses all public information operations related to an incident, including all Federal, State, local, tribal and private organization PIOs, staff, and JICs established to support an incident.

Key elements include the following:

- Inter-agency coordination and integration;
- Developing and delivering coordinated messages;
- Support for decision-makers; and
- Flexibility, modularity, and adaptability.

It is important for the JIC to have the most current and accurate information regarding incident management activities at all times. The JIC provides the organizational structure for coordinating and disseminating official information. JICs may be established at each level of incident management, as required. Note the following:

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- The JIC must include representatives of each jurisdiction, agency, private sector, and nongovernmental organization involved in incident management activities.
- A single JIC location is preferable, but the system should be flexible and adaptable enough to accommodate multiple JIC locations when the circumstances of an incident require. Multiple JICs may be needed for a complex incident spanning a wide geographic area or multiple jurisdictions.

Each JIC must have procedures and protocols to communicate and coordinate effectively with other JICs, as well as with other appropriate components of the ICS organization.

JIC Concept of Operations

Local Joint Information Centers (JIC) will be supported by or, if requested, operated by the RDSTF Multi-Agency Coordinating Group (MAC). The MAC Group operates under the authority of Chapters 252 AND 943, Florida Statutes as a coordination entity for the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC).

When RDSTF support is requested or determined necessary the SEOC will activate the RDSTF MAC Group in the affected region(s). A MAC Public Information Officer will be designated by the RDSTF MAC Group Coordinator to support the local jurisdictions public information needs. The MAC PIO will provide support to the Local PIO and, if necessary, will staff and operate a regional JIC to coordinate and support public Information needs for multiple jurisdictions or multiple JICs.

The MAC PIO reports to the MAC Group Coordinator and functions as the liaison to the local jurisdiction and is responsible for coordinating public information support activities conducted by the JIC. Each Regional Domestic Security Task Force and participating agencies will be responsible for providing training and staffing to the personnel assigned to the JIC.

Prior to the mobilization of any RDSTF personnel or resources the RDSTF may opt to dispatch a liaison to assess the need for RDSTF assistance. The RDSTF Chair or designee may also send a JIC liaison to assess public information needs.

If the RDSTF responds it may activate at various levels including the activation of one or more Multi-agency Coordination Groups (MAC). During deployment, command and control of all Joint Information Centers will be staffed and operated consistent with Incident Command System under the direct command and control of the designated local Incident Commander. The MAC Group Coordinator will ensure appropriate liaison to the local IC on all support needs, including public information.

JIC Organization Structure (Figures 1, 2, 3)


The JIC organizational structure set forth and defined below is the recommended footprint for use by local jurisdictions and RDSTF Public Information Officers to manage large-scale events or catastrophic incidents. The structure is scalable and flexible, which means that the functional components contained within the JIC can be established, as needed, and expanded or contracted to match the information needs of the event or incident.

The JIC structure works equally well for a local a PIO, EOC, MAC, or any other coordination entity. Accordingly, the three organization charts depict JIC structures at various levels of operation within the Florida EOC activation system.

Local jurisdictions that do not possess sufficient number of trained personnel to staff a full function JIC may use resources from other local jurisdictions or request JIC staff support from the local EOC or RDSTF.


NOTE: Some local jurisdictions will not be able to staff and operate a JIC within its available resources. The JIC can be staffed and supported by local agencies, local EOCs, the RDSTF MAC or any other established and recognized support organization. Catastrophic incidents will require regional response, support and coordination.

Local JIC Organization (Figure 1)




SINGLE COMMAND IC. When an incident occurs within a single jurisdiction and there is no jurisdictional or functional agency overlap, a single IC should be designated with overall incident management responsibility by the appropriate jurisdictional authority. The designated IC will develop the incident objectives on which subsequent incident action planning will be based. The IC will approve the Incident Action Plan (IAP) and all requests pertaining to the ordering and releasing of incident resources and public information.

Statewide JIC Organization with MAC and SEOC (Figure 2)



Multiple JICs with MAC Support (Figure 3)



MAC GROUP COORDINATION. Coordination is an important element in multi-jurisdictional or multi-agency incident management. The Incident Command System (ICS) provides guidelines to enable agencies with different legal, geographic, and functional responsibilities to coordinate, plan, and interact effectively. Agencies with jurisdictional authority or functional responsibility for any or all aspects of an incident and those able to provide specific resource support participate in the Unified Command structure and contribute to the process of determining overall incident strategies; selecting objectives; ensuring that joint planning for tactical activities is accomplished in accordance with approved incident objectives; ensuring the integration of tactical operations; and approving, committing, and making optimum use of all assigned resources.

JIC Minimum Staffing

Each JIC will consist of representatives of the primary agencies affected by the incident, others that comprise the task force and other members as warranted depending on the nature of the incident or event. Each JIC will have a designated JIC Manager to support the Lead PIO. Pre-designated individuals will be trained to fill key positions from local jurisdictions and each RDSTF. The following positions are recommended:

- Public Information Officer (Lead PIO for the JIC)
- MAC Public Information Officer (RDSTF Liaison to the JIC)
- JIC Manager
- Telephone Manager
- Rumor Control Officer
- Community Liaison Officer, and
- Government Liaison Officers
- Content Experts Coordinator (Chemical, Biological, Public Health, Hazardous Devices, etc.)

Recommended JIC Positions (with Descriptions)

Public Information Officer (Lead PIO for the JIC)

The PIO is a member of the command staff within the Incident Command System (ICS). This position reports directly to the Incident Commander and is responsible for all public information matters relating to the incident. The PIO utilizes a Joint Information System (JIS) to organize public information activities in the form of a Joint Information Center (JIC). The PIO coordinates or oversees all JIC functions and ensures that the Incident Commander approves all public information releases.

MAC Public Information Officer (RDSTF Liaison to the JIC)

All RDSTF/MACs will have a designated MAC PIO who will serve as the RDSTF/MAC liaison to the local JIC(s). The MAC PIO will coordinate RDSTF/MAC requests for deployment of Public Information Officers to support local JIC operations as indicated in the Team Notification sequence. The MAC PIO can be deployed to support a local JIC or to coordinate information between multiple JICs in wide spread incidents. Pre-designated Deputy MAC PIOs will be called if the primary MAC PIO is not available to respond to an event. Also, the Deputy MAC PIO will function as relief for the MAC PIO in situations that require continuous operations or for extended periods.

The MAC PIO will also represent the RDSTF on the appropriate law enforcement team subcommittee of the Operations and Planning Committee of the RDSTF State Working Group (SWG) on Domestic Preparedness. The SWG provides a forum for regional and statewide coordination of Regional Teams and the mechanism to:

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- Establish standardized protocols and procedures.
- Standardize equipment and training requirements.
- Determine local, county, and state resource and response capabilities.
- Identify funding sources to augment existing resources.
- Integrate the planning and response phases of Emergency Management and the Regional Domestic Security Task Forces.
- Ensure interoperable communications among RDSTF response team members and their counterparts across the state.

When a RDSTF/MAC is requested to support a local JIC, responding members will be expected to:

- Quickly assemble at a designated location for assembly of travel directly to the scene of the incident as soon as possible.
- Ensure that all resources necessary for deployment are available and in good working order.
- Upon arrival, the MAC PIO should establish liaison with RDSTF Command or designee and determine appropriate role for MAC personnel.
- The teams will receive a briefing from on-site personnel prior to establishing the JIC or relieving JIC personnel.
- The Incident Action Plan (IAP) will identify the public information mission.

The MAC PIO will maintain an all-disciplines *regional* callout schedule and contact list to ensure operational readiness. The Florida Fire Chief's Association (FFCA) maintains a *statewide* all-disciplines PIO deployment roster as a part of the FFCA State Emergency Response Plan (SERP). The FFCA has a designated Deployment Coordinator to handle requests for PIO deployment who coordinates all requests with the SEOC through ESF-14 (Public Information) and other ESFs as such requests are made. The MAC PIO should provide up-to-date regional lists to the FFCA for inclusion in the state deployment system. The MAC PIO will also insure that team leaders within the region are maintaining appropriate documentation for member training and certification.

(The FFCA SERP and the Deployment Team Handbook can be accessed at FFCA.org) (Insert PIO Asset Typing here when approved by the FFCA).

JIC Manager(s)

The JIC manager(s) is responsible for all logistics support for the JIC operation, which includes, locating equipment, establishing and operational facility, coordinating staffing and operating the JIC facility. The JIC manager is responsible for acquiring and maintaining administrative support staff and supplies necessary to support the various JIC functions. This includes communications equipment, information technology (IT) support and any other materials and supplies that are needed to operate an office

environment. The JIC Manager should coordinate with the designated Logistics Chief (if one has been designated) to establish the JIC site.

Public Information

The Public Information (PI) function comprises the traditional public information functions including the preparation of press releases, scheduling press conferences or briefings, preparing risk and crisis communications messages for distribution to the public via media outlets. It is important that the PI function be staffed with an adequate number of spokespersons, including those with bi-lingual skills. In the absence of PIOs, the public information section should maintain a list of available translators/spokespersons to address non-English-speaking populations.

The PI function is also responsible for conducting event research to support and document public safety messages and media releases to promote citizen safety and accurate information releases. Documentation should be maintained consistent with requirements set forth in Chapter 119, Florida Statutes.

Telephone Call Center

The JIC function shall consider whether establish a Telephone Call Center depending on the magnitude of the emergency event. The call center will function as the central contact point for the JIC for media and citizen inquiries. The call center should maintain an accurate log of all messages to promote efficient operation and to establish a record of information being received by the JIC, such as, the name of the caller, the nature of the information or inquiry and who was assigned for follow-up, if needed. The PIO

should receive regular briefings concerning the nature of information being received at the telephone call center.

Another important function within the call center is Rumor Control. Information received in the call center must be examined for accuracy and measured against facts and circumstances to dispel erroneous information and to maintain, both, public calm and confidence.

The Investigations Liaison is responsible for coordinating information received via the call center with the Investigations Function or other specialty teams who are supporting the incident(s). This liaison should remain aware of the nature and extent of telephone information received in the center with particular focus on;

- Callers who provide material information regarding the event regarding the incident, victims or suspects, or other information that is specific or actionable in any form.

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- Information that may lead to increased public concern or panic. In such cases it is appropriate to brief the investigations component and/or other specialty service if the information can be quickly dispelled via the JIC public messaging.

Community Liaison

The Community Liaison function coordinates information and community needs with a variety of local organizations to include Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), Faith-Based Organizations, local Chamber(s) of Commerce and other community-based groups. These organizations are stakeholders that can provide valuable information and assistance to the responding elements and can assist with public messaging. All Liaison functions should be coordinated with the Liaison Officer.

Government Liaison

The Government Liaison function coordinates information and government information needs with local, state and federal agencies. While it is probable that many of the government functions will have Public Affairs personnel assigned to the JIC it not be possible to accommodate every branch and level of government that might have an interest in the event. The government Liaison function exists to bridge any information gaps and to assist government agencies, at all levels, with information to assist them in the performance of their responsibilities during emergency situations. All Liaison functions should be coordinated with the MAC Liaison Officer.

JIC PROCEDURES

Each organization covered by the JIC protocol should develop procedures and specific action-oriented checklists for use during incident management operations to accomplish its assigned tasks. Procedures are documented and implemented with;

- Checklists; resource listings; maps, charts, and other pertinent data;
- Mechanisms for notifying staff; processes for obtaining and using equipment, supplies, and vehicles;
- Methods of obtaining mutual aid;
- Mechanisms for reporting information to organizational work centers and EOCs; and
- Communications operating instructions, including connectivity with private-sector and nongovernmental organizations
- Procedures for the mobilization, staffing and operation of a Mobile JIC, if available within the region.

PRIMARY MISSION

The RDSTF MAC PIO will provide rapid public information response and support to Local PIOs during actual or potential incidents or events. The MAC PIO will coordinate with the local and State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) through Emergency

Support Function (ESF) 14 and to request support, as needed, for the impacted jurisdictions. The MAC PIO should work with Local JIC PIO(s) and actively encourage the consolidation of all public information functions (local, state and federal) as quickly as possible to promote the effective and timely review and release of information to the public.

JIC DEPLOYMENT PHILOSOPHY

The RDSTF MAC PIO will maintain a roster of designated Public Information personnel who are trained to establish and maintain a JIC in support of a MAC Group response to a terrorist incident or other emergency. The JIC may be established at a pre-determined location or as a Mobile JIC, depending on the nature of the incident or event and availability of a mobile platform.

RELATIONSHIP OF ACTIVATED JIC TO OTHER RDSTF JICS

When an RDSTF MAC is mobilized to support jurisdictions JICs within the region it will operate to the fullest possible extent using resources within the region. At the point that additional resources are needed support will be provided from resources from within the closest non-impacted region. The authority for the authorization for additional resources from other RDSTF MAC Groups/JICs will rest with the FDLE Commissioner and the Director of the Division of Emergency Management.

In addition, in a widespread event it is possible that multiple JIS/JICs will be established. In such events the MAC/IC/US PIO will serve as the lead for each JIS/JIC and may choose to designate one or more Deputy PIOs to assist with coordination of public information between the established MACs.

Typical MAC PIO Notification

- Local Incident Commander requests assistance.
- County Warning Point and/or 911 communication center notifies State Warning Point
- State Warning Point contacts applicable Emergency Support Function(s) and the EOG (Executive Office of the Governor)
- ESF notifies Regional Domestic Security Task Force (RDSTF)
- RDSTF activates the MAC PIO closest to the incident.
- Team deployment will be consistent with the regional standard operating procedures

RDSTF JIC RESPONSE TIME

Response times within the established RDSTF geographic areas will vary but JICs should strive to be on scene within one to two hours and fully staffed and operational within four to six hours.

Staff Coordination at the JIC

Staff coordination will be responsibility of the JIC Manager on behalf of the Lead PIO. Staffing requirements will vary depending upon the nature of the emergency event. The MAC PIO will assist with acquiring additional resources for the JIC, as requested.

PREPARATION AND RELEASE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

The JIC should begin to coordinate information review and release activities as soon as possible. To follow are some example of the types of information that can be made available;

- Fact Sheets
- Press Releases
- Pamphlets and Brochures
- Maps, and
- Diagrams and Illustrations

RDSTF JIC MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS AND RECOMMENDED TRAINING

All designated JIC Team Leaders should possess experience in emergency situations and should have basic PIO training from recognized institutions, such as NIMS G-290, Basic Public Information Course and NIMS E-388, Advanced Public Information Course. In addition, all JIC staff should complete NIMS/ICS introductory ICS Courses IS-700 and ICS-100.

All JIC personnel should participate in field-based RDSTF exercises to test the JIC component of the MAC.

DEMOBILIZATION OF THE JIC

The MAC PIO will function in support of the Local JIC(s) as long as it is deemed necessary by the MAC Group coordinator.

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THREAT ANNEX LISTING AND JIC TOOL KIT

ANNEX 1: NUCLEAR DETONATION (10-KILOTON IMPROVISED NUCLEAR DEVICE)

**RDSTF SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT EMERGENCY CONTACT REGISTRY
 REGIONAL**

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

STATE AGENCY CONTACTS

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

FEDERAL AGENCY CONTACTS

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

Executive Summary

CASUALTIES	CAN VARY WIDELY
INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGE	TOTAL WITHIN RADIUS OF 0.5 TO 1.0 MILE
EVACUATIONS/DISPLACED PERSONS	450,000 OR MORE
CONTAMINATION	APPROXIMATELY 3,000 SQUARE MILES
ECONOMIC IMPACT	HUNDREDS OF BILLIONS OF DOLLARS
POTENTIAL FOR MULTIPLE EVENTS	NO
RECOVERY TIMELINE	YEARS

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SCENARIO OVERVIEW:

General Description –

IN THIS SCENARIO, TERRORIST MEMBERS OF THE UNIVERSAL ADVERSARY (UA) GROUP ASSEMBLE A GUN-TYPE NUCLEAR DEVICE USING HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) – USED HERE TO MEAN WEAPONS-GRADE URANIUM – STOLEN FROM A NUCLEAR FACILITY LOCATED IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION. THE NUCLEAR DEVICE COMPONENTS ARE SMUGGLED INTO THE UNITED STATES. THE 10-KILOTON NUCLEAR DEVICE IS ASSEMBLED NEAR A MAJOR METROPOLITAN CENTER. USING A DELIVERY VAN, TERRORISTS TRANSPORT THE DEVICE TO THE CENTRAL BUSINESS DISTRICT OF A LARGE CITY AND DETONATE IT. MOST BUILDINGS WITHIN 1,000 METERS (~ 3,200 FEET) OF THE DETONATION ARE SEVERELY DAMAGED. INJURIES FROM FLYING DEBRIS (MISSILES) MAY OCCUR OUT TO 6 KILOMETERS (~ 3.7 MILES). AN ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP) DAMAGES MANY ELECTRONIC DEVICES WITHIN ABOUT 5 KILOMETERS (~ 3 MILES). A MUSHROOM CLOUD RISES ABOVE THE CITY AND BEGINS TO DRIFT EAST-NORTHEAST.

GEOGRAPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS/DESCRIPTION –

THIS SCENARIO POSTULATES A 10-KILOTON NUCLEAR DETONATION IN A LARGE METROPOLITAN AREA. THE EFFECTS OF THE DAMAGE FROM THE BLAST, THERMAL RADIATION, PROMPT RADIATION, AND THE SUBSEQUENT RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT HAVE BEEN CALCULATED, BASED ON A DETONATION IN WASHINGTON, D.C. HOWEVER, THE CALCULATION IS GENERAL ENOUGH THAT MOST MAJOR CITIES IN THE UNITED STATES CAN BE SUBSTITUTED IN A RELATIVELY STRAIGHTFORWARD MANNER. IF THE INCIDENT HAPPENED NEAR THE U.S. BORDER, THERE WOULD BE A NEED FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO BORDER GOVERNMENTS. ADDITIONALLY, THE IND ATTACK MAY WARRANT THE CLOSURE OF U.S. BORDERS FOR SOME PERIOD OF TIME. IF THE DETONATION OCCURS IN A COASTAL CITY, THE FALLOUT PLUME MAY BE CARRIED OUT OVER THE WATER, CAUSING A SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION IN CASUALTIES. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SURROUNDING WATER WILL LIKELY RESTRICT THE ZONES THAT ARE SUITABLE FOR EVACUATION. BRIDGES AND TUNNELS THAT GENERALLY ACCOMPANY COASTAL CITIES WILL RESTRICT THE EVACUATION, CAUSING DELAY AND AN INCREASE IN THE RADIOACTIVE DOSE THAT EVACUEES RECEIVE. THIS DELAY MAY BE SUBSTANTIAL AND THE RESULTING DOSE INCREASE MAY DRIVE A DECISION TO SHELTER-IN-PLACE OR EVACUATE-IN-STAGES.

TIMELINE/EVENT DYNAMICS –

THE RESPONSE TIMELINE WILL BEGIN THE INSTANT THE DETONATION OCCURS. INITIALLY, ONLY SURVIVORS IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA WILL CONDUCT RESCUE AND LIFESAVING ACTIVITIES. LATER (MINUTES TO HOURS), RESCUE TEAMS WILL BEGIN TO ARRIVE AND PROVIDE ASSISTANCE. WITH THE CURRENT STATE OF EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND EQUIPMENT, IT IS LIKELY THAT MANY OF THESE RESPONDERS WILL SUBJECT THEMSELVES TO VERY LARGE (PERHAPS INCAPACITATING OR FATAL) DOSES OF RADIATION. AS VARIOUS COMMAND POSTS ARE SETUP (WHICH MAY TAKE

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HOURS TO DAYS), THE RESPONSE WILL BECOME MORE COORDINATED.

FOR A NUCLEAR DETONATION, THE ACTUAL OCCURRENCE OF INJURIES DOES NOT STOP WHEN THE IMMEDIATE BLAST EFFECTS HAVE SUBSIDED. THE MOST CRITICAL COMPONENTS OF THE POST-DETONATION RESPONSE MAY NOT BE THE LIFESAVING EFFORTS THAT ASSIST THE VICTIMS DIRECTLY INJURED BY THE DETONATION. INSTEAD, IT IS LIKELY THAT THE MOST EFFECTIVE LIFESAVING ACTIVITIES WILL BE THOSE THAT ADDRESS THE EVACUATION OR SHELTERING-IN-PLACE DECISIONS FOR THE POTENTIAL VICTIMS IN THE IMMEDIATE FALLOUT PATH, THE EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION OF INSTRUCTIONS TO THE AFFECTED POPULATION, AND THE EFFICIENT DECONTAMINATION OF THE EVACUATED POPULATION.

SECONDARY HAZARDS/EVENTS –

THE DETONATION WILL CAUSE MANY SECONDARY HAZARDS. THE INTENSE HEAT OF THE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION AND OTHER SUBSEQUENT CAUSES WILL PRODUCE NUMEROUS FIRES LOCATED THROUGHOUT THE IMMEDIATE BLAST ZONE. DAMAGED BUILDINGS, DOWNED POWER AND PHONE LINES, LEAKING GAS LINES, BROKEN WATER MAINS, AND WEAKENED BRIDGES AND TUNNELS ARE JUST SOME OF THE HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS THAT WILL NEED TO BE ASSESSED. DEPENDING ON THE TYPE OF INDUSTRIES PRESENT (SUCH AS CHEMICAL OR PETROLEUM PRODUCTION, INDUSTRIAL STORAGE FACILITIES, AND MANUFACTURING OPERATIONS), THERE COULD BE SIGNIFICANT RELEASES OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS.

ANOTHER SECONDARY EFFECT OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION IS THE EMP THAT WILL BE PRODUCED BY THE IONIZATION AND SUBSEQUENT ACCELERATION OF ELECTRONS FROM THE AIR AND OTHER MATERIALS BY THE INTENSE RADIATION OF THE DETONATION. THIS EMP IS A SHARP, HIGH-VOLTAGE SPIKE THAT RADIATES OUT FROM THE DETONATION SITE. IT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO DISRUPT THE COMMUNICATION NETWORK, OTHER ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT, AND ASSOCIATED SYSTEMS WITHIN APPROXIMATELY A 5-KILOMETER (~ 3-MILE) RANGE FROM THE 10-KILOTON GROUND BLAST.

THERE LIKELY WILL BE SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC SUPPORT INFRASTRUCTURE WITH POTENTIALLY CASCADING EFFECTS. THESE SYSTEMS INCLUDE TRANSPORTATION LINES AND NODES (E.G., AIR, WATER, RAIL, HIGHWAY); POWER GENERATION AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS; COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS; FOOD DISTRIBUTION; AND FUEL STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION. THERE WILL BE CONCERNS ABOUT THE SAFETY AND RELIABILITY OF MANY STRUCTURES (E.G., DAMS, LEVEES, NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, HAZARDOUS MATERIAL STORAGE FACILITIES). STRUCTURES MAY BE DAMAGED THAT ARE USED TO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL SERVICES (E.G., HOSPITALS, SCHOOLS).

KEY IMPLICATIONS:

A FULL DESCRIPTION OF THE FATALITIES AND INJURIES FOR A NUCLEAR DETONATION IS DIFFICULT AND COMPLICATED. THERE WILL BE CASUALTIES DIRECTLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE BLAST, WHICH WILL CAUSE “TRANSLATION/TUMBLING” (THE HUMAN BODY BEING THROWN) AND SUBSEQUENT IMPACTS OF PEOPLE AND OTHER OBJECTS. A NUCLEAR DETONATION WILL ALSO PRODUCE A GREAT DEAL OF THERMAL (HEAT) ENERGY THAT WILL CAUSE BURNS TO EXPOSED

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SKIN (AND EYES). THERE ARE TWO GENERAL “CATEGORIES” OF NUCLEAR RADIATION PRODUCED IN A DETONATION. FIRST IS THE SO-CALLED “PROMPT” NUCLEAR RADIATION, ARBITRARILY DEFINED AS BEING EMITTED WITHIN THE FIRST MINUTE – IT IS ACTUALLY PRODUCED AS THE DEVICE DETONATES OR SHORTLY THEREAFTER. FOR A 10-KILOTON BLAST, THIS RADIATION MAY EXPOSE UNPROTECTED PEOPLE WITHIN A DISTANCE OF A FEW KILOMETERS (A COUPLE OF MILES) TO EXTREMELY LARGE GAMMA RAY AND/OR NEUTRON DOSES. IN ADDITION, A DETONATION OF A NUCLEAR DEVICE NEAR THE SURFACE OF THE GROUND WILL RESULT IN A GREAT DEAL OF FALLOUT (IN THE FORM OF DIRT PARTICLES) THAT IS RADIOACTIVELY CONTAMINATED. THIS FALLOUT WILL SETTLE OUT OF THE RADIOACTIVE CLOUD OVER A PERIOD OF MINUTES TO WEEKS. BY FAR, THE MOST DANGEROUSLY RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT WILL BE DEPOSITED NEAR THE DETONATION SITE AND WILL HAPPEN WITHIN THE FIRST COUPLE OF HOURS AFTER DETONATION. RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT WILL EXPONENTIALLY DECAY WITH TIME, BUT MAY EXPOSE MANY PEOPLE TO LARGE DOSES AND WILL CERTAINLY CONTAMINATE LARGE AREAS OF LAND FOR YEARS. MANY FATALITIES AND INJURIES WILL RESULT FROM A COMBINATION OF THESE VARIOUS EFFECTS.

THE LARGEST RADIATION CONCERNS FOLLOWING AN IND INCIDENT WILL BE THE “PROMPT” RADIATION (GAMMA RAY AND NEUTRON) AND THE GAMMA DOSE RECEIVED FROM THE “GROUND SHINE” (RADIOACTIVE PARTICLES DEPOSITED ON THE GROUND) AS PEOPLE ARE EVACUATED FROM THE FALLOUT AREAS. THESE EFFECTS ARE LIKELY TO HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY LARGER IMPACTS ON THE POPULATION THAN INTERNAL DOSES. INTERNAL DOSES TEND TO EXPOSE THE BODY TO RELATIVELY SMALL RADIATION DOSES OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME, WHICH PRODUCES DIFFERENT EFFECTS THAN LARGE RADIATION DOSES RECEIVED DURING A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME.

AS THE DISTANCE FROM GROUND ZERO INCREASES PAST 20 KILOMETERS (~ 12 MILES), THE INJURIES DUE TO ACUTE RADIATION EXPOSURE (FROM PROMPT RADIATION AND THE SUBSEQUENT FALLOUT) WILL DECREASE, AND LOWER LEVEL CONTAMINATION, EVACUATION, AND SHELTERING ISSUES WILL BECOME THE MAJOR CONCERN. IN GENERAL, AT DISTANCES GREATER THAN 250 KILOMETERS (~ 150 MILES) FROM GROUND ZERO OF A 10-KILOTON NUCLEAR DETONATION, ACUTE HEALTH CONCERNS WILL NOT BE A SIGNIFICANT ISSUE. HOWEVER, CONTAMINATION OF PEOPLE AND THE ENVIRONMENT WILL STILL BE A CONCERN. YEARS LATER, THERE WILL STILL BE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES IN THE FORM OF INCREASED PROBABILITIES OF CANCERS IN THE EXPOSED POPULATION. THE NUMBER OF THESE CANCERS WILL LIKELY RUN INTO THE THOUSANDS AND WILL EXTRACT A LARGE HUMAN, SOCIAL, AND FINANCIAL COST.

IT IS LIKELY THAT THE BLAST AND SUBSEQUENT FIRES WILL DESTROY ALL BUILDINGS IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA OF THE DETONATION. HISTORICALLY, DECONTAMINATION OF SITES INVOLVES THE REMOVAL OF ALL AFFECTED MATERIAL, SO MOST BUILDINGS IN THE IMMEDIATE DOWNWIND FALLOUT PATH WILL LIKELY HAVE TO BE DESTROYED IN THE DECONTAMINATION EFFORT. AS THE DISTANCE FROM THE DETONATION SITE INCREASES, THE CONTAMINATION LEVEL WILL DECREASE. AT SOME DISTANCE, THE BUILDINGS WILL NOT HAVE TO BE DESTROYED AND REMOVED BUT WILL STILL REQUIRE DECONTAMINATION OF ALL AFFECTED SURFACES. THIS DECONTAMINATION PROCESS WILL TAKE YEARS AND WILL BE EXTREMELY EXPENSIVE. THE

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DECONTAMINATION WILL PRODUCE A FAR GREATER CHALLENGE AND COST MUCH MORE THAN THE ACTUAL REBUILDING OF THE DESTROYED STRUCTURES. APPROXIMATELY 8,000 SQUARE KILOMETERS (~ 3,000 SQUARE MILES) OF LAND WILL HAVE TO UNDERGO VARYING DEGREES OF DECONTAMINATION. THIS EFFORT WILL LAST FOR MANY YEARS AND WILL COST MANY BILLIONS OF DOLLARS TO COMPLETE.

SERVICE DISRUPTION WILL BE EXTENSIVE IN THE AREA NEAR GROUND ZERO AND IN THE FALLOUT PATH FOR SEVERAL MILES DOWNWIND. SERVICES IN THESE AREAS WILL NOT BE RESTORED FOR YEARS BECAUSE THE LAND AFFECTED WILL NOT BE RETURNED TO USE UNTIL THE DECONTAMINATION IS COMPLETE AND THE STRUCTURES REBUILT. SERVICE DISRUPTION WILL BE MUCH LESS DRAMATIC IN AREAS THAT ARE LESS SEVERELY CONTAMINATED OR NOT CONTAMINATED AT ALL.

THE ELECTRICAL POWER GRID IS LIKELY TO BE DAMAGED BY TRANSIENTS PRODUCED BY THE DESTRUCTION OF SUBSTATIONS, AS WELL AS OTHER POWER PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION INSTALLATIONS, AND PERHAPS BY THE EMP OF THE DETONATION. IT IS LIKELY THAT THE GRID DAMAGE MAY CAUSE POWER OUTAGES OVER WIDE AREAS, PERHAPS OVER SEVERAL STATES, BUT THESE OUTAGES SHOULD BE REPAIRED WITHIN SEVERAL DAYS TO A COUPLE OF WEEKS. THE COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS IN THE AREA WILL SUFFER SIMILAR DAMAGE AND WILL LIKELY BE REPAIRED WITHIN SIMILAR TIMEFRAMES.

CITY WATER MAINS WILL LIKELY SURVIVE WITHOUT MAJOR DAMAGE. THE CITY WATER SUPPLY IS UNLIKELY TO BECOME SUBSTANTIALLY CONTAMINATED WITH RADIATION VIA WATER MAIN BREAKS, BUT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOME SMALL AMOUNT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION MAY ENTER THE LINES.

TO VARYING DEGREES, ALL GOVERNMENT SERVICES WILL BE IMPACTED OVER SOME GEOGRAPHICAL AREA. THE NATIONAL ECONOMY WILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY IMPACTED. DECONTAMINATION, DISPOSAL, AND REPLACEMENT OF LOST INFRASTRUCTURE WILL COST MANY BILLIONS OF DOLLARS. REPLACEMENT OF LOST PRIVATE PROPERTY AND GOODS COULD ADD BILLIONS MORE TO THE COST. ADDITIONALLY, AN OVERALL NATIONAL ECONOMIC DOWNTURN, IF NOT RECESSION, IS PROBABLE IN THE WAKE OF THE ATTACK.

MISSION AREAS ACTIVATED:

PREVENTION/DETERRENCE/PROTECTION – LAW ENFORCEMENT ATTEMPTS WILL BE MADE TO PREVENT DEVELOPMENT AND DETONATION OF THE DEVICE. SITE BOUNDARIES MUST BE PROTECTED AND SURVEYED AFTER THE DETONATION. OFFICERS MUST RESPOND TO ANY ADDITIONAL THREATS OR LOOTING/THEFT ISSUES.

EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT/DIAGNOSIS – THE DETONATION WILL BE EASILY RECOGNIZED AS NUCLEAR. ACTIONS REQUIRED INCLUDE DISPATCHING RESPONSE UNITS; MAKING INCIDENT SCENE REPORTS; DETECTING AND IDENTIFYING THE SOURCE; ESTABLISHING A PERIMETER; COLLECTING INFORMATION; MAKING HAZARD ASSESSMENTS AND PREDICTIONS; COORDINATING HOSPITAL AND URGENT CARE FACILITIES; COORDINATING COUNTY AND STATE RESPONSE REQUESTS; AND COORDINATING MONITORING, SURVEYING, AND SAMPLING OPERATIONS.

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EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT/RESPONSE – EVACUATION/SHELTER-IN-PLACE DECISIONS MUST BE MADE IMMEDIATELY. REQUIRED ACTIONS INCLUDE ALERTING THE PUBLIC, PROVIDING TRAFFIC AND ACCESS CONTROL, PROTECTING AT-RISK AND SPECIAL POPULATIONS, SUPPORTING REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE, DIRECTING AND CONTROLLING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ASSETS, AND DIRECTING PUBLIC INFORMATION ACTIVITIES. LOCATION AND REMOVAL OF INJURED AND DISABLED PEOPLE WILL BE A SIGNIFICANT UNDERTAKING THAT WILL BE GREATLY COMPLICATED BY THE NEED TO KEEP THE RADIATION DOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL WORKERS AS LOW AS REASONABLY ACHIEVABLE (ALARA). INITIAL EMERGENCY WORKERS WILL LIKELY RECEIVE HIGH DOSES OF RADIATION AND MUST BE TRAINED ON HOW TO AVOID AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE.

INCIDENT/HAZARD MITIGATION – SELF-EVACUATION SHOULD OCCUR IN THE SHORT-TERM, AND THE GREATEST FACTOR IMPACTING THE REDUCTION OF THE EFFECTS OF THE DETONATION ON THE GENERAL POPULATION WILL REMAIN THE SPEED AND APPROPRIATENESS OF THE DECISIONS THAT ARE MADE AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION (E.G., EVACUATION/SHELTER-IN-PLACE INSTRUCTIONS). EVACUEES MUST BE PROMPTLY DECONTAMINATED.

PUBLIC PROTECTION – ACTIONS SHOULD INCLUDE MAKING AND COMMUNICATING PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISIONS, MONITORING AND DECONTAMINATING EVACUEES, IMPLEMENTING DECISIONS TO ADMINISTER PROPHYLAXIS TO THE AFFECTED POPULATIONS, PROTECTING SPECIAL POPULATIONS, PROTECTING SCHOOLS AND DAY CARE FACILITIES, AND PROVIDING SHELTER/RECEPTION FACILITIES.

VICTIM CARE – TENS OF THOUSANDS WILL REQUIRE DECONTAMINATION AND BOTH SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM TREATMENT. DUE TO A HIGH NUMBER OF CASUALTIES, THE LEVEL OF CARE MAY BE SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER THAN NORMALLY EXPECTED. WHEN OVERWHELMED WITH VICTIMS WHO NEED CARE, DECISIONS MUST BE MADE BASED ON THE FACT THAT THE SOONER THE ONSET OF THE SYMPTOMS, THE HIGHER THE DOSE RECEIVED AND THE LESS LIKELY THE VICTIM IS TO SURVIVE (EVEN WITH MEDICAL INTERVENTION).

INVESTIGATION/APPREHENSION – ATTRIBUTION ACTIVITIES AT THE DETONATION SITE WILL RELY LARGELY ON SCIENTIFIC FORENSIC TECHNIQUES AND WILL BE PROVIDED BY SPECIALIZED NATIONAL TEAMS. ACTIONS OF INCIDENT-SITE PERSONNEL WILL INCLUDE SITE CONTROL AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION. FEDERAL AUTHORITIES OR THE MILITARY WILL PROBABLY CONDUCT “APPREHENSION” ACTIVITIES.

RECOVERY/REMEDIATION – EXPECTED RADIATION LEVELS WILL LIMIT THE TOTAL TIME WORKERS CAN SPEND IN THE AFFECTED AREA, QUICKLY LEADING TO A SHORTAGE OF WILLING, QUALIFIED, AND TRAINED WORKERS. THE VOLUME OF CONTAMINATED MATERIAL THAT WILL BE REMOVED WILL OVERWHELM THE NATIONAL HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL FACILITIES AND WILL SEVERELY CHALLENGE THE NATION’S ABILITY TO TRANSPORT THE MATERIAL. THIS EFFORT WILL BE THE MOST EXPENSIVE AND TIME-CONSUMING PART OF RECOVERY AND WILL LIKELY COST MANY BILLIONS OF DOLLARS AND TAKE MANY YEARS.

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ANNEX 2: BIOLOGICAL ATTACK – AEROSOL ANTHRAX

**RDSTF SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT EMERGENCY CONTACT REGISTRY
REGIONAL**

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

STATE AGENCY CONTACTS

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

FEDERAL AGENCY CONTACTS

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CASUALTIES	13,000 FATALITIES AND INJURIES
INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGE	MINIMAL, OTHER THAN CONTAMINATION
EVACUATIONS/DISPLACED PERSONS	POSSIBLY
CONTAMINATION	EXTENSIVE
ECONOMIC IMPACT	BILLIONS OF DOLLARS
POTENTIAL FOR MULTIPLE EVENTS	YES
RECOVERY TIMELINE	MONTHS

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SCENARIO OVERVIEW:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION –

ANTHRAX SPORES DELIVERED BY AEROSOL DELIVERY RESULTS IN INHALATION ANTHRAX, WHICH DEVELOPS WHEN THE BACTERIAL ORGANISM, *BACILLUS ANTHRACES*, IS INHALED INTO THE LUNGS. A PROGRESSIVE INFECTION FOLLOWS. THIS SCENARIO DESCRIBES A SINGLE AEROSOL ANTHRAX ATTACK IN ONE CITY DELIVERED BY A TRUCK USING A CONCEALED IMPROVISED SPRAYING DEVICE IN A DENSELY POPULATED URBAN CITY WITH A SIGNIFICANT COMMUTER WORKFORCE. IT DOES NOT, HOWEVER, EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF MULTIPLE ATTACKS IN DISPARATE CITIES OR TIME-PHASED ATTACKS (I.E., “RELOAD”).

FOR FEDERAL PLANNING PURPOSES, IT WILL BE ASSUMED THAT THE UNIVERSAL ADVERSARY (UA) WILL ATTACK FIVE SEPARATE METROPOLITAN AREAS IN A SEQUENTIAL MANNER. THREE CITIES WILL BE ATTACKED INITIALLY, FOLLOWED BY TWO ADDITIONAL CITIES 2 WEEKS LATER.

TIMELINE/EVENT DYNAMICS –

IT IS POSSIBLE THAT A BIO-WATCH SIGNAL WOULD BE RECEIVED AND PROCESSED, BUT THIS IS NOT LIKELY TO OCCUR UNTIL THE DAY AFTER THE RELEASE. THE FIRST CASES OF ANTHRAX WOULD BEGIN TO PRESENT TO EMERGENCY ROOMS (ERs) APPROXIMATELY 36 HOURS POST-RELEASE, WITH RAPID PROGRESSION OF SYMPTOMS AND FATALITIES IN UNTREATED (OR INAPPROPRIATELY TREATED) PATIENTS.

THE SITUATION IN THE HOSPITALS WILL BE COMPLICATED BY THE FOLLOWING FACTS: THE RELEASE HAS OCCURRED AT THE BEGINNING OF AN UNUSUALLY EARLY INFLUENZA SEASON AND THE PRODROMAL SYMPTOMS OF INHALATION ANTHRAX ARE RELATIVELY NON-SPECIFIC. PHYSICIAN UNCERTAINTY WILL RESULT IN LOW THRESHOLDS FOR ADMISSION AND ADMINISTRATION OF AVAILABLE COUNTERMEASURES (E.G., ANTIBIOTICS), PRODUCING SEVERE STRAINS ON COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE SUPPLIES OF SUCH MEDICATIONS AS CIPROFLOXACIN AND DOXYCYCLINE, AND EXACERBATING THE SURGE CAPACITY PROBLEM.

SECONDARY HAZARDS/EVENTS –

SOCIAL ORDER QUESTIONS WILL ARISE. THE PUBLIC WILL WANT TO KNOW VERY QUICKLY IF IT IS SAFE TO REMAIN IN THE AFFECTED CITY AND SURROUNDING REGIONS. MANY PERSONS WILL FLEE REGARDLESS OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH GUIDANCE THAT IS PROVIDED. PRESSURE MAY BE PLACED DIRECTLY ON PHARMACIES TO DISPENSE MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES DIRECTLY, AND IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO PROVIDE PUBLIC HEALTH GUIDANCE IN MORE THAN A DOZEN LANGUAGES.

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KEY IMPLICATIONS:

THIS ATTACK RESULTS IN 328,484 EXPOSURES; 13,208 UNTREATED FATALITIES; AND 13,342 TOTAL CASUALTIES. ALTHOUGH PROPERTY DAMAGE WILL BE MINIMAL, CITY SERVICES WILL BE HAMPERED BY SAFETY CONCERNS.

THERE IS THE POTENTIAL FOR A HUGE SELL-OFF IN THE ECONOMIC MARKETS; MOREOVER, THE STOCK EXCHANGE AND LARGE BUSINESSES MAY BE DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY THE ATTACK. THERE MAY ALSO BE A DECLINE IN CONSUMER SPENDING AND A LOSS OF REVENUE FOR THE METROPOLITAN AREA. AN OVERALL NATIONAL ECONOMIC DOWNTURN IS POSSIBLE IN THE WAKE OF THE ATTACK DUE TO LOSS OF CONSUMER CONFIDENCE. THE COSTS OF THE CLOSURE OF A LARGE SECTION OF THE CITY AND THE DECREASE IN REVENUE FROM TOURISM FOR AN INDETERMINATE PERIOD WOULD BE ENORMOUS, AS WOULD THE COSTS OF REMEDIATION AND DECONTAMINATION.

MISSION AREAS ACTIVATED:

PREVENTION/DETERRENCE/PROTECTION – THIS AREA REQUIRES KNOWLEDGE OF THOSE WITH THE ABILITY TO GROW AND AEROSOLIZE ANTHRAX, RECONNAISSANCE OF EQUIPMENT AND LABORATORIES, AND PUBLIC HEALTH PROTECTION MEASURES.

EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT/DIAGNOSIS – IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO MONITOR ATTACK IMPACT, DETERMINE RESOURCE NEEDS, CLASSIFY THE TYPE OF EVENT, AND IDENTIFY OTHER EVENTS (IF ANY). ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING FOR EXPOSURE RISK ASSESSMENT, IDENTIFICATION OF ANTHRAX STRAIN, AND DETERMINATION OF ANY DRUG RESISTANCE WILL ALSO BE REQUIRED.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT/RESPONSE – MANAGEMENT AND RESPONSE WILL REQUIRE PUBLIC ALERTS, MOBILIZATION OF THE STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE, ACTIVATION OF TREATMENT SITES, TRAFFIC/ACCESS CONTROL, SPECIAL POPULATION PROTECTION, PROTECTIVE MEASURES (E.G., SHELTER-IN-PLACE), REQUESTS FOR RESOURCES AND ASSISTANCE, AND PUBLIC INFORMATION ACTIVITIES.

INCIDENT/HAZARD MITIGATION – MITIGATION WILL REQUIRE PEP AND PPE PROVISION, ENVIRONMENTAL TESTING/DECONTAMINATION, CARE OF ILL PERSONS, VICTIM TREATMENT, SITE REMEDIATION AND MONITORING, NOTIFICATION OF AIRLINES/TRANSPORT PROVIDERS, PUBLIC INFORMATION PROVISION, AND COORDINATION WITH PUBLIC HEALTH AGENCIES.

PUBLIC PROTECTION – IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO PROVIDE SYMPTOM/EXPOSURE INFORMATION, WARNINGS, AND SHELTER-IN-PLACE/EVACUATION NOTIFICATION, AS WELL AS TO MANAGE TRAFFIC/ACCESS FLOW AND MOBILIZE THE STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE.

VICTIM CARE – CARE TO THE ILL MUST BE PROVIDED AND SHOULD INCLUDE DISBURSING PEP/VACCINATIONS AND ESTABLISHING TREATMENT/DISTRIBUTION CENTERS.

INVESTIGATION/APPREHENSION – LAW ENFORCEMENT WILL INVESTIGATE THE ATTACK IN

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COLLABORATION WITH PUBLIC HEALTH OFFICIALS WORKING TO IDENTIFY POPULATIONS AT RISK OF DISEASE. THIS ALSO REQUIRES EPIDEMIOLOGICAL TRACE-BACK OF VICTIMS, PARALLEL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, AND LABORATORY ANALYSES.

RECOVERY/REMEDIATION – THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA) AND THE CDC WILL COORDINATE THIS AREA. EXTENSIVE DECONTAMINATION AND CLEANUP WILL BE REQUIRED (ANTHRAX IS LONG-LIVED IN THE ENVIRONMENT) COSTING BILLIONS OF DOLLARS. REMEDIATION WILL ALSO REQUIRE ENVIRONMENTAL TESTING, HIGHLY CONTAMINATED AREA CLOSURES, AND PUBLIC INFORMATION PROVISION.

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ANNEX 3: BIOLOGICAL DISEASE OUTBREAK – PANDEMIC INFLUENZA

**RDSTF SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT EMERGENCY CONTACT REGISTRY
REGIONAL**

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

STATE AGENCY CONTACTS

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

FEDERAL AGENCY CONTACTS

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CASUALTIES	AT A 15% ATTACK RATE: 87,000 FATALITIES; 300,000 HOSPITALIZATIONS
INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGE	NONE
EVACUATIONS/DISPLACED PERSONS	ISOLATION OF EXPOSED PERSONS
CONTAMINATION	NONE
ECONOMIC IMPACT	\$70 TO \$160 BILLION
POTENTIAL FOR MULTIPLE EVENTS	YES, WOULD BE WORLDWIDE NEARLY SIMULTANEOUSLY
RECOVERY TIMELINE	SEVERAL MONTHS

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SCENARIO OVERVIEW:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION –

INFLUENZA PANDEMICS HAVE OCCURRED EVERY 10 TO 60 YEARS, WITH THREE OCCURRING IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1918, 1957-1958, AND 1967-1968). INFLUENZA PANDEMICS OCCUR WHEN THERE IS A NOTABLE GENETIC CHANGE (TERMED GENETIC SHIFT) IN THE CIRCULATING STRAIN OF INFLUENZA. BECAUSE OF THIS GENETIC SHIFT, A LARGE PORTION OF THE HUMAN POPULATION IS ENTIRELY VULNERABLE TO INFECTION FROM THE NEW PANDEMIC STRAIN.

THIS SCENARIO HYPOTHETICALLY RELATES WHAT COULD HAPPEN DURING THE NEXT INFLUENZA PANDEMIC WITHOUT AN EFFECTIVE PREPLANNED RESPONSE. AT LEAST TWENTY-FIVE CASES OCCUR FIRST IN A SMALL VILLAGE IN SOUTH CHINA. OVER THE NEXT 2 MONTHS, OUTBREAKS BEGIN TO APPEAR IN HONG KONG, SINGAPORE, SOUTH KOREA, AND JAPAN. ALTHOUGH CASES ARE REPORTED IN ALL AGE GROUPS, YOUNG ADULTS APPEAR TO BE THE MOST SEVERELY AFFECTED, AND CASE-FATALITY RATES APPROACH 5%. SEVERAL WEEKS LATER, THE VIRUS APPEARS IN FOUR MAJOR U.S. CITIES. BY NATURE, PANDEMIC INFLUENZA MOVES EXTREMELY RAPIDLY, AND THE OUTBREAKS CONTINUE.

TIMELINE/EVENT DYNAMICS –

WHEN PLANNING AND PREPARING FOR THE NEXT INFLUENZA PANDEMIC, THERE ARE TWO EQUALLY IMPORTANT TIMELINES. DUE TO THE RAPID SPREAD OF THE INFLUENZA PANDEMIC AND THE TIME REQUIRED TO DEVELOP, TEST, PRODUCE, AND DISTRIBUTE AN EFFECTIVE VACCINE, THE DISEASE WILL LIKELY ARRIVE IN THE UNITED STATES BEFORE A “SIGNIFICANT” NUMBER OF PEOPLE CAN BE VACCINATED. THE IMPLICATION OF THIS IS THAT, AS PART OF ANY PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPARATION AND RESPONSE PLAN, THERE MUST BE A MECHANISM FOR ALLOCATING THE VACCINE AMONG THE POPULATION.

SECONDARY HAZARDS/EVENTS –

THE GREATEST SECONDARY HAZARD WILL BE THE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY SHORTAGES OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES (E.G., VACCINES AND ANTIVIRAL DRUGS), EQUIPMENT (E.G., MECHANICAL VENTILATORS), HOSPITAL BEDS, AND HEALTH CARE WORKERS. HAVING A DETAILED SYSTEM FOR ALLOCATING RESOURCES POTENTIALLY CAN REDUCE SUCH DIFFICULTIES. THIS SYSTEM IDEALLY SHOULD BE IN PLACE WELL BEFORE AN INFLUENZA PANDEMIC ACTUALLY OCCURS. ALSO OF PARTICULAR CONCERN IS THE REAL LIKELIHOOD THAT HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS, PARTICULARLY HOSPITALS, WILL BE OVERWHELMED. ANOTHER IMPORTANT SECONDARY HAZARD IS THE DISRUPTION THAT MIGHT OCCUR IN SOCIETY. INSTITUTIONS, SUCH AS SCHOOLS AND WORKPLACES, MAY CLOSE BECAUSE A LARGE PROPORTION OF STUDENTS OR EMPLOYEES ARE ILL. A LARGE ARRAY OF ESSENTIAL SERVICES MAY BE LIMITED BECAUSE WORKERS ARE OFF WORK DUE TO PANDEMIC INFLUENZA. TRAVEL BETWEEN CITIES AND COUNTRIES MAY BE SHARPLY REDUCED.

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KEY IMPLICATIONS:

ESTIMATES OF IMPACT ARE PROVIDED IN TABLE 3-1.

HEALTH OUTCOMES	5% GROSS ATTACK RATE (5TH - 95TH PERCENTILES),	15% GROSS ATTACK RATE (5TH - 95 TH PERCENTILES)
FATALITIES	87,000,(54,400; 122,200),	207,000(127,200; 285,300)
HOSPITALIZATIONS,	314,400 (210,400; 417,200),	733,800(491,000; 973,500)
OUTPATIENT VISITS,	18.1 MILLION (17.5; 18.7),	42.2 MILLION (40.8; 43.7)
SELF-CARE ILL,	21.3 MILLION (20.6; 21.9),	49.7 MILLION (48.2; 51.2)

*PERCENT GROSS ATTACK RATE REFERS TO THE PERCENTAGE OF THE ENTIRE U.S. POPULATION THAT WILL HAVE A CLINICAL CASE OF INFLUENZA.

NOTE: ASSUMPTIONS FOR THESE ESTIMATES ARE AVAILABLE IN THE FULL-TEXT VERSION OF THIS SCENARIO, WHICH ALSO INCLUDES AN APPENDIX 3-C THAT PROVIDES GRAPHS AND ADDITIONAL ESTIMATES.

TABLE 3-1. MEAN ESTIMATES (5TH, 95TH PERCENTILES) OF THE IMPACT OF THE NEXT INFLUENZA PANDEMIC IN THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT ANY LARGE-SCALE AND/OR EFFECTIVE INTERVENTIONS

PROPERTY DAMAGE IS MINIMAL. SERVICE DISRUPTION, HOWEVER, COULD BE SEVERE DUE TO WORKER ILLNESS. HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS WILL BE SEVERELY STRESSED, IF NOT OVERWHELMED, AND FIRST RESPONDERS ARE ALSO LIKELY TO BE SEVERELY STRAINED.

BASED ON THE ESTIMATES IN TABLE 3-1, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT, IN 1995 U.S. DOLLARS, WILL RANGE FROM \$71 BILLION (15% GROSS ATTACK RATE) TO \$166 BILLION (35% GROSS ATTACK RATE). THESE ESTIMATES INCLUDE A VALUE FOR TIME LOST FROM WORK BUT DO NOT INCLUDE ANY ESTIMATE DUE TO ECONOMIC DISRUPTION OR LONG-TERM HEALTH CARE COSTS.

MISSION AREAS ACTIVATED:

PREVENTION/DETERRENCE/PROTECTION – PREVENTION IS CURRENTLY IMPOSSIBLE. PROTECTION REQUIRES PRE-PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS, PROVIDING MORE VACCINES AND CONDUCTING MORE VACCINE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, ANTIVIRAL DRUG STOCKPILING, AND INCREASED SURVEILLANCE CAPACITY TO TRACK ILLNESS PATTERNS.

EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT/DIAGNOSIS – U.S. INFLUENZA SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS WILL BE ACTIVATED. HOWEVER, MORE INFORMATION IS NEEDED REGARDING ATTACK RATE MEASUREMENTS.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT/RESPONSE – PREPAREDNESS PLANS SHOULD CONTAIN CLEAR GUIDELINES ON SETTING PRIORITIES FOR THE USE OF SCARCE RESOURCES SUCH AS VACCINES, DRUGS, AND HOSPITAL BEDS. FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS HAVE SUCH PLANS IN PROGRESS BUT NOT ALL ARE COMPLETE.

INCIDENT/HAZARD MITIGATION – SUCCESS DEPENDS ON THE AVAILABILITY OF SCARCE RESOURCES AND HOW WELL THESE RESOURCES ARE DISTRIBUTED. TIMELY, EFFECTIVE PUBLIC INFORMATION COMMUNICATION IS ALSO IMPORTANT.

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PUBLIC PROTECTION – DUE TO LATE-ONSET SYMPTOMS AND THE RAPID RATE AT WHICH THE DISEASE SPREADS, EVACUATION AND QUARANTINE ARE NOT RECOMMENDED. PROTECTION WILL RELY ON VACCINES AND ANTIVIRAL DRUGS TO PREVENT SPREAD OF THE DISEASE.

VICTIM CARE – WILL RELY ON THE USE OF ANTIVIRAL DRUGS FOR TREATMENT. HOSPITALIZATION AND MECHANICAL VENTILATORS WILL BE NECESSARY FOR MANY AND LIKELY BE IN SHORT SUPPLY. HOWEVER, AT-HOME CARE AND OVER-THE-COUNTER MEDICATIONS MAY BE HELPFUL FOR SOME. A LARGE NUMBER OF FATALITIES WILL LIKELY OCCUR, REQUIRING MORTUARY AND BURIAL SERVICES.

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ANNEX 4: BIOLOGICAL ATTACK – PLAGUE

**RDSTF SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT EMERGENCY CONTACT REGISTRY
REGIONAL**

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

STATE AGENCY CONTACTS

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

FEDERAL AGENCY CONTACTS

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CASUALTIES	2,500 FATALITIES; 7,000 INJURIES
INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGE	NONE
EVACUATIONS/DISPLACED PERSONS	POSSIBLY
CONTAMINATION	LASTS FOR HOURS
ECONOMIC IMPACT	MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
POTENTIAL FOR MULTIPLE EVENTS	YES
RECOVERY TIMELINE	WEEKS

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SCENARIO OVERVIEW:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION –

PLAGUE IS A BACTERIUM THAT CAUSES HIGH MORTALITY IN UNTREATED CASES AND HAS EPIDEMIC POTENTIAL. IT IS BEST KNOWN AS THE CAUSE OF JUSTINIAN'S PLAGUE (IN THE MIDDLE SIXTH CENTURY) AND THE BLACK DEATH (IN THE MIDDLE FOURTEENTH CENTURY), TWO PANDEMICS THAT KILLED MILLIONS. IN THIS SCENARIO, MEMBERS OF THE UNIVERSAL ADVERSARY (UA) RELEASE PNEUMONIC PLAGUE INTO THREE MAIN AREAS OF A MAJOR METROPOLITAN CITY – IN THE BATHROOMS OF THE CITY'S MAJOR AIRPORT, AT THE CITY'S MAIN SPORTS ARENA, AND AT THE CITY'S MAJOR TRAIN STATION.

TIMELINE/EVENT DYNAMICS –

PLAGUE CASES RAPIDLY OCCUR IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA. AS A RESULT OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC TRAVEL, RAPID DISSEMINATION TO DISTANT LOCATIONS OCCURS. BY DAY 3, THE PLAGUE SPREADS ACROSS BOTH THE PACIFIC AND ATLANTIC OCEANS AND BY DAY 4, THE PLAGUE IS CONFIRMED IN ELEVEN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA.

SECONDARY HAZARDS/EVENTS –

AS THE FINANCIAL WORLD IN MAJOR CITY AND ELSEWHERE BEGINS TO REALIZE THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN EPIDEMIC, A HUGE SELL-OFF OCCURS IN THE MARKETS. THERE IS A HIGH ABSENTEE RATE AT BANKS, OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND MAJOR CORPORATIONS. ADDING TO THESE COMPLICATIONS IS THE FACT THAT BANK AND OTHER FINANCIAL CUSTOMERS MAY BE STAYING HOME. AS A RESULT, THE PHONE SYSTEMS AT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS MAY BECOME COMPLETELY TIED UP, WITH FAR FEWER TRANSACTIONS THAN NORMAL OCCURRING. THE FEAR OF PLAGUE HAS RAISED MEMORIES OF THE ANTHRAX INCIDENTS OF 2001, WHICH MAY CAUSE MANY CITIZENS TO BE AFRAID TO OPEN THEIR MAIL.

KEY IMPLICATIONS:

MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY TOTALS BY THE END OF THE FOURTH DAY ARE INDICATED IN TABLE 4-1. ALTHOUGH THE SPECIFIC ASSUMPTIONS THAT UNDERLIE THESE TOTALS ARE NOT GENERALLY AVAILABLE, NOR CAN THEY BE RELIABLY RECREATED, THE PARAMETERS AFFECTING THESE FIGURES INCLUDE LENGTH OF INCUBATION PERIOD FOLLOWING PRIMARY EXPOSURE, RATE OF SECONDARY TRANSMISSION, INCUBATION PERIOD FOLLOWING SECONDARY EXPOSURE, AND TIMING AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERVENTION.

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ILLNESSES AND FATALITIES BY COUNTRY

Illnesses and Fatalities by Country		
	ILLNESSES	FATALITIES
UNITED STATES	7,348	2,287
CANADA	787	246
OTHER COUNTRIES	33	10
TOTAL	8,168	2,543

TABLE 4-1. TOTAL ILLNESSES AND FATALITIES BY COUNTRY BY THE END OF THE FOURTH DAY

ALTHOUGH THE ACTUAL PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO PROPERTY WILL BE NEGLIGIBLE, THERE WILL BE AN ASSOCIATED NEGATIVE IMPACT OF BUILDINGS AND AREAS THAT WERE OR COULD HAVE BEEN CONTAMINATED. SERVICE DISRUPTION WILL BE SIGNIFICANT FOR CALL CENTERS, PHARMACIES, AND HOSPITALS DUE TO OVERWHELMING CASUALTY NEEDS. IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO CLOSE OR RESTRICT CERTAIN TRANSPORTATION MODES. THE THREAT OF REDUCED FOOD SUPPLY WILL CAUSE FOOD PRICES TO RISE.

A HUGE SELL-OFF IN THE ECONOMIC MARKETS IS POSSIBLE, AND LOSS OF LIFE WILL RESULT IN A DECLINE IN CONSUMER SPENDING AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF REVENUE IN THE METROPOLITAN AREA. AN OVERALL NATIONAL ECONOMIC DOWNTURN IS POSSIBLE IN THE WAKE OF THE ATTACK DUE TO LOSS OF CONSUMER CONFIDENCE.

MANY PEOPLE WILL BE KILLED, PERMANENTLY DISABLED, OR SICK AS A RESULT OF THE PLAGUE. THE PRIMARY ILLNESS WILL BE PNEUMONIA, ALTHOUGH THE PLAGUE CAN ALSO CAUSE SEPTICEMIA, CIRCULATORY COMPLICATIONS, AND OTHER MANIFESTATIONS. THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF ANTIMICROBIAL PROPHYLAXIS IN LARGE NUMBERS WILL REQUIRE FOLLOW-UP STUDY. THE ASSOCIATED MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES RELATING TO MASS TRAUMA AND TERRORISM EVENTS WILL ALSO REQUIRE ASSESSMENT.

MISSION AREAS ACTIVATED:

PREVENTION/DETERRENCE/PROTECTION – THIS AREA REQUIRES KNOWLEDGE OF PERSONS WITH THE SKILLS TO GROW AND AEROSOLIZE PLAGUE, RECONNAISSANCE OF SUPPLIES AND LABORATORIES, AND PUBLIC HEALTH PROTECTION MEASURES.

EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT/DIAGNOSIS – ALTHOUGH HEALTH PROFESSIONALS SHOULD RAPIDLY RECOGNIZE THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE INCIDENT, DIAGNOSIS OF THE PLAGUE MAY BE DELAYED. DETECTION OF THE PLAGUE SHOULD INITIATE LABORATORY IDENTIFICATION OF THE STRAIN AND A DETERMINATION OF THE POTENTIALLY KNOWN ANTIMICROBIAL DRUG RESISTANCE. ORIGIN OF THE INITIAL CONTAMINANT SHOULD BE TRACED BACK TO THE SOURCE.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT/RESPONSE – IDENTIFICATION OF DRUG-RESISTANT PLAGUE STRAINS WOULD REQUIRE FULL UTILIZATION OF PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE) AND

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QUARANTINE MEASURES. RESPONSE WILL REQUIRE PROVISION OF PUBLIC ALERTS, MOBILIZATION OF THE NATIONAL STRATEGIC STOCKPILE, ACTIVATION OF TREATMENT SITES, TRAFFIC AND ACCESS CONTROL, PROTECTION OF SPECIAL POPULATIONS, POTENTIAL QUARANTINE MEASURES INCLUDING SHELTER-IN-PLACE RECOMMENDATIONS, REQUESTS FOR RESOURCES AND ASSISTANCE, AND PUBLIC INFORMATION ACTIVITIES. EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION BETWEEN U.S. AND CANADIAN GOVERNMENTS IS VITAL.

INCIDENT/HAZARD MITIGATION – VICTIMS MUST RECEIVE ANTIBIOTIC THERAPY WITHIN 24 HOURS TO PREVENT FATALITY. EXPOSED VICTIMS MUST BE ISOLATED AND MINIMIZING DISEASE SPREAD WILL REQUIRE EPIDEMIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENTS, INCLUDING CONTACT INVESTIGATION AND NOTIFICATION.

PUBLIC PROTECTION – VICTIMS MUST BE EVACUATED AND TREATED (AND/OR SELF-QUARANTINED), AND ANTIMICROBIAL PROPHYLAXIS WILL BE NECESSARY FOR EXPOSED PERSONS, RESPONDERS, AND PERTINENT HEALTH CARE WORKERS. MOBILIZATION OF THE STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE FOR ADDITIONAL CRITICAL SUPPLIES AND ANTIBIOTICS WILL BE NECESSARY. THE PUBLIC SHOULD BE INFORMED OF SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS OF PLAGUE.

VICTIM CARE – VICTIMS WILL REQUIRE TREATMENT OR PROPHYLAXIS WITH VENTILATORS AND ANTIBIOTICS, AS WELL AS INFORMATION MEASURES FOR PREVENTING SPREAD OF THE DISEASE. ADVANCED HOSPITAL CARE WILL BE REQUIRED FOR THOSE WITH PNEUMONIA. THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS WILL NEED TO BE INVOLVED IN ORDER TO ASSIST FOREIGN POPULATIONS RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES, OR U.S. CITIZENS EXPOSED OR ILL ABROAD.

INVESTIGATION/APPREHENSION – POINT-OF-SOURCE EXPOSURES AND PLAGUE STRAIN MUST BE DETERMINED USING VICTIM TRACE-BACK, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, AND LABORATORY ANALYSES.

RECOVERY/REMEDIATION – EXTENSIVE DECONTAMINATION AND CLEANUP WILL NOT BE NECESSARY BECAUSE PLAGUE CANNOT LIVE LONG IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND IS VIABLE TO HEAT AND SUNLIGHT EXPOSURE. HOWEVER, SOME EFFORTS SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN TO SUPPORT POLITICAL/PUBLIC CONFIDENCE.

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ANNEX 5: CHEMICAL ATTACK – BLISTER AGENT

**RDSTF SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT EMERGENCY CONTACT REGISTRY
 REGIONAL**

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

STATE AGENCY CONTACTS

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

FEDERAL AGENCY CONTACTS

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CASUALTIES	150 FATALITIES; 70,000 HOSPITALIZED
INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGE	MINIMAL
EVACUATIONS/DISPLACED PERSONS	MORE THAN 100,000
CONTAMINATION	STRUCTURES AFFECTED
ECONOMIC IMPACT	\$500 MILLION
POTENTIAL FOR MULTIPLE EVENTS	YES
RECOVERY TIMELINE	WEEKS; MANY LONG-TERM HEALTH AFFECTS

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SCENARIO OVERVIEW:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION –

AGENT YELLOW, WHICH IS A MIXTURE OF THE BLISTER AGENTS SULFUR MUSTARD AND LEWISITE, IS A LIQUID WITH A GARLIC-LIKE ODOR. INDIVIDUALS WHO BREATHE THIS MIXTURE MAY EXPERIENCE DAMAGE TO THE RESPIRATORY SYSTEM. CONTACT WITH THE SKIN OR EYE CAN RESULT IN SERIOUS BURNS. LEWISITE OR MUSTARD-LEWISITE ALSO CAN CAUSE DAMAGE TO BONE MARROW AND BLOOD VESSELS. EXPOSURE TO HIGH LEVELS MAY BE FATAL.

IN THIS SCENARIO, THE UNIVERSAL ADVERSARY (UA) USES A LIGHT AIRCRAFT TO SPRAY CHEMICAL AGENT YELLOW INTO A PACKED COLLEGE FOOTBALL STADIUM. THE AGENT DIRECTLY CONTAMINATES THE STADIUM AND THE IMMEDIATE SURROUNDING AREA, AND GENERATES A DOWNWIND VAPOR HAZARD. THE ATTACK CAUSES A LARGE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES THAT REQUIRE URGENT AND LONG-TERM MEDICAL TREATMENT, BUT FEW IMMEDIATE FATALITIES OCCUR. OF THE TOTAL STADIUM ATTENDANCE, 70% IS EXPOSED TO THE LIQUID AT THE TIME OF THE ATTACK. THE REMAINING 30% (I.E., THOSE IN THE COVERED AREAS OF THE STADIUM), PLUS 10% OF THE TOTAL POPULATION IN THE VAPOR HAZARD AREA, ARE EXPOSED TO VAPOR CONTAMINATION.

TIMELINE/EVENT DYNAMICS –

THE TOTAL TIME OF THE ATTACK, INCLUDING THE LAST MILE OF THE PLANE'S APPROACH, IS LESS THAN 5 MINUTES. THE CROWD WILL PANIC AND IMMEDIATELY EVACUATE THE STADIUM, WHICH WILL REQUIRE UP TO 30 MINUTES. FIRST RESPONDERS SHOULD BEGIN ARRIVING AT THE FACILITY PERIMETER WITHIN 10 TO 15 MINUTES OF THE ATTACK. IN ORDER FOR THE UA TO SUCCEED IN THIS ATTACK, CERTAIN METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS – WIND SPEED, TEMPERATURE, HUMIDITY, AND PRECIPITATION – MUST BE MET.

SECONDARY HAZARDS/EVENTS –

NUMEROUS INJURIES WILL OCCUR AS A RESULT OF CROWD PANIC, INCLUDING THOSE THAT RESULT FROM FALLING AND CRUSHING. FURTHER INJURIES ARE LIKELY TO OCCUR DUE TO MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS IN THE PARKING LOT AND SURROUNDING ROADWAYS.

KEY IMPLICATIONS:

IN THE CASE OF A FULL, 100,000-SEAT STADIUM, 70,000 PEOPLE (70%) MAY BE CONTAMINATED IN THE ATTACK. OF THESE, MOST WILL HAVE ONLY CLOTHING AND/OR SKIN CONTAMINATION, RESULTING IN MODERATE-TO-SEVERE SKIN BLISTERS THAT WILL APPEAR IN 2 TO 12 HOURS. EXPEDIENT DECONTAMINATION (I.E., CLOTHING REMOVAL AND HEAVY WATER SPRAY) WILL AVOID HALF OF THESE INJURIES. SYSTEMIC ARSENIC POISONING WILL OCCUR IN HIGHLY CONTAMINATED INDIVIDUALS. HOWEVER, MANY WILL INHALE SUFFICIENT AGENT VAPOR TO CAUSE SEVERE LUNG DAMAGE, AND MANY MORE WILL SUSTAIN PERMANENT DAMAGE TO THE EYES. FATALITIES AND MAJOR INJURIES WILL OCCUR DUE TO FALLING AND CRUSHING DURING

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THE EVACUATION, AND TO VEHICLE ACCIDENTS.

THERE WILL BE LITTLE DIRECT PROPERTY DAMAGE DUE TO THE ATTACK. HOWEVER, THE STADIUM SITE AND OTHER CONTAMINATED PROPERTY WILL BE A TOTAL LOSS DUE TO DECONTAMINATION MEASURES AND/OR PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF FUTURE USABILITY. LOSS OF USE OF THE STADIUM AND ADJACENT ATHLETIC FACILITIES IS EXPECTED.

ADDITIONALLY, SOME PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION AND OTHER FACILITIES MAY BE LOST DUE TO CONTAMINATION CARRIED BY FLEEING VICTIMS. OVERWHELMING DEMAND WILL DISRUPT COMMUNICATIONS (LANDLINE TELEPHONE AND CELLULAR) IN THE LOCAL AREA. FINALLY, SOME VICTIMS MAY SELF-TRANSPORT TO HEALTH CARE FACILITIES AND CONTAMINATE THOSE FACILITIES.

DECONTAMINATION, DESTRUCTION, DISPOSAL, AND REPLACEMENT OF A MAJOR STADIUM COULD COST UP TO \$500 MILLION. ENROLLMENT AT THE COLLEGE WILL BE NEGATIVELY AFFECTED, AND THE LOCAL COMMUNITY WILL EXPERIENCE SIGNIFICANT LOSSES RESULTING FROM THE ATTACK. ADDITIONALLY, AN OVERALL NATIONAL ECONOMIC DOWNTURN IS POSSIBLE IN THE WAKE OF THE ATTACK DUE TO A LOSS OF CONSUMER CONFIDENCE. MANY WILL BE PERMANENTLY BLINDED AND MANY MORE WILL CARRY LIFETIME SCARS. MANY MAY SUFFER SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE TO THE LUNGS. IN ADDITION, MUSTARD IS A KNOWN CARCINOGEN, AND SYSTEMIC POISONING FROM THE ARSENIC IN LEWISITE IS ALSO A CONCERN.

MISSION AREAS ACTIVATED:

PREVENTION/DETERRENCE/PROTECTION – THE ABILITY TO PREVENT THE ATTACK IS CONTINGENT ON THE PREVENTION OF CHEMICAL WARFARE MATERIAL (CWM) IMPORTATION, WEAPON ASSEMBLY, PLANE AND PILOT ACQUISITION, AND SITE RECONNAISSANCE.

EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT/DIAGNOSIS – HAZARDOUS MATERIAL (HAZMAT) TEAMS SHOULD INSTANTLY RECOGNIZE THE ATTACK. LIQUID CONTAMINATION AND A DOWNWIND VAPOR HAZARD WILL BE COMPONENTS OF THE HAZARD. ACTIONS REQUIRED INCLUDE DISPATCH; AGENT DETECTION; AND HAZARD ASSESSMENT, PREDICTION, MONITORING, AND SAMPLING.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT/RESPONSE – ACTIONS REQUIRED INCLUDE ALERTS, ACTIVATION AND NOTIFICATION, TRAFFIC AND ACCESS CONTROL, PROTECTION OF SPECIAL POPULATIONS, RESOURCE SUPPORT AND REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE, AND PUBLIC INFORMATION ACTIVITIES.

INCIDENT/HAZARD MITIGATION – THE SPREAD OF CONTAMINATION BY FLEEING VICTIMS WILL BE A MAJOR CHALLENGE. ACTIONS REQUIRED INCLUDE ISOLATING AND DEFINING THE HAZARD; ESTABLISHING, PLANNING, AND OPERATING INCIDENT COMMAND; PRESERVING THE SCENE; CONDUCTING MITIGATION EFFORTS; DECONTAMINATING RESPONDERS; AND CONDUCTING SITE REMEDIATION AND MONITORING.

PUBLIC PROTECTION – EVACUATION AND/OR SHELTERING OF DOWNWIND POPULATIONS IN A 360-DEGREE ARC AROUND THE STADIUM WILL BE REQUIRED UNTIL THE STADIUM IS DECONTAMINATED.

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VICTIM CARE – TENS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE WILL REQUIRE DECONTAMINATION AND BOTH SHORT- AND LONG-TERM MEDICAL TREATMENT.

INVESTIGATION/APPREHENSION – ACTIONS REQUIRED INCLUDE AIRCRAFT TRACKING, DISPATCH, SITE CONTROL, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, TACTICAL DEPLOYMENT, AND SUSPECT APPREHENSION.

RECOVERY/REMEDIATION – THE STADIUM AND ADJACENT FACILITIES MUST BE DECONTAMINATED OF LIQUID AGENT YELLOW. DECONTAMINATION WASTE DISPOSAL IS COMPLICATED BY THE PRESENCE OF ARSENIC. ENVIRONMENTAL TESTING MUST BE DONE.

ALTHOUGH DECONTAMINATION COULD TECHNICALLY RESTORE THE STADIUM, PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT WILL LIKELY REQUIRE THE STADIUM TO BE REBUILT.

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ANNEX 6: CHEMICAL ATTACK – TOXIC INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS

**RDSTF SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT EMERGENCY CONTACT REGISTRY
REGIONAL**

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

STATE AGENCY CONTACTS

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

FEDERAL AGENCY CONTACTS

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CASUALTIES	350 FATALITIES; 1,000 HOSPITALIZATIONS
INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGE	50% OF STRUCTURES IN AREA OF EXPLOSION
EVACUATIONS/DISPLACED PERSONS	UP TO 700,000
CONTAMINATION	YES
ECONOMIC IMPACT	BILLIONS OF DOLLARS
POTENTIAL FOR MULTIPLE EVENTS	YES
RECOVERY TIMELINE	MONTHS

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SCENARIO OVERVIEW:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION –

IN THIS SCENARIO, TERRORISTS FROM THE UNIVERSAL ADVERSARY (UA) LAND IN SEVERAL HELICOPTERS AT FIXED FACILITY PETROLEUM REFINERIES. THEY QUICKLY LAUNCH ROCKET-PROPELLED GRENADES (RPGs) AND PLANT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (IEDs) BEFORE RE-BOARDING AND DEPARTING, RESULTING IN MAJOR FIRES. AT THE SAME TIME, MULTIPLE CARGO CONTAINERS AT A NEARBY PORT EXPLODE ABOARD OR NEAR SEVERAL CARGO SHIPS WITH RESULTING FIRES. TWO OF THE SHIPS CONTAIN FLAMMABLE LIQUIDS OR SOLIDS. THE WIND IS HEADED IN THE NORTH-NORTHEAST DIRECTION, AND THERE IS A LARGE, HEAVY PLUME OF SMOKE DRIFTING INTO HEAVILY POPULATED AREAS AND RELEASING VARIOUS METALS INTO THE AIR. ONE OF THE BURNING SHIPS IN THE PORT CONTAINS RESINS AND COATINGS INCLUDING ISOCYANIDES, NITRIDES, AND EPOXY RESINS. SOME IEDs ARE SET FOR DELAYED DETONATION. CASUALTIES OCCUR ONSITE DUE TO EXPLOSIVE BLAST AND FRAGMENTATION, FIRE, AND VAPOR/LIQUID EXPOSURE TO THE TOXIC INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL (TIC). DOWNWIND CASUALTIES OCCUR DUE TO VAPOR EXPOSURE.

TIMELINE/EVENT DYNAMICS –

TOTAL TIME TO PLAN AND PREPARE FOR THE ATTACK WOULD BE ON THE ORDER OF 2 YEARS, INCLUDING RECONNAISSANCE, PILOT AND WEAPONS TRAINING, AND ACCUMULATION OF WEAPONS. TIME TO EXECUTE THE ATTACK WOULD BE SEVERAL WEEKS TO COORDINATE THE SHIPPING AND COINCIDENT ARRIVAL OF THE CONTAINERS ABOARD SEPARATE SHIPS AT THE PORT. TIME TO EXECUTE THE AIRBORNE PHASE OF THE ATTACK WOULD BE ON THE ORDER OF 1 TO 2 HOURS FROM LIFTOFF FROM THE ORIGINATING AIRPORT. TIME OVER TARGET FOR THE HELICOPTERS WOULD BE ABOUT 10 MINUTES. TIME ON THE GROUND WOULD BE 2 TO 3 MINUTES AT EACH SITE. FIRES RESULTING FROM THE ATTACK WOULD TAKE MANY HOURS, POSSIBLY DAYS, TO EXTINGUISH. IN ORDER FOR THE UA TO SUCCEED IN THIS ATTACK, CERTAIN METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS – WIND SPEED, TEMPERATURE, HUMIDITY, AND PRECIPITATION – MUST BE MET.

SECONDARY HAZARDS/EVENTS –

ONCE THEY GRASP THE SITUATION, AUTHORITIES WILL EVACUATE OR ORDER SHELTER-IN-PLACE FOR A SIGNIFICANT AREA DOWNWIND OF THE REFINERIES AND THE PORT. NUMEROUS INJURIES WILL OCCUR AS A RESULT OF POPULATION PANIC ONCE DOWNWIND CASUALTIES BEGIN TO OCCUR. FURTHER INJURIES ARE LIKELY TO OCCUR DUE TO MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS IN THE SURROUNDING ROADWAYS. (THE RULE OF THUMB IS ONE FATALITY PER 10,000 EVACUATED.) SIGNIFICANT CONTAMINATION OF THE WATERWAY MAY ALSO RESULT, INCLUDING OIL AND CARGO SPILLS FROM SUNK OR BURNING SHIPS.

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KEY IMPLICATIONS:

ASSUMING A DENSELY POPULATED AREA, 7,000 PEOPLE MAY BE IN THE ACTUAL DOWNWIND AREA. OF THESE, 5% (350) WILL RECEIVE LETHAL EXPOSURES, AND HALF OF THESE WILL DIE BEFORE OR DURING TREATMENT. AN ADDITIONAL 15% WILL REQUIRE HOSPITALIZATION, AND THE REMAINDER WILL BE TREATED AND RELEASED AT THE SCENE BY EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICE (EMS) PERSONNEL. HOWEVER, APPROXIMATELY 70,000 "WORRIED WELL" MAY SEEK TREATMENT AT LOCAL MEDICAL FACILITIES.

ALL THREE REFINERIES SUSTAIN SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE, WITH 50% OF THE EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES REQUIRING SIGNIFICANT REPAIRS OR REPLACEMENT. TWO SHIPS IN THE PORT SINK AT THEIR MOORINGS; THE PORT SUSTAINS HEAVY DAMAGE NEAR THE SHIPS AND AT A DOZEN POINTS WHERE IEDS WERE DROPPED. DEPENDING ON WHICH CHEMICALS ARE RELEASED, THERE MAY BE SIGNIFICANT PROPERTY DAMAGE IN THE DOWNWIND AREA.

REFINERY CAPACITY ON THE WEST COAST IS SIGNIFICANTLY DIMINISHED, RESULTING IN FUEL SHORTAGES AND PRICE INCREASES. THE PORT IS TEMPORARILY CLOSED DUE TO DAMAGE AND CONTAMINATION. CONTAMINATION IN THE WATERWAY MAY ALSO RESULT. SOME PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION AND OTHER FACILITIES MAY BE LOST. OVERWHELMING DEMAND WILL DISRUPT COMMUNICATIONS (LANDLINE TELEPHONE AND CELLULAR) IN THE LOCAL AREA. SIGNIFICANT DISRUPTIONS IN HEALTH CARE OCCUR DUE TO THE OVERWHELMING DEMAND OF THE INJURED AND THE "WORRIED WELL."

DECONTAMINATION, DESTRUCTION, DISPOSAL, AND REPLACEMENT OF MAJOR PORTIONS OF THE REFINERIES COULD COST BILLIONS OF DOLLARS. SIMILAR COSTS COULD BE EXPECTED AT THE PORT. LOSS OF THE PORT WILL HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE WITH THE PACIFIC RIM. AN OVERALL NATIONAL ECONOMIC DOWNTURN IS POSSIBLE IN THE WAKE OF THE ATTACK DUE TO A LOSS OF CONSUMER CONFIDENCE.

IN ADDITION TO THEIR TOXIC EFFECTS, MANY TICs ARE KNOWN CARCINOGENS. LONG-TERM DAMAGE TO INTERNAL ORGANS AND EYES IS POSSIBLE, DEPENDING ON WHICH TICs ARE PRESENT.

MISSION AREAS ACTIVATED:

PREVENTION/DETERRENCE/PROTECTION – AVOIDING AN ATTACK WOULD REQUIRE PREVENTION OF AIRCRAFT AND WEAPONS ACQUISITION, IED ASSEMBLY, AND SITE RECONNAISSANCE.

EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT/DIAGNOSIS – THE PRESENCE OF MULTIPLE CHEMICALS AND EXPOSURE SYMPTOMS WILL GREATLY COMPLICATE ASSESSMENT AND IDENTIFICATION EFFORTS. ACTIONS REQUIRED INCLUDE DISPATCH; TIC DETECTION; AND HAZARD ASSESSMENT, PREDICTION, MONITORING, AND SAMPLING.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT/RESPONSE – ACTIONS REQUIRED INCLUDE ALERTS, ACTIVATION AND NOTIFICATION, TRAFFIC AND ACCESS CONTROL, PROTECTION OF SPECIAL POPULATIONS, RESOURCE SUPPORT AND REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE, AND PUBIC INFORMATION ACTIVITIES.

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INCIDENT/HAZARD MITIGATION – MITIGATION MEASURES WILL BE COMPLICATED BY MULTIPLE TICs AND SECONDARY DEVICE CONCERNS. ACTIONS REQUIRED INCLUDE ISOLATING AND DEFINING THE HAZARD; ESTABLISHING, PLANNING, AND OPERATING INCIDENT COMMAND; FIREFIGHTING; PERFORMING BOMB DISPOSAL DISPATCH AND IED RENDER-SAFE PROCEDURES; PRESERVING THE SCENE; CONDUCTING MITIGATION EFFORTS; DECONTAMINATING RESPONDERS; AND PERFORMING SITE REMEDIATION AND MONITORING.

PUBLIC PROTECTION – EVACUATION AND/OR SHELTERING OF DOWNWIND POPULATIONS WILL BE REQUIRED.

VICTIM CARE – INJURIES TO BE TREATED WILL INCLUDE TRAUMA, BURNS, SMOKE INHALATION, SEVERE RESPIRATORY DISTRESS, SEIZURES, AND/OR COMAS. SHORT- AND LONG-TERM TREATMENT WILL BE REQUIRED AS WELL AS DECONTAMINATION.

INVESTIGATION/APPREHENSION – SEARCHING FOR SUSPECTS AND EVIDENCE IN AN INDUSTRIAL AREA WHILE WEARING PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE) WILL BE A SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGE. ACTIONS REQUIRED INCLUDE DISPATCH, SITE CONTROL, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, PURSUIT AND TACTICAL DEPLOYMENT, AND APPREHENSION OF SUSPECTS.

RECOVERY/REMEDIATION – THE EXTENT OF DECONTAMINATION REQUIRED WILL DEPEND ON THE TIC. REGARDLESS, MONITORING AND SAMPLING A LARGE INDUSTRIAL PORT FACILITY AND REFINERIES WILL BE A CHALLENGE. SITE RESTORATION WILL BE A MAJOR CHALLENGE, PARTICULARLY FOR THE REFINERIES. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ISSUES ARE LIKELY TO SIGNIFICANTLY DELAY REBUILDING EFFORTS.

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ANNEX 7: CHEMICAL ATTACK – NERVE AGENT

**RDSTF SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT EMERGENCY CONTACT REGISTRY
REGIONAL**

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

STATE AGENCY CONTACTS

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

FEDERAL AGENCY CONTACTS

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CASUALTIES	6,000 FATALITIES (95% OF BUILDING OCCUPANTS); 350 INJURIES
INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGE	MINIMAL, OTHER THAN CONTAMINATION
EVACUATIONS/DISPLACED PERSONS	YES
CONTAMINATION	EXTENSIVE
ECONOMIC IMPACT	\$300 MILLION
POTENTIAL FOR MULTIPLE EVENTS	EXTENSIVE
RECOVERY TIMELINE	3 TO 4 MONTHS

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SCENARIO OVERVIEW:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION –

SARIN IS A HUMAN-MADE CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENT CLASSIFIED AS A NERVE AGENT. NERVE AGENTS ARE THE MOST TOXIC AND RAPIDLY ACTING OF THE KNOWN CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS. SARIN IS A CLEAR, COLORLESS, AND TASTELESS LIQUID THAT HAS NO ODOR IN ITS PURE FORM. HOWEVER, SARIN CAN EVAPORATE INTO A VAPOR AND SPREAD INTO THE ENVIRONMENT. SARIN IS ALSO KNOWN AS GB.

IN THIS SCENARIO, THE UNIVERSAL ADVERSARY (UA) BUILDS SIX SPRAY DISSEMINATION DEVICES AND RELEASES SARIN VAPOR INTO THE VENTILATION SYSTEMS OF THREE LARGE COMMERCIAL OFFICE BUILDINGS IN A METROPOLITAN AREA. THE AGENT KILLS 95% OF THE PEOPLE IN THE BUILDINGS, AND KILLS OR SICKENS MANY OF THE FIRST RESPONDERS. IN ADDITION, SOME OF THE AGENT EXITS THROUGH ROOFTOP VENTILATION STACKS, CREATING A DOWNWIND HAZARD.

FOR PURPOSES OF ESTIMATING FEDERAL RESPONSE REQUIREMENTS, EACH BUILDING IS ASSUMED TO HAVE AN OCCUPANCY OF 2,000 PERSONNEL (I.E., TWENTY-STORY BUILDINGS WITH 100 OCCUPANTS PER FLOOR), AND THE OUTDOOR/SUBWAY POPULATION DENSITY OF THE SURROUNDING AREAS IS 3,900 PEOPLE PER SQUARE MILE (ONE-TENTH OF THE TOTAL POPULATION DENSITY IN THE VICINITY OF TIMES SQUARE, NEW YORK).

TIMELINE/EVENT DYNAMICS –

THE ATTACK WILL REQUIRE SIX MONTHS TO PLAN, INCLUDING PUTTING FAUX JANITORS IN PLACE, SHIPPING THE AGENT, AND FABRICATING THE SPRAY DEVICES. THE ACTUAL ATTACK WILL TAKE LESS THAN 10 MINUTES. FIRST RESPONDERS SHOULD ARRIVE AT THE FACILITY WITHIN 10 TO 15 MINUTES OF THE ATTACK. IN ORDER FOR THE UA TO SUCCEED IN THIS ATTACK, CERTAIN METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS – WIND SPEED, TEMPERATURE, HUMIDITY, AND PRECIPITATION – MUST BE MET.

SECONDARY HAZARDS/EVENTS –

NUMEROUS INJURIES WILL OCCUR AS A RESULT OF PANIC ON THE STREET, INCLUDING FALLING AND CRUSHING INJURIES. FURTHER INJURIES ARE LIKELY TO OCCUR DUE TO MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS IN THE SURROUNDING ROADWAYS.

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KEY IMPLICATIONS:

ASSUMING 2,000 OCCUPANTS PER BUILDING, THE INITIAL FATALITY COUNT WILL BE 5,700 (95%) AND 300 INJURED, INCLUDING THE INITIAL EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICE (EMS) AND FIRE PERSONNEL AT EACH BUILDING. PATIENTS WHO EXPERIENCE PROLONGED SEIZURES MAY SUSTAIN PERMANENT DAMAGE TO THE CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM – ASSUME 350 PATIENTS IN THIS CATEGORY (300 INSIDE PLUS 50 OUTSIDE). FATALITIES AND MAJOR INJURIES WILL OCCUR DUE TO FALLING AND CRUSHING DURING THE PANIC ON THE STREET, AND DUE TO VEHICLE ACCIDENTS.

LITTLE DIRECT DAMAGE DUE TO THE ATTACK, EXCEPT THE BUILDING INTERIORS AND CONTENTS, WILL BE HIGHLY CONTAMINATED BY AGENT CONDENSING ON SURFACES. THE THREE BUILDINGS AND THEIR CONTENTS WILL BE A TOTAL LOSS DUE TO DECONTAMINATION MEASURES AND/OR PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF FUTURE USABILITY. HOWEVER, AIRING AND WASHING SHOULD DECONTAMINATE ADJACENT STRUCTURES ADEQUATELY.

OVERWHELMING DEMAND WILL DISRUPT COMMUNICATIONS (LANDLINE TELEPHONE AND CELLULAR) IN THE LOCAL AREA. THERE WILL BE LARGE NUMBERS OF “WORRIED WELL” SWAMPING THE MEDICAL SYSTEM. LOSS OF THREE FIRE CREWS AND THREE EMS CREWS WILL IMPACT READINESS FOR OTHER EVENTS IN THE SHORT TERM.

DECONTAMINATION, DESTRUCTION, DISPOSAL, AND REPLACEMENT OF THREE LARGE COMMERCIAL OFFICE BUILDINGS COULD COST UP TO \$300 MILLION. BUSINESS IN THE BUILDINGS MAY NEVER REOPEN, AND AN OVERALL NATIONAL ECONOMIC DOWNTURN IS POSSIBLE IN THE WAKE OF THE ATTACK DUE TO LOSS OF CONSUMER CONFIDENCE.

THOSE WHO SURVIVE USUALLY RECOVER WITHIN 4 TO 6 WEEKS, WITH FULL CHOLINESTERASE LEVEL RESTORATION WITHIN 3 TO 4 MONTHS. PATIENTS WHO EXPERIENCE PROLONGED SEIZURES MAY SUSTAIN PERMANENT DAMAGE TO THE CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM.

MISSION AREAS ACTIVATED:

PREVENTION/DETERRENCE/PROTECTION – THE ABILITY TO PREVENT THE ATTACK IS CONTINGENT ON THE PREVENTION OF CWM IMPORTATION, WEAPONS ASSEMBLY, AND SITE RECONNAISSANCE.

EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT/DIAGNOSIS – RAPID RECOGNITION OF AN ATTACK WILL BE KEY TO AVOIDING FIRST RESPONDER CASUALTIES. ACTIONS REQUIRED INCLUDE DISPATCH; AGENT DETECTION; AND HAZARD ASSESSMENT, PREDICTION, MONITORING, AND SAMPLING.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT/RESPONSE – ACTIONS REQUIRED INCLUDE ALERTS, ACTIVATION AND NOTIFICATION, TRAFFIC AND ACCESS CONTROL, PROTECTION OF SPECIAL POPULATIONS, RESOURCE SUPPORT AND REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE, AND PUBIC INFORMATION ACTIVITIES.

INCIDENT/HAZARD MITIGATION – ACTIONS REQUIRED INCLUDE ISOLATING AND DEFINING THE

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HAZARD; ESTABLISHING, PLANNING, AND OPERATING INCIDENT COMMAND; PRESERVING THE SCENE; CONDUCTING MITIGATION EFFORTS; DECONTAMINATING RESPONDERS, AND CONDUCTING SITE REMEDIATION AND MONITORING.

PUBLIC PROTECTION – EVACUATION AND/OR SHELTERING OF DOWNWIND POPULATIONS WILL BE REQUIRED.

VICTIM CARE – TENS OF THOUSANDS OF PERSONS WILL REQUIRE MONITORING AND DECONTAMINATION AS THEY ARE ALLOWED TO LEAVE THEIR BUILDINGS. HUNDREDS WILL REQUIRE HOSPITAL TREATMENT.

INVESTIGATION/APPREHENSION – TRACKING AND APPREHENSION OF THE SUSPECTS WILL BE INCLUDED. ACTIONS REQUIRED INCLUDE SUSPECT TRACKING AND APPREHENSION, DISPATCH, SITE CONTROL, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, AND TACTICAL DEPLOYMENT.

RECOVERY/REMEDIATION – ANYTHING EXPOSED TO A HIGH-VAPOR AGENT CONCENTRATION WILL REQUIRE DECONTAMINATION, INCLUDING BODIES. THERE WILL BE LITTLE DAMAGE TO THE BUILDING AS A DIRECT RESULT OF THE ATTACK. HOWEVER, DECONTAMINATION OF SOME MATERIALS MAY BE DIFFICULT OR IMPOSSIBLE. EVEN IF STRUCTURES AND PROPERTY COULD BE TECHNICALLY DECONTAMINATED, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT ON FUTURE USABILITY WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT.

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ANNEX 8: CHEMICAL ATTACK – CHLORINE TANK EXPLOSION

**RDSTF SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT EMERGENCY CONTACT REGISTRY
 REGIONAL**

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

STATE AGENCY CONTACTS

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

FEDERAL AGENCY CONTACTS

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CASUALTIES	17,500 FATALITIES; 10,000 SEVERE INJURIES; 100,000 HOSPITALIZATIONS
INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGE	IN IMMEDIATE EXPLOSIONS AREAS, AND METAL CORROSION IN AREAS OF HEAVY EXPOSURE
EVACUATIONS/DISPLACED PERSONS	UP TO 70,000 (SELF EVACUATE)
CONTAMINATION	PRIMARILY AT EXPLOSION SITE, AND IF WATERWAYS ARE IMPACTED
ECONOMIC IMPACT	MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
POTENTIAL FOR MULTIPLE EVENTS	YES
RECOVERY TIMELINE	WEEKS

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SCENARIO OVERVIEW:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION –

CHLORINE GAS IS POISONOUS AND CAN BE PRESSURIZED AND COOLED TO CHANGE IT INTO A LIQUID FORM SO THAT IT CAN BE SHIPPED AND STORED. WHEN RELEASED, IT QUICKLY TURNS INTO A GAS AND STAYS CLOSE TO THE GROUND AND SPREADS RAPIDLY. CHLORINE GAS IS YELLOW-GREEN IN COLOR AND ALTHOUGH NOT FLAMMABLE ALONE, IT CAN REACT EXPLOSIVELY OR FORM EXPLOSIVE COMPOUNDS WITH OTHER CHEMICALS SUCH AS TURPENTINE OR AMMONIA.

IN THIS SCENARIO, THE UNIVERSAL ADVERSARY (UA) INFILTRATES AN INDUSTRIAL FACILITY AND STORES A LARGE QUANTITY OF CHLORINE GAS (LIQUEFIED UNDER PRESSURE). USING A LOW-ORDER EXPLOSIVE, UA RUPTURES A STORAGE TANK MAN-WAY, RELEASING A LARGE QUANTITY OF CHLORINE GAS DOWNWIND OF THE SITE. SECONDARY DEVICES ARE SET TO IMPACT FIRST RESPONDERS.

TIMELINE/EVENT DYNAMICS –

TOTAL TIME TO PLAN AND PREPARE FOR THE ATTACK WOULD BE ON THE ORDER OF 2 YEARS, INCLUDING RECONNAISSANCE AND WEAPONS TRAINING, AND ACCUMULATION OF WEAPONS. THE ACTUAL INFILTRATION, EXPLOSIVE CHARGES SETTING, AND EX-FILTRATION WOULD TAKE LESS THAN 20 MINUTES. EXCEPT IN VERY COLD CONDITIONS, THE RELEASE WOULD BE COMPLETE IN LESS THAN AN HOUR. THE PLUME WOULD TRAVEL DOWNWIND AND BE DISPERSED BELOW THE DETECTION LEVEL IN 6 HOURS. IN ORDER FOR THE UA TO SUCCEED IN THIS ATTACK, CERTAIN METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS – WIND SPEED, TEMPERATURE, HUMIDITY, AND PRECIPITATION – MUST BE MET.

SECONDARY HAZARDS/EVENTS –

AUTHORITIES WILL SHELTER-IN-PLACE A SIGNIFICANT AREA DOWNWIND OF THE SITE. NUMEROUS INJURIES WILL RESULT FROM POPULATION PANIC ONCE DOWNWIND CASUALTIES BEGIN TO OCCUR, AND AS MANY AS 10% OF THE PEOPLE WILL SELF-EVACUATE. ADDITIONAL INJURIES ARE LIKELY, DUE TO MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS IN THE SURROUNDING ROADWAYS. THE RULE OF THUMB IS ONE FATALITY PER 10,000 EVACUATED. ANY LOCAL WATERWAYS OR WETLANDS WILL ABSORB THE CHLORINE GAS, CREATING HYDROCHLORIC ACID AND LOWERING THE ACIDITY (POTENTIAL OF HYDROGEN, OR PH) OF THE WATER.

KEY IMPLICATIONS:

ASSUMING A HIGH-DENSITY AREA, AS MANY AS 700,000 PEOPLE MAY BE IN THE ACTUAL DOWNWIND AREA, WHICH COULD EXTEND AS FAR AS 25 MILES. OF THESE, 5% (35,000) WILL RECEIVE POTENTIALLY LETHAL EXPOSURES, AND HALF OF THESE WILL DIE BEFORE OR DURING TREATMENT. AN ADDITIONAL 15% WILL REQUIRE HOSPITALIZATION, AND THE REMAINDER WILL BE TREATED AND RELEASED AT THE SCENE BY EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICE (EMS) PERSONNEL. HOWEVER, APPROXIMATELY 450,000 “WORRIED WELL” WILL SEEK TREATMENT AT

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LOCAL MEDICAL FACILITIES.

THE STORAGE TANK WILL BE LOST, ALONG WITH SOME SENSITIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS DAMAGED BY THE FREEZING LIQUEFIED GAS. THE SECONDARY DEVICES WILL CAUSE DAMAGE TO OTHER PLANT FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT IN A 20-METER RADIUS OF THE BLASTS AS WELL. THERE WILL BE HUNDREDS, IF NOT THOUSANDS, OF AUTO ACCIDENTS DURING THE EVACUATION. IN AREAS OF HEAVY CHLORINE EXPOSURE, THERE WILL ALSO BE HEAVY CORROSION OF METAL OBJECTS.

THE PLANT WILL BE TEMPORARILY CLOSED DUE TO BOMB DAMAGE. OVERWHELMING DEMAND WILL DISRUPT COMMUNICATIONS (LANDLINE TELEPHONE AND CELLULAR) IN THE LOCAL AREA. SIGNIFICANT DISRUPTIONS IN HEALTH CARE OCCUR DUE TO THE OVERWHELMING DEMAND OF THE INJURED AND THE “WORRIED WELL.”

DECONTAMINATION, DESTRUCTION, DISPOSAL, AND REPLACEMENT OF MAJOR PORTIONS OF THE PLANT COULD COST MILLIONS. THE LOCAL ECONOMY WILL BE IMPACTED BY A LOSS OF JOBS AT THE FACILITY IF IT IS UNABLE TO REOPEN. AN OVERALL NATIONAL ECONOMIC DOWNTURN IS POSSIBLE IN THE WAKE OF THE ATTACK DUE TO A LOSS OF CONSUMER CONFIDENCE.

MOST OF THE INJURED WILL RECOVER IN 7 TO 14 DAYS, EXCEPT FOR THOSE WITH SEVERE LUNG DAMAGE. THESE INDIVIDUALS WILL REQUIRE LONG-TERM MONITORING AND TREATMENT.

MISSION AREAS ACTIVATED:

PREVENTION/DETERRENCE/PROTECTION – THE ABILITY TO PREVENT THE ATTACK IS CONTINGENT ON THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS ACQUISITION, SPECIFICALLY IEDS, AND SITE RECONNAISSANCE.

EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT/DIAGNOSIS – THE PRESENCE OF SECONDARY DEVICES WILL COMPLICATE ASSESSMENT AND IDENTIFICATION EFFORTS. ACTIONS REQUIRED INCLUDE DISPATCH; CHLORINE DETECTION; AND HAZARD ASSESSMENT, PREDICTION, MONITORING, AND SAMPLING.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT/RESPONSE – ACTIONS REQUIRED INCLUDE ALERTS, ACTIVATION AND NOTIFICATION, TRAFFIC AND ACCESS CONTROL, PROTECTION OF SPECIAL POPULATIONS, RESOURCE SUPPORT AND REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE, AND PUBIC INFORMATION ACTIVITIES.

INCIDENT/HAZARD MITIGATION – MITIGATION MEASURES WILL BE COMPLICATED BY SECONDARY DEVICE CONCERNS (I.E., DELAYED DETONATION OF IEDS). ACTIONS REQUIRED INCLUDE ISOLATING AND DEFINING THE HAZARD; ESTABLISHING, PLANNING, AND OPERATING INCIDENT COMMAND; FIREFIGHTING; CONDUCTING BOMB DISPOSAL DISPATCH AND IED RENDER-SAFE PROCEDURES; PRESERVING THE SCENE; PERFORMING MITIGATION EFFORTS; DECONTAMINATING RESPONDERS; AND CONDUCTING SITE REMEDIATION AND MONITORING.

PUBLIC PROTECTION – EVACUATION AND/OR SHELTERING OF DOWNWIND POPULATIONS WILL BE REQUIRED.

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VICTIM CARE – INJURIES TO BE TREATED WILL INCLUDE RESPIRATORY DIFFICULTY OR SEVERE DISTRESS AND/OR VEHICULAR ACCIDENT TRAUMA. SHORT- AND LONG-TERM TREATMENT MAY BE REQUIRED.

INVESTIGATION/APPREHENSION – SEARCHING FOR SUSPECTS AND EVIDENCE IN AN INDUSTRIAL AREA WHILE WEARING PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE) WILL BE A SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGE. ACTIONS REQUIRED INCLUDE DISPATCH, SITE CONTROL, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, PURSUIT AND TACTICAL DEPLOYMENT, AND APPREHENSION OF SUSPECTS.

RECOVERY/REMEDIATION – SINCE CHLORINE IS A GAS, THE EXTENT OF DECONTAMINATION REQUIRED WILL BE MINOR AND LARGELY RELATED TO ANY RELEASES GENERATED BY SECONDARY DEVICES. REGARDLESS, MONITORING AND SAMPLING A LARGE INDUSTRIAL FACILITY WILL BE A CHALLENGE. THERE WILL BE SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE TO THE PLANT AS A DIRECT RESULT OF THE ATTACK. DECONTAMINATION OF WATERWAYS MAY PRESENT A SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGE AS WELL. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS, ESPECIALLY PUBLIC SAFETY CONCERNS, ARE LIKELY TO SIGNIFICANTLY DELAY REBUILDING EFFORTS.

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ANNEX 9: NATURAL DISASTER – MAJOR EARTHQUAKE

**RDSTF SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT EMERGENCY CONTACT REGISTRY
 REGIONAL**

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

STATE AGENCY CONTACTS

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

FEDERAL AGENCY CONTACTS

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CASUALTIES	1,400 FATALITIES; 100,000 HOSPITALIZATIONS
INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGE	150,000 BUILDINGS DESTROYED, 1 MILLION BUILDINGS DAMAGED
EVACUATIONS/DISPLACED PERSONS	300,000 HOUSEHOLDS
CONTAMINATION	FROM HAZARDOUS MATERIALS, IN SOME AREAS
ECONOMIC IMPACT	HUNDREDS OF BILLIONS
POTENTIAL FOR MULTIPLE EVENTS	YES, AFTERSHOCKS
RECOVERY TIMELINE	MONTHS TO YEARS

SCENARIO OVERVIEW:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION –

EARTHQUAKES OCCUR WHEN THE PLATES THAT FORM UNDER THE EARTH'S SURFACE SUDDENLY SHIFT, AND MOST EARTHQUAKES OCCUR AT THE BOUNDARIES WHERE THE PLATES MEET. A FAULT IS A FRACTURE IN THE EARTH'S CRUST ALONG WHICH TWO BLOCKS OF THE CRUST HAVE SLIPPED WITH RESPECT TO EACH OTHER. THE MAGNITUDE OF AN EARTHQUAKE, USUALLY EXPRESSED BY THE RICHTER SCALE, IS A MEASURE OF THE AMPLITUDE OF THE SEISMIC WAVES. THE INTENSITY, AS EXPRESSED BY THE MODIFIED MERCALLI SCALE, IS A SUBJECTIVE MEASURE THAT DESCRIBES HOW STRONG A SHOCK WAS FELT AT A PARTICULAR LOCATION.

THE RICHTER SCALE IS LOGARITHMIC SO THAT A RECORDING OF 7, FOR EXAMPLE, INDICATES A DISTURBANCE WITH GROUND MOTION TEN TIMES AS LARGE AS A RECORDING OF 6. A QUAKE OF MAGNITUDE 2 IS THE SMALLEST QUAKE NORMALLY FELT BY PEOPLE. EARTHQUAKES WITH A RICHTER VALUE OF 6 OR MORE ARE COMMONLY CONSIDERED MAJOR; GREAT EARTHQUAKES HAVE MAGNITUDE OF 8 OR MORE. THE MODIFIED MERCALLI (MM) SCALE EXPRESSES THE INTENSITY OF AN EARTHQUAKE'S EFFECTS IN A GIVEN LOCALITY IN VALUES RANGING FROM I TO XII. THE MOST COMMONLY USED ADAPTATION COVERS THE RANGE OF INTENSITY FROM THE CONDITION OF "I – NOT FELT EXCEPT BY A VERY FEW UNDER ESPECIALLY FAVORABLE CONDITIONS," TO "XII – DAMAGE TOTAL. LINES OF SIGHT AND LEVEL ARE DISTORTED. OBJECTS THROWN UPWARD INTO THE AIR."

IN THIS SCENARIO, A 7.2-MAGNITUDE EARTHQUAKE OCCURS ALONG A FAULT ZONE IN A MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREA (MMA) OF A CITY. MM SCALE VIII OR GREATER INTENSITY GROUND SHAKING EXTENDS THROUGHOUT LARGE SECTIONS OF THE METROPOLITAN AREA, GREATLY IMPACTING A SIX-COUNTY REGION WITH A POPULATION OF APPROXIMATELY 10 MILLION PEOPLE. SUBSURFACE FAULTING OCCURS ALONG 45 MILES OF THE FAULT ZONE, EXTENDING ALONG A LARGE PORTION OF HIGHLY POPULATED LOCAL JURISDICTIONS, CREATING A LARGE SWATH OF DESTRUCTION. SOIL LIQUEFACTION OCCURS IN SOME AREAS, CREATING QUICKSAND-LIKE CONDITIONS.

TIMELINE/EVENT DYNAMICS –

WHILE SCIENTISTS HAVE BEEN PREDICTING A MODERATE TO CATASTROPHIC EARTHQUAKE IN THE REGION SOMETIME IN THE FUTURE, THERE WERE NO SPECIFIC INDICATIONS THAT AN EARTHQUAKE WAS IMMINENT IN THE DAYS AND WEEKS PRIOR TO THIS EVENT.

DAMAGE INCLUDES A LARGE MULTI-STATE AREA OF SEVERAL HUNDRED SQUARE MILES. RAPID HORIZONTAL MOVEMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE EARTHQUAKE SHIFT HOMES OFF THEIR FOUNDATIONS AND CAUSE SOME TALL BUILDINGS TO COLLAPSE OR "PANCAKE" AS FLOORS COLLAPSE DOWN ONTO ONE ANOTHER. SHAKING IS EXAGGERATED IN AREAS WHERE THE UNDERLYING SEDIMENT IS WEAK OR SATURATED WITH WATER. (NOTE: IN THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN UNITED STATES, EARTHQUAKE WAVES TRAVEL MORE EFFICIENTLY THAN IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES. AN EARTHQUAKE OF A GIVEN SIZE IN THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN UNITED STATES MAY CAUSE DAMAGE OVER A MUCH BROADER AREA THAN THE SAME SIZE

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EARTHQUAKE IN CALIFORNIA.)

SEVERAL HOURS LATER, AN AFTERSHOCK OF MAGNITUDE 8.0 OCCURS. BASED ON PAST EVENTS, ADDITIONAL AFTERSHOCKS ARE POSSIBLE. SIZEABLE AFTERSHOCKS (7.0 TO 8.0 IN MAGNITUDE) MAY OCCUR FOR MONTHS AFTER THE ORIGINAL JOLT.

SECONDARY HAZARDS/EVENTS –

AS A RESULT OF THE EARTHQUAKE, HAZARDOUS CONTAMINATION IMPACTS OF CONCERN INCLUDE NATURAL GAS COMPRESSION STATIONS AND PROCESSING PLANTS, OIL REFINERIES AND MAJOR TANK FARMS, AND NATURAL GAS/CRUDE OIL PIPELINES. IN ADDITION, MORE THAN 2,000 SPOT FIRES OCCUR AND WIDESPREAD DEBRIS RESULTS. FLOODING MAY OCCUR DUE TO LEVEE FAILURES AND BREAKS IN WATER MAINS AND SEWAGE SYSTEMS.

TRANSPORTATION LINES AND NODES; POWER GENERATION AND DISTRIBUTION; COMMUNICATIONS LINES; FUEL STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION; AND VARIOUS STRUCTURES (RANGING FROM DAMS TO HOSPITALS) MAY BE DAMAGED AND WILL REQUIRE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT IN ORDER TO CONTINUE OPERATING. REDUCED AVAILABILITY OF SERVICES WILL BE DISRUPTIVE AND COSTLY.

GROUND SHAKING FROM THE EARTHQUAKE HAS GENERATED MASSIVE AMOUNTS OF DEBRIS (MORE THAN 120 MILLION TONS) FROM COLLAPSED STRUCTURES. IN ADDITION, FUEL PUMPS IN SEVERAL GAS STATIONS HAVE SUSTAINED DAMAGES, LEAKING THOUSANDS OF GALLONS OF GASOLINE INTO THE STREETS. THERE ARE NUMEROUS REPORTS OF TOXIC CHEMICAL FIRES, PLUMES WITH NOXIOUS FUMES, AND SPILLS. SEVERAL OTHER LOCAL WASTE TREATMENT FACILITIES HAVE REPORTED WASTEWATER AND SEWAGE DISCHARGES. A LARGE REFINING SPILL HAS CONTAMINATED THE PORT FACILITY AND IS SPILLING INTO THE HARBOR. SIGNIFICANT CONCERN FOR SPILLED HAZARDOUS MATERIALS FROM STORAGE, OVERTURNED RAILCARS, AND CHEMICAL STOCKPILES MAKE PROGRESS VERY SLOW AS TRIAGE IS CONDUCTED.

KEY IMPLICATIONS:

APPROXIMATELY 1,400 FATALITIES OCCUR AS A DIRECT RESULT OF THE EARTHQUAKE. MORE THAN 100,000 PEOPLE ARE INJURED AND CONTINUE TO OVERWHELM AREA HOSPITALS AND MEDICAL FACILITIES, MOST OF WHICH HAVE SUSTAINED CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE. APPROXIMATELY 18,000 OF THE INJURED REQUIRE HOSPITALIZATION. AS MANY AS 20,000 PEOPLE ARE MISSING AND MAY BE TRAPPED UNDER COLLAPSED BUILDINGS AND UNDERGROUND COMMUTER TUNNELS.

MORE THAN 1 MILLION BUILDINGS WERE AT LEAST MODERATELY DAMAGED (40% OF THE BUILDINGS) AND MORE THAN 150,000 BUILDINGS HAVE BEEN COMPLETELY DESTROYED. SERVICE DISRUPTIONS ARE NUMEROUS TO HOUSEHOLDS, BUSINESSES, AND MILITARY FACILITIES. MEDICAL SERVICES ARE OVERWHELMED AND FUNCTIONING HOSPITALS ARE LIMITED. FIRE AND EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES (EMS) STATIONS AND TRUCKS WERE ALSO DAMAGED. BRIDGES AND MAJOR HIGHWAYS ARE DOWN OR BLOCKED AND DAMAGED RUNWAYS

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HAVE CAUSED FLIGHT CANCELLATIONS. THERE ARE WIDESPREAD POWER OUTAGES AND RUPTURES TO UNDERGROUND FUEL, OIL, AND NATURAL GAS LINES. WATER MAINS ARE BROKEN. WASTEWATER PRIMARY RECEPTORS HAVE BROKEN, CLOSING DOWN SYSTEMS AND LEAKING RAW SEWAGE INTO THE STREETS. AS A RESULT, PUBLIC HEALTH IS THREATENED.

MORE THAN 300,000 HOUSEHOLDS HAVE BEEN DISPLACED, AND MANY BUSINESSES HAVE LOST EMPLOYEES AND CUSTOMERS. THE PORT HAS BEEN ADVERSELY AFFECTED IN ITS CAPACITY TO PROVIDE EXPORT/IMPORT AND LOADING/UNLOADING CAPABILITIES, AND DAMAGE TO VITAL PARTS OF THE COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE HAS RESULTED IN LIMITED COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES.

THE DISRUPTION TO THE NATION'S ECONOMY COULD BE SEVERE BECAUSE THE EARTHQUAKE IMPACTS MAJOR SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION CENTERS. RECONSTRUCTION, REPAIRS, DISPOSAL, AND REPLACEMENT OF LOST INFRASTRUCTURE WILL COST BILLIONS OF DOLLARS. REPLACEMENT OF LOST PRIVATE PROPERTY AND GOODS COULD ALSO COST BILLIONS. AN OVERALL NATIONAL ECONOMIC DOWNTURN IS PROBABLE IN THE WAKE OF THIS EVENT.

MISSION AREAS ACTIVATED:

PREVENTION/DETERRENCE/PROTECTION – AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE OCCURS, ACTIONS SHOULD BE TAKEN TO PROTECT CRITICAL FACILITIES FROM TERRORIST ATTACKS AND TO MAINTAIN CIVIL ORDER.

EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT/DIAGNOSIS – DISASTER ASSESSMENTS AND AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE ARE NECESSARY. USING REAL-TIME SEISMIC DATA, THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA) RUNS AN EARTHQUAKE MODEL TO PROVIDE A PRELIMINARY “BEST GUESS” AT THE LEVEL OF EXPECTED DAMAGE, SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION OR MODIFICATION THROUGH REMOTE SENSING AND FIELD ASSESSMENTS. ASSESSMENT TEAMS MUST BE DEPLOYED AND REMOTE SENSING INITIATED.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT/RESPONSE – HAZARDOUS MATERIAL SPILLS MUST BE MANAGED. EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT, SHELTERS, AND FOOD MUST BE PROVIDED. A JOINT INFORMATION CENTER (JIC) IS ESTABLISHED, AND SEARCH AND RESCUE TEAMS MUST BE PLACED ON ALERT, SOME OF WHICH SHOULD BE ACTIVATED AND DEPLOYED. PUBLIC UTILITIES AND OTHER BASIC-NEEDS SERVICES MUST BE REPAIRED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, AND DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED.

INCIDENT/HAZARD MITIGATION – FEDERAL SUPPORT WILL BE REQUIRED TO COORDINATE THE DEVELOPMENT OF PLANS TO EXECUTE MITIGATION EFFORTS TO LESSEN THE EFFECTS OF FUTURE DISASTERS. MITIGATION TO MINIMIZE OR AVOID FUTURE IMPACTS WOULD LARGELY BE AN ISSUE FOR RECOVERY AND RESTORATION.

PUBLIC PROTECTION – STRUCTURAL ENGINEERS ARE INSPECTING CRITICAL BUILDING, BRIDGE, FREEWAY, WASTE FACILITIES, ETC., AND INSPECTION TEAMS ARE DEPLOYED TO INSPECT HUNDREDS OF HOMES FOR SAFE HABITABILITY.

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VICTIM CARE – THE MASSIVE NUMBER OF INJURED AND DISPLACED PERSONS REQUIRES A WARNING ORDER FOR THE ACTIVATION OF TASK FORCES FOR THE DELIVERY OF MASS CARE AND HEALTH AND MEDICAL SERVICES. TEMPORARY HOUSING STRATEGIES MUST BE CONSIDERED.

INVESTIGATION/APPREHENSION – NOT APPLICABLE (NATURAL DISASTER).

RECOVERY/REMEDIATION – HAZARDOUS MATERIALS WILL CONTAMINATE MANY AREAS, AND DECONTAMINATION AND SITE RESTORATION WILL BE A MAJOR CHALLENGE.

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ANNEX 10: NATURAL DISASTER – MAJOR HURRICANE

**RDSTF SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT EMERGENCY CONTACT REGISTRY
REGIONAL**

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

STATE AGENCY CONTACTS

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

FEDERAL AGENCY CONTACTS

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CASUALTIES	1,000 FATALITIES, 5,000 HOSPITALIZATIONS
INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGE	BUILDINGS DESTROYED, LARGE DEBRIS
EVACUATIONS/DISPLACED PERSONS	1 MILLION EVACUATED; 100,000 HOMES SERIOUSLY DAMAGED
CONTAMINATION	FROM HAZARDOUS MATERIALS, IN SOME AREAS
ECONOMIC IMPACT	MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
POTENTIAL FOR MULTIPLE EVENTS	YES, SEASONAL
RECOVERY TIMELINE	MONTHS

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SCENARIO OVERVIEW:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION –

HURRICANES ARE INTENSE TROPICAL WEATHER SYSTEMS CONSISTING OF DANGEROUS WINDS AND TORRENTIAL RAINS. HURRICANES OFTEN SPAWN TORNADOES AND CAN PRODUCE A STORM SURGE OF OCEAN WATER THAT CAN BE UP TO 24 FEET AT ITS PEAK AND 50 TO 100 MILES WIDE. THE MOST DESTRUCTIVE COMPANION OF HURRICANES IS THE STORM SURGE.

A TYPICAL HURRICANE IS 400 MILES IN DIAMETER AND HAS AN AVERAGE FORWARD SPEED OF 15 MILES PER HOUR (MPH) IN A RANGE OF 0 TO 60 MPH. THE AVERAGE LIFE SPAN OF A HURRICANE IS 9 DAYS IN A RANGE OF LESS THAN 1 DAY TO MORE THAN 12 DAYS. HURRICANES' HIGHEST WIND SPEEDS ARE 20 TO 30 MILES FROM THE CENTER. HURRICANE FORCE WINDS COVER ALMOST 100 MILES, AND GALE-FORCE WINDS OF 40 MPH OR MORE MAY COVER 400 MILES IN DIAMETER. A FULLY DEVELOPED HURRICANE MAY TOWER 10 MILES INTO THE ATMOSPHERE.

A HURRICANE IS CATEGORIZED BY ITS SUSTAINED WIND INTENSITY ON A SAFFIR-SIMPSON HURRICANE SCALE THAT IS USED TO ESTIMATE THE POTENTIAL FOR PROPERTY DAMAGE AND FLOODING. "MAJOR" HURRICANES ARE PLACED IN CATEGORIES 3, 4, OR 5 WITH SUSTAINED WIND INTENSITIES BETWEEN 111 MPH TO GREATER THAN 155 MPH. THE MOST DANGEROUS POTENTIAL STORM WOULD BE A SLOW-MOVING CATEGORY 5 HURRICANE, MAKING LANDFALL IN A HIGHLY POPULATED AREA.

IN THIS SCENARIO, A CATEGORY 5 HURRICANE HITS A MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREA (MMA). SUSTAINED WINDS ARE AT 160 MPH WITH A STORM SURGE GREATER THAN 20 FEET ABOVE NORMAL. AS THE STORM MOVES CLOSER TO LAND, MASSIVE EVACUATIONS ARE REQUIRED. CERTAIN LOW-LYING ESCAPE ROUTES ARE INUNDATED BY WATER ANYWHERE FROM 5 HOURS BEFORE THE EYE OF THE HURRICANE REACHES LAND.

TIMELINES/EVENT DYNAMICS –

A TROPICAL STORM DEVELOPS IN THE ATLANTIC AND IS UPGRADED TO A HURRICANE AFTER 5 DAYS IN THE OPEN WATERS. AFTER 4 DAYS, THE HURRICANE HAS STEADIED AT DANGEROUS CATEGORY 4 LEVEL ON THE SAFFIR-SIMPSON HURRICANE SCALE AND MODELS INDICATE A TRACK THAT INCLUDES A POSSIBLE LANDFALL ALONG THE COAST ADJACENT TO THE MMA WITHIN 2 MORE DAYS. THE HURRICANE REACHES ITS PEAK AS PREDICTED AND MAKES LANDFALL WITH A DIRECT HIT ON THE MMA AND COASTAL RESORT TOWNS. THE NEXT DAY THE HURRICANE MOVES OUT. THE RAIN ASSOCIATED WITH THE STORM HAS CAUSED RIVERS TO OVERFLOW THEIR BANKS, AND SEVERAL RIVERS SYSTEMS ARE EXPERIENCING RECORD FLOOD LEVELS.

SECONDARY HAZARDS/ EVENTS –

IN ADDITION TO THE MASSIVE DESTRUCTION CAUSED BY THE HURRICANE ITSELF, THERE ARE

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ALSO AREAS WITHIN THE MMA AND SCATTERED INLAND AREAS THAT HAVE SUSTAINED SEVERE DAMAGE FROM TORNADOES THAT WERE GENERATED BY THE STORM. STORM SURGES AND HEAVY RAINS CAUSE CATASTROPHIC FLOODING TO LOW LYING AREAS. RAINFALL FROM THE HURRICANE, IN COMBINATION WITH EARLIER STORMS, CAUSES SIGNIFICANT FLOODING IN MULTIPLE STATES ALONG THE COAST.

FLOODED AND DAMAGED PETROCHEMICAL FACILITIES, CHEMICAL PLANTS, SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANTS, AND OTHER FACILITIES THREATEN THE HEALTH OF CITIZENS, CREATE A HAZARDOUS OPERATING ENVIRONMENT, AND REQUIRE CLEANUP AND REMEDIATION. AN OIL TANKER IS BLOWN OFF COURSE DURING THE STORM AND SUSTAINS SERIOUS DAMAGE AND LEAKS OIL INTO THE WATERS ADJACENT TO THE MMA.

KEY IMPLICATIONS:

THE HURRICANE RESULTS IN MORE THAN 1,000 FATALITIES, AND 5,000 THOUSAND PEOPLE HAVE SUSTAINED INJURIES REQUIRING PROFESSIONAL TREATMENT. TOURISTS AND RESIDENTS IN LOW-LYING AREAS WERE ORDERED TO EVACUATE 48 HOURS PRIOR TO PROJECTED LANDFALL. TWENTY-FOUR HOURS PRIOR TO PREDICTED LANDFALL MASSIVE EVACUATIONS WERE ORDERED, AND EVACUATION ROUTES HAVE BEEN OVERWHELMED.

MAJOR PORTIONS OF THE MMA BECOME FLOODED. STRUCTURES IN THE LOW-LYING AREAS ARE INUNDATED WHEN STORM SURGES REACH THEIR PEAK. MANY OLDER FACILITIES SUFFER STRUCTURAL COLLAPSE DUE TO THE SWIFT INFLUX OF WATER AND DEGRADATION OF THE SUPPORTING STRUCTURAL BASE. NEWER FACILITIES AND STRUCTURES SURVIVE THE INFLUX OF WATER, BUT SUSTAIN HEAVY DAMAGE TO CONTENTS ON THE LOWER LEVELS.

MOST ALL SHRUBBERY AND TREES WITHIN THE STORM'S PATH ARE DAMAGED OR DESTROYED, GENERATING MASSIVE AMOUNTS OF DEBRIS. DEBRIS IS ALSO GENERATED FROM STRUCTURES DESTROYED FROM TORNADOES AND STRUCTURES THAT HAVE BEEN DESTROYED OR DAMAGED BY THE HURRICANE. MANY STRUCTURES WILL NEED TO BE DEMOLISHED.

SERVICE DISRUPTIONS ARE NUMEROUS. SHELTERS THROUGHOUT THE REGION ARE ALSO FILLED TO CAPACITY. HUNDREDS OF PEOPLE ARE TRAPPED AND REQUIRE SEARCH AND RESCUE. UNTIL DEBRIS IS CLEARED, RESCUE OPERATIONS ARE DIFFICULT BECAUSE MUCH OF THE AREA IS REACHABLE ONLY BY HELICOPTERS AND BOATS. WIND AND DOWNED TREES HAVE DAMAGED NEARLY ALL OF THE ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION LINES WITHIN THE MMA. MOST COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS WITHIN THE IMPACTED AREA ARE NOT FUNCTIONING DUE TO DAMAGE AND LACK OF POWER.

THOUSANDS ARE HOMELESS, AND ALL AREAS ARE IN SERIOUS NEED OF DRINKING WATER, AND FOOD IS IN SHORT SUPPLY AND SPOILING DUE TO LACK OF REFRIGERATION. SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANTS IN THE REGION HAVE BEEN FLOODED AND SUSTAINED DAMAGED FROM THE STORM. FACTORIES, CHEMICAL PLANTS, SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANTS AND OTHER FACILITIES IN THE MMA HAVE SUFFERED SEVERE DAMAGE. HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF GALLONS OF EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES HAVE SPILLED INTO THE FLOODWATERS. THERE IS ALSO GASOLINE, DIESEL FUEL, AND OIL LEAKING FROM UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANKS. A 95,000-

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TON TANKER STRUCK A BRIDGE, BREACHING THE HULL OF THE VESSEL, WHICH THEN BEGAN TO LEAK OIL INTO WATERS ADJACENT TO THE MMA. ALL OF THESE ISSUES THREATEN PUBLIC HEALTH.

MANY BUSINESSES HAVE EXPERIENCED DAMAGE TO BUILDINGS AND INFRASTRUCTURE AS WELL AS LOST EMPLOYEES AND CUSTOMERS. MILITARY FACILITIES ARE DAMAGED, AND ASSISTANCE IS NEEDED TO PROVIDE FOR THE MILITARY COMMUNITY AND TO RECONSTITUTE THE FACILITIES. THE 20-FOOT STORM SURGE HAS BREACHED AND OVERTOPPED FLOOD CONTROL AND HURRICANE PROTECTION WORKS. ALL TRANSPORTATION ROUTES ARE DAMAGED TO SOME DEGREE, AND THE PORT FACILITY HAS ALSO BEEN ADVERSELY AFFECTED. MANY HOSPITALS HAVE SUSTAINED SEVERE DAMAGE AND THOSE THAT ARE OPEN ARE OVERWHELMED. SCHOOLS THAT ARE NOT SEVERELY DAMAGED ARE BEING USED AS SHELTERS FOR THE DISASTER VICTIMS. THOUSANDS OF PETS, DOMESTICATED ANIMALS, AND WILD ANIMALS HAVE BEEN KILLED OR INJURED, AND OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN OVERWHELMED WITH REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE IN FINDING LOST PETS.

THERE ARE SEVERE ECONOMIC REPERCUSSIONS FOR THE WHOLE STATE AND REGION. THE IMPACT OF CLOSING THE PORT RIPPLES THROUGH THE COUNTRY. THE LOSS OF THE PETRO-CHEMICAL SUPPLIES COULD RAISE PRICES AND INCREASE DEMAND ON FOREIGN SOURCES.

MISSION AREAS ACTIVATED:

PREVENTION/DETERRENCE/PROTECTION – AS THE STORM APPROACHES, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ARE GIVEN INCREASINGLY ACCURATE FORECASTS AND ASSESSMENTS OF POSSIBLE IMPACTS. FORECASTERS HAVE DIFFICULTY PREDICTING THE INTENSITY OF THE STORM PRIOR TO LANDFALL, BUT URGE OFFICIALS TO PREPARE FOR THE WORST. STATE AND LOCALS HAVE TIME TO EXECUTE EVACUATION PLANS.

EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT/DIAGNOSIS – ASSESSMENT IS REQUIRED FOR INFRASTRUCTURE, RAPID NEEDS, SEARCH AND RESCUE, HEALTH AND MEDICAL, AND NAVIGATION. REMOTE SENSING AND MODELING HELP DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF THE DAMAGES.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT/RESPONSE – SOME OF THE RESPONSE ACTIONS REQUIRE INCLUDE SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS, MORTUARY SERVICES AND VICTIM IDENTIFICATION, MEDICAL SYSTEM SUPPORT, DEBRIS CLEARANCE AND MANAGEMENT, TEMPORARY EMERGENCY POWER, TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPORT, INFRASTRUCTURE RESTORATION, AND TEMPORARY ROOFING.

INCIDENT/HAZARD MITIGATION – SUPPORT IS REQUIRED TO COORDINATE THE DEVELOPMENT OF PLANS TO EXECUTE MITIGATION EFFORTS THAT LESSEN THE EFFECTS OF FUTURE DISASTERS. THIS INCLUDES STUDIES TO ASSESS FLOOD AND COASTAL EROSION AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL PLANS TO MITIGATE FUTURE DAMAGES.

PUBLIC PROTECTION – MEASURES NEED TO BE TAKEN TO CONTROL VECTORS THAT MAY THRIVE IN THE AREAS AFTER A CATASTROPHIC HURRICANE. SUPPORT WILL BE REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN

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LAW AND ORDER AND TO PROTECT PRIVATE PROPERTY. SUPPORT WILL BE REQUIRED TO TEST AND ANALYZE HEALTH AND SAFETY HAZARDS AND IMPLEMENT MEASURES TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC.

VICTIM CARE – CARE MUST INCLUDE MEDICAL ASSISTANCE; SHELTER AND TEMPORARY HOUSING ASSISTANCE; EMERGENCY FOOD, WATER, AND ICE PROVISION; AND SANITARY FACILITY PROVISION.

INVESTIGATION/APPREHENSION – NOT APPLICABLE (NATURAL DISASTER).

RECOVERY/REMEDIATION – HAZARDOUS MATERIALS WILL CONTAMINATE MANY AREAS, AND DECONTAMINATION AND SITE RESTORATION WILL BE A MAJOR CHALLENGE.

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ANNEX 11: RADIOLOGICAL ATTACK – RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL DEVICES

**RDSTF SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT EMERGENCY CONTACT REGISTRY
 REGIONAL**

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

STATE AGENCY CONTACTS

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

FEDERAL AGENCY CONTACTS

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CASUALTIES	180 FATALITIES; 270 INJURIES; 20,000 DETECTIBLE CONTAMINATIONS (AT EACH SITE)
INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGE	NEAR THE EXPLOSION
EVACUATIONS/DISPLACED PERSONS	YES
CONTAMINATION	36 CITY BLOCKS (AT EACH SITE)
ECONOMIC IMPACT	UP TO BILLIONS OF DOLLARS
POTENTIAL FOR MULTIPLE EVENTS	YES
RECOVERY TIMELINE	MONTHS TO YEARS

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SCENARIO OVERVIEW:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION –

CESIUM-137 (^{137}Cs) HAS A HALF-LIFE OF 33 YEARS. IT DECAYS BY BOTH BETA AND GAMMA RADIATION. IT IS ONE OF SEVERAL KNOWN RADIOACTIVE ISOTOPES THAT STAND OUT AS BEING HIGHLY SUITABLE FOR RADIOLOGICAL TERROR. THIS ISOTOPE CAUSES SKIN DAMAGE SIMILAR TO BURNS, BUT THE INJURY MAY BE AS DEEP WITHIN THE BODY AS ON THE SKIN. CESIUM WOULD BE PARTICULARLY DANGEROUS IF ACCIDENTALLY INGESTED OR INHALED, EVEN IN SMALL QUANTITIES. CESIUM MIMICS POTASSIUM IN THE BODY. IT BINDS TO CONCRETE AND OTHER MASONRY, MAKING DECONTAMINATION OF SUCH BUILDINGS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT AND POSSIBLY ECONOMICALLY INFEASIBLE. USE OF ^{137}Cs IN AN URBAN SETTING WOULD SERIOUSLY RAISE THE COST OF CLEANUP.

^{137}Cs IS MOSTLY USED IN THE FORM OF CESIUM CHLORIDE (CsCl), BECAUSE IT IS EASY TO PRECIPITATE. CsCl IS A FAIRLY FINE, LIGHT POWDER WITH TYPICAL PARTICLE SIZE MEDIAN AT ABOUT 300 MICRONS. FRACTIONS BELOW 10 MICRONS ARE TYPICALLY LESS THAN 1%. IN A RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL DEVICE (RDD), MOST WILL FALL OUT WITHIN APPROXIMATELY 1 TO 2,000 FEET (ALTHOUGH MANY VARIABLES EXIST), BUT A SMALL AMOUNT MAY BE CARRIED GREAT DISTANCES, EVEN HUNDREDS OF MILES.

IN THIS SCENARIO, THE UNIVERSAL ADVERSARY (UA) PURCHASES STOLEN CsCl TO MAKE AN RDD OR “DIRTY BOMB.” THE EXPLOSIVE AND THE SHIELDED ^{137}Cs SOURCES ARE SMUGGLED INTO THE COUNTRY. DETONATOR CORD IS STOLEN FROM A MINING OPERATION, AND ALL OTHER MATERIALS ARE OBTAINED LEGALLY IN THE UNITED STATES. DEVICES ARE DETONATED IN THREE SEPARATE, BUT REGIONALLY CLOSE, MODERATE-TO-LARGE CITIES. THE CITIES ARE PHYSICALLY SIMILAR WITH GEOGRAPHIC TOPOGRAPHY THAT IS FLAT. THE RESULTS IN EACH CITY ARE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME. THE CONTAMINATED REGION COVERS APPROXIMATELY THIRTY-SIX BLOCKS IN EACH CITY AND INCLUDES THE BUSINESS DISTRICT (HIGH-RISE STREET CANYONS), RESIDENTIAL ROW HOUSES, CROWDED SHOPPING AREAS, AND A HIGH SCHOOL. BUILDINGS IN THE AFFECTED AREAS ARE PRINCIPALLY MADE OF CONCRETE AND BRICK; SOME ARE STONE FACED.

THE ENTIRE SCENE IS CONTAMINATED WITH ^{137}Cs , THOUGH NOT AT LEVELS CAUSING IMMEDIATE CONCERN TO FIRST RESPONDERS. DUE TO THE SIZE OF THE EXPLOSION, THE RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION IS BLOWN WIDELY SUCH THAT THE GROUND ZERO AREA IS NOT AS RADIOACTIVE AS MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED. THE DETONATION AEROSOL CONTAINS 90% OF THE ORIGINAL ^{137}Cs SOURCE WITH RADIOACTIVE PARTICLES WHOSE SIZES RANGE FROM 1 MICRON (OR MICRO-METER, μm) TO 150 MICRONS – THE SIZE OF MOST OF THE PARTICLES IS APPROXIMATELY 100 MICRONS. LARGER PARTICLES EITHER PENETRATE BUILDING MATERIALS IN THE BLAST ZONE, OR DROP QUICKLY TO THE GROUND AS FALL-OUT WITHIN ABOUT 500 FEET.

VARIABLE WINDS OF 3 TO 8 MILES PER HOUR CARRY THE RADIOACTIVELY CONTAMINATED AEROSOL THROUGHOUT AN AREA OF APPROXIMATELY THIRTY-SIX BLOCKS (THE PRIMARY DEPOSITION ZONE). COMPLEX URBAN WIND PATTERNS CARRY THE CONTAMINATION IN UNPREDICTABLE DIRECTIONS, LEAVING HIGHLY VARIABLE CONTAMINATION DEPOSITION WITH

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NUMEROUS HOT SPOTS CREATED BY WIND EDDIES AND VORTICES. RADIOACTIVITY CONCENTRATIONS IN THIS ZONE ARE ON THE ORDER OF 5-50 MICRO μ l/M², WITH HOT SPOTS MEASURING 100-500 MICRO μ l/M²; HOWEVER, TRACES OF THE ¹³⁷Cs PLUME CARRY MORE THAN 3.5 KILOMETERS (~ 2.2 MILES) ON PREVAILING WINDS. AIR INTAKES CONTAMINATE INTERIORS OF LARGER BUILDINGS, AND NEGATIVE INDOOR BUILDING PRESSURE DRAWS CONTAMINATED AEROSOL INTO BUILDINGS VIA CRACKS AROUND WINDOWS AND DOORS. IN CITY ONE, THE SUBWAY AIR INTAKES CONTAMINATE THE SUBWAY SYSTEM.

TIMELINE/EVENT DYNAMICS –

THE ATTACKS HAVE NO ADVANCE NOTICE OR INTELLIGENCE THAT INDICATES THEIR POSSIBILITY. THE EXPLOSIONS ARE INSTANTANEOUS, BUT PLUME DISPERSION CONTINUES FOR 20 MINUTES WHILE BREEZES NAVIGATE THE COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS BEFORE PARTICLES HAVE FULLY SETTLED. FIRST RESPONDERS DO NOT RECOGNIZE RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION FOR 15 MINUTES IN CITY ONE. THE EXPLOSIONS IN CITIES TWO AND THREE ARE PROMPTLY IDENTIFIED AS “DIRTY BOMBS” – THIS PROVIDES SOME ADVANTAGE TO FIRST RESPONDERS AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN MANAGING CONTAMINATION ON-SCENE, AND IN COMMUNICATING WITH THE PUBLIC CONCERNING TOPICAL CONTAMINATION AND SPREAD OF CONTAMINATION.

SECONDARY HAZARDS/EVENTS –

SMALL FIRES FROM RUPTURED GAS LINES OCCUR IN THE VICINITY OF THE BLASTS. UNSTABLE BUILDING FACADES, RUBBLE, AND BROKEN GLASS CREATE PHYSICAL HAZARDS FOR RESCUE WORKERS. SMALL AMOUNTS OF LEAD, ASBESTOS, AND POLYCHLORINATED BIPHENYLS (PCBs) ARE PRESENT IN THE AIR AND ON SURFACES. HUMAN REMAINS PRESENT A BIOHAZARD, AND SOME OF THESE ARE VERY RADIOACTIVE.

KEY IMPLICATIONS:

AT EACH SITE, THE BLAST RESULTS IN 180 FATALITIES AND ABOUT 270 INJURED REQUIRING MEDICAL CARE. IN ADDITION, UP TO 20,000 INDIVIDUALS IN EACH PRIMARY DEPOSITION ZONE POTENTIALLY HAVE DETECTABLE SUPERFICIAL RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION.

IN EACH BLAST, ONE BUILDING AND TWENTY VEHICLES ARE DESTROYED, AND EIGHT OTHER BUILDINGS SUFFER VARYING DEGREES OF DAMAGE, SUCH AS MINOR STRUCTURAL DAMAGE AND BROKEN WINDOWS. RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION IS FOUND INSIDE AND OUTSIDE OF BUILDINGS OVER AN AREA OF APPROXIMATELY THIRTY-SIX BLOCKS IN EACH CITY. MINOR CONTAMINATION MAY BE AN ISSUE FURTHER DOWNWIND AS INVESTIGATORS PERFORM MORE THOROUGH SURVEYS. MOST OF THE SUBWAY SYSTEM IN CITY ONE IS CONTAMINATED.

OVER THE LONG TERM, DECONTAMINATION EFFORTS ARE EXPECTED TO BE EFFECTIVE, BUT SOME PROPERTY OWNERS CHOOSE DEMOLITION AND REBUILDING. MANY SQUARE BLOCKS WILL BE UNAVAILABLE TO BUSINESSES AND RESIDENTS FOR SEVERAL YEARS UNTIL REMEDIATION IS COMPLETED.

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TRANSPORTATION IS SEVERELY HAMPERED IN EACH CITY. BUS, RAIL, AND AIR TRANSPORT ROUTES ARE ALTERED, AND OFFICIALS BUILD HIGHWAY CHECKPOINTS TO MONITOR INCOMING TRAFFIC FOR CONTAMINATION. THE SUBWAY SYSTEM IN CITY ONE IS COMPLETELY CLOSED FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD. HOSPITALS IN EACH REGION, ALREADY AT MAXIMUM CAPACITY WITH INJURIES FROM THE BLASTS, ARE INUNDATED WITH UP 50,000 “WORRIED WELL.”

THE SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANT IS QUICKLY CONTAMINATED. SEVENTY-FIVE BUSINESSES ARE CLOSED FOR AN EXTENDED DURATION WHILE RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION IS REMEDIATED. LOCAL TAX REVENUES PLUMMET, AND PEOPLE DISCOVER THAT INSURANCE CLAIMS ARE REJECTED. THE SCHOOLS IN THE CONTAMINATION ZONES ARE CLOSED AND STUDENTS MEET IN ALTERNATE LOCATIONS. NEARBY TOWNS AND CITIES CLOSE THEIR DOORS TO RESIDENTS OF THE IMPACTED CITIES FOR FEAR OF CONTAMINATION SPREAD. DECONTAMINATION, DESTRUCTION, DISPOSAL, AND REPLACEMENT OF LOST INFRASTRUCTURE WILL BE COSTLY (I.E., HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS PER SITE). THE ENTIRE CONTAMINATED AREA MAY BE ECONOMICALLY DEPRESSED FOR YEARS. AN OVERALL NATIONAL ECONOMIC DOWNTURN MAY OCCUR IN THE WAKE OF THE ATTACK DUE TO A LOSS OF CONSUMER CONFIDENCE.

IN THE LONG TERM, NO ONE WILL SUFFER ACUTE RADIATION SYNDROME, BUT APPROXIMATELY 20,000 INDIVIDUALS ARE LIKELY TO BECOME EXTERNALLY CONTAMINATED AT EACH SITE. LOW-LEVEL CONTAMINATION MAY ENTER FOOD AND WATER SUPPLIES. THE SUM OF THE CUMULATIVE EXPOSURES RESULTS IN AN INCREASED LIFETIME CANCER RISK PROPORTIONATE TO THE DOSE. MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES WILL BE REQUIRED.

MISSION AREAS ACTIVATED:

PREVENTION/DETERRENCE/PROTECTION – EFFORTS SHOULD INCLUDE PREVENTION OF TRAFFICKING AND IMPORTATION OF CsCl AND WEAPON COMPONENTS, DETECTION OF THE PLOT, RECONNAISSANCE OF THE SITE, PROTECTION, AND DETERRENCE MEASURES.

EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT/DIAGNOSIS – FIRST RESPONDERS ARE LIKELY TO BE CONTAMINATED. THE DOWNWIND AEROSOL DISPERSION WILL BE A SIGNIFICANT COMPONENT OF THE HAZARD. ASSESSMENT AND COORDINATION EFFORTS REQUIRED ARE NUMEROUS.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT/RESPONSE – ACTIONS REQUIRED INCLUDE MOBILIZING AND OPERATING INCIDENT COMMAND; OVERSEEING VICTIM TRIAGE; STABILIZING THE SITE; CORDONING THE SITE AND MANAGING AND CONTROLLING THE PERIMETER; PROVIDING NOTIFICATION AND ACTIVATION OF SPECIAL TEAMS; PROVIDING TRAFFIC AND ACCESS CONTROL; PROVIDING PROTECTION OF AT-RISK AND SPECIAL POPULATIONS; PROVIDING RESOURCE SUPPORT AND REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE; PROVIDING PUBLIC WORKS COORDINATION; PROVIDING DIRECTION AND CONTROL OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE MITIGATION; AND PROVIDING PUBLIC INFORMATION, OUTREACH, AND COMMUNICATION ACTIVITIES.

INCIDENT/HAZARD MITIGATION – ACTIONS REQUIRED INCLUDE ISOLATING THE INCIDENT SCENE AND DEFINING THE HAZARD AREAS, BUILDING STABILIZATION, PROVIDING FIRE SUPPRESSION,

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CONDUCTING DEBRIS MANAGEMENT AND RADIOACTIVE AND HAZARDOUS CONTAMINATION MITIGATION, DECONTAMINATING RESPONDERS AND EQUIPMENT AS WELL AS LOCAL CITIZENS, AND CONDUCTING LOCAL SITE CONTAMINATION CONTROL.

PUBLIC PROTECTION – SHELTERING AND/OR EVACUATION OF DOWNWIND POPULATIONS WILL BE REQUIRED AND MUST OCCUR QUICKLY. PROTECTION ACTIONS REQUIRED RANGE FROM DEVELOPING PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMUNICATING THEM TO THE PUBLIC TO MAKING RADIO-PROTECTIVE PHARMACEUTICAL DECISIONS AND EFFICIENTLY DISTRIBUTING DRUGS.

VICTIM CARE – INJURED PEOPLE WILL REQUIRE SOME DECONTAMINATION IN THE COURSE OF MEDICAL TREATMENT AND, IF POSSIBLE, PRIOR TO HOSPITAL ADMISSION. THOUSANDS MORE WILL LIKELY NEED SUPERFICIAL DECONTAMINATION, AND BOTH SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM MEDICAL FOLLOW-UPS.

INVESTIGATION/APPREHENSION – ACTIONS REQUIRED INCLUDE DISPATCHING PERSONNEL, CONDUCTING SITE CORDONING AND CONTROL, COLLECTING FIELD DATA AND WITNESS INTERVIEWS, AND PERFORMING TACTICAL DEPLOYMENT AND APPREHENSION OF SUSPECTS. RECONSTRUCTION OF THE ATTACK SHOULD OCCUR.

RECOVERY/REMEDIATION – THE EXTENT OF CONTAMINATION WILL BE A MAJOR CHALLENGE BECAUSE ^{137}Cs IS HIGHLY WATER-SOLUBLE AND IS CHEMICALLY REACTIVE WITH A WIDE VARIETY OF MATERIALS, INCLUDING COMMON BUILDING MATERIALS SUCH AS CONCRETE AND STONE. SEVERAL BUILDINGS (THOSE MOST DAMAGED) WILL BE TORN DOWN AND EVENTUALLY REBUILT. DECONTAMINATION ACTIVITIES ARE UNDERTAKEN FOR BUILDING EXTERIORS AND INTERIORS, STREETS, SIDEWALKS, AND OTHER AREAS.

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ANNEX12: EXPLOSIVES ATTACK – BOMBING USING IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

**RDSTF SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT EMERGENCY CONTACT REGISTRY
 REGIONAL**

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

STATE AGENCY CONTACTS

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

FEDERAL AGENCY CONTACTS

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CASUALTIES	100 FATALITIES; 450 HOSPITALIZATIONS
INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGE	STRUCTURES AFFECTED BY BLAST AND FIRE
EVACUATIONS/DISPLACED PERSONS	MINIMAL
CONTAMINATION	NONE
ECONOMIC IMPACT	LOCAL
POTENTIAL FOR MULTIPLE EVENTS	YES
RECOVERY TIMELINE	WEEKS TO MONTHS

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SCENARIO OVERVIEW:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION –

IN THIS SCENARIO, AGENTS OF THE UNIVERSAL ADVERSARY (UA) USE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (IEDs) TO DETONATE BOMBS INSIDE A SPORTS ARENA AND CREATE A LARGE VEHICLE BOMB (LVB). THEY ALSO USE SUICIDE BOMBERS IN AN UNDERGROUND PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION CONCOURSE AND DETONATE ANOTHER BOMB IN A PARKING FACILITY NEAR THE ENTERTAINMENT COMPLEX. AN ADDITIONAL SERIES OF DEVICES IS DETONATED IN THE LOBBY OF THE NEAREST HOSPITAL EMERGENCY ROOM (ER).

THE EVENT IS PRIMARILY DESIGNED FOR AN URBAN ENVIRONMENT, BUT COULD BE ADAPTED FOR MORE RURAL AREA EVENTS SUCH AS COUNTY FAIRS AND OTHER LARGE GATHERINGS. CASUALTY ESTIMATES WOULD BE REDUCED AS A FUNCTION OF A REDUCED TARGET POPULATION AND LESS POPULATION DENSITY AT TARGET POINTS.

TIMELINE/EVENT DYNAMICS–

THE FIRE IS IGNITED APPROXIMATELY 1 HOUR AFTER THE START OF THE ENTERTAINMENT EVENT. THE DETONATION OF EXPLOSIVES IS DELAYED APPROXIMATELY 10 TO 15 MINUTES AFTER THE IGNITION OF THE FIRE IN ORDER TO ALLOW FOR DETECTION, EVACUATION, AND RESPONSE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES PROVIDERS. THE DETONATION OF EXPLOSIVES AT THE HOSPITAL SITE WILL BE THE HARDEST TO TIME FOR MAXIMUM EFFECT AND MAY NEED TO BE COORDINATED BY SOME COMMUNICATION AMONG CELL MEMBERS. IN ANY CASE, THE HOSPITAL DEVICE SHOULD BE DETONATED BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF CASUALTIES FROM THE ENTERTAINMENT VENUE.

THE TIMING OF SOME OF THESE EVENTS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE EVACUATION STIMULUS, IS NOT CRITICAL. THE MORE PEOPLE WHO EVACUATE THE VENUE, THE MORE POTENTIAL EXPLOSIVES-RELATED CASUALTIES ARE PRODUCED. IF EVACUATION OF THE VENUE IS DELAYED, THE FIRE AND DETONATION OF THE LVB NEAR THE VENUE CAN BE EXPECTED TO PRODUCE INCREASED CASUALTIES INSIDE THE STRUCTURE DUE TO COLLAPSE, SECONDARY AND TERTIARY BLAST EFFECTS, INCREASED EXPOSURE TO PRODUCTS OF COMBUSTION, THERMAL EFFECTS, AND CROWD SURGE.

SECONDARY HAZARDS/EVENTS –

SECONDARY HAZARDS INCLUDE THE DISRUPTION OF ELECTRIC POWER, NATURAL GAS LINES, AND WATER MAINS – THE DISRUPTION WILL CAUSE UNDERMINING OF STREETS AND FLOODING OF UNDERGROUND TRANSIT WAYS. THERE MAY BE TOXIC SMOKE RESULTING FROM FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS. THERE WILL BE LOSS OF TRAFFIC CONTROLS IN THE AREA, AND FLEEING CITIZENS WOULD LIKELY CAUSE TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS. MEDIA RESPONSE TO THE AREA MAY AFFECT RESPONDERS. SINCE ONE OF THE BOMBS WAS DISGUISED AS AN EMERGENCY RESPONSE VEHICLE, OTHER “LEGITIMATE” VEHICLES MAY BE IMPEDED IN THEIR RESPONSE TO THE SCENE AND HOSPITALS.

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KEY IMPLICATIONS:

CASUALTIES WILL RESULT AT ALL FIVE INCIDENT SITES AND WILL INCLUDE CIVILIANS, EMERGENCY PERSONNEL, AND THE SUICIDE BOMBERS. THE LVB DETONATION OUTSIDE THE VENUE CAN BE EXPECTED TO RESULT IN THE LARGEST NUMBER OF FATALITIES AND INJURIES DUE TO THE "POPULATION DENSITY" EXPECTED. FATALITIES AND INJURIES ARE SUMMARIZED IN TABLE 12-1.

INCIDENT OR LOCATION	FATALITIES	SERIOUS INJURIES
FIRE	8	150
LARGE VEHICLE BOMB	35	200
CAR BOMB	7	40
TRANSPORTATION CENTER(SUBWAY)	8	50
HOSPITAL	8	40

TABLE 12-1. SUMMARY OF FATALITIES AND SERIOUS INJURIES AS A RESULT OF THE BOMBINGS

PROPERTY DAMAGE WOULD INCLUDE SEVERE FIRE AND BLAST DAMAGE TO THE ENTERTAINMENT VENUE, BLAST DAMAGE TO BUILDINGS ACROSS FROM THE ENTERTAINMENT VENUE, MODERATE DAMAGE TO THE TRANSPORTATION CENTER, SEVERE DAMAGE TO VEHICLES AND NEARBY BUILDINGS AT THE PARKING FACILITY, AND SEVERE DAMAGE TO THE HOSPITAL ER.

SERVICE DISRUPTION WOULD BE SEVERE IN THE IMPACTED CITY AND WOULD INCLUDE TRAFFIC (ESPECIALLY THE SUBWAY), PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION, EMERGENCY SERVICES, AND HOSPITALS. THE LOCAL ECONOMIC IMPACT INCLUDES LOSS OF USE OF THE ENTERTAINMENT VENUE FOR A PERIOD OF 1 YEAR DURING THE REPAIR OF FIRE AND BLAST DAMAGE.

MAJOR HEALTH ISSUES INCLUDE SEVERE BURN TREATMENT AND THERAPY FOR THE VICTIMS; PERMANENT HEARING LOSS; LONG-TERM TINNITUS; VERTIGO FOR SOME EXPOSED TO THE BLAST; AND POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS FOR VICTIMS, FIRST RESPONDERS, AND NEARBY RESIDENTS.

MISSION AREAS ACTIVATED:

PREVENTION/DETERRENCE/PROTECTION – THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF THIS EVENT WOULD REQUIRE A SIGNIFICANT LEVEL OF RELATIVELY UNSOPHISTICATED COORDINATION. AS SUCH, THE POTENTIAL FOR DETECTION IN THE PRE-EVENT PLANNING STAGES EXISTS.

EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT/DIAGNOSIS – THE FIRE WOULD BE THE FIRST RECOGNIZABLE INDICATION THAT THE ATTACK WAS UNDER WAY. ACTIONS REQUIRED INCLUDE DISPATCH; AGENT DETECTION; AND HAZARD ASSESSMENT, PREDICTION, MONITORING, AND SAMPLING.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT/RESPONSE – ACTIONS REQUIRED INCLUDE SEARCH AND RESCUE, ALERTS, ACTIVATION AND NOTIFICATION, TRAFFIC AND ACCESS CONTROL, PROTECTION OF SPECIAL POPULATIONS, RESOURCE SUPPORT, REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE, AND PUBLIC

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INFORMATION. ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT OPERATIONS CENTER (JOC) IS REQUIRED.

INCIDENT/HAZARD MITIGATION – PRIMARY HAZARDS INCLUDE FIRE; TOXIC ATMOSPHERE/SMOKE; UN-DETONATED EXPLOSIVES; UNSTABLE STRUCTURES; ELECTRICAL HAZARDS; AND LOW VISIBILITY. HOSPITAL PERSONNEL MUST ENSURE THAT ARRIVING VEHICLES ARE NOT DELIVERY SYSTEMS FOR ADDITIONAL WEAPONS.

PUBLIC PROTECTION – EVACUATION IS REQUIRED AS WELL AS ADDITIONAL THREAT ASSESSMENT. THE AREA MUST BE CORDONED.

VICTIM CARE – INJURIES RANGE FROM “WALKING WOUNDED” TO MULTIPLE SYSTEMS TRAUMA, BURNS, AND OBVIOUS FATALITIES. ELIMINATION OF THE ER FACILITY AT THE TARGET HOSPITAL WILL FORCE OTHER FACILITIES TO RECEIVE ALL PATIENTS FROM THE ENTERTAINMENT VENUE BLASTS.

INVESTIGATION/APPREHENSION – INVESTIGATION CAN BEGIN DURING THE RESCUE PHASE WITH PHOTO DOCUMENTATION OF THE IMMEDIATE SCENE, VICTIM LOCATIONS, AND INJURY PATTERNS. COORDINATION OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL INVESTIGATIVE RESOURCES WILL BEGIN EARLY IN THE INCIDENT MANAGEMENT.

RECOVERY/REMEDIATION – DECONTAMINATION IS NECESSARY FOR BLOOD-BORNE PATHOGENS AT ALL SITES. DEBRIS REMOVAL MUST OCCUR AFTER EVIDENCE SEARCH AND RECOVERY. RESTORATION OF THE MAIN VENUE COULD TAKE MORE THAN 1 YEAR (DEPENDING ON THE EXTENT OF THE FIRE DAMAGE). REPAIR AND RESTORATION OF THE TRANSPORTATION CENTER CAN BE ESTIMATED AT 4 MONTHS.

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ANNEX 13: BIOLOGICAL ATTACK – FOOD CONTAMINATION

**RDSTF SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT EMERGENCY CONTACT REGISTRY
 REGIONAL**

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

STATE AGENCY CONTACTS

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

FEDERAL AGENCY CONTACTS

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CASUALTIES	300 FATALITIES; 400 HOSPITALIZATIONS
INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGE	NONE
EVACUATIONS/DISPLACED PERSONS	NONE
CONTAMINATION	SITES WHERE CONTAMINATION WAS DISPERSED
ECONOMIC IMPACT	MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
POTENTIAL FOR MULTIPLE EVENTS	YES
RECOVERY TIMELINE	WEEKS

SCENARIO OVERVIEW

GENERAL DESCRIPTION –

THE U.S. FOOD INDUSTRY HAS SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED ITS PHYSICAL AND PERSONNEL SECURITY SINCE 2001. A SUCCESSFUL ATTACK COULD ONLY OCCUR FOLLOWING THE ILLEGAL ACQUISITION OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION REVEALING DETAILED VULNERABILITIES OF A SPECIFIC PRODUCTION SITE. HOWEVER, IN THIS SCENARIO THE UNIVERSAL ADVERSARY (UA) IS ABLE TO ACQUIRE THESE RESTRICTED DOCUMENTS DUE TO A SECURITY LAPSE. THE UA USES THESE SENSITIVE DOCUMENTS AND A HIGH DEGREE OF CAREFUL PLANNING TO AVOID APPREHENSION AND CONDUCT A SERIOUS ATTACK.

THE UA DELIVERS LIQUID ANTHRAX BACTERIA TO PRE-SELECTED PLANT WORKERS. AT A BEEF PLANT IN A WEST COAST STATE, TWO BATCHES OF GROUND BEEF ARE CONTAMINATED WITH ANTHRAX, WITH DISTRIBUTION TO A CITY ON THE WEST COAST, A SOUTHWEST STATE, AND A STATE IN THE NORTHWEST. AT AN ORANGE JUICE PLANT IN A SOUTHWESTERN STATE, THREE BATCHES OF ORANGE JUICE ARE CONTAMINATED WITH ANTHRAX, WITH DISTRIBUTION TO A WEST COAST CITY, A SOUTHWEST CITY, AND A NORTHWEST CITY.

TIMELINE/EVENT DYNAMICS –

- NOVEMBER: THE BIOLOGICAL AGENT IS DELIVERED TO TERRORISTS (PLANT WORKERS).
- DECEMBER 3: THE BIOLOGICAL AGENT IS INSERTED INTO GROUND BEEF AND ORANGE JUICE AT PRODUCTION FACILITIES, AND THE PACKAGES ARE SHIPPED TO AFFECTED CITIES.
- DECEMBER 5: THE FIRST SIGNS OF PATIENTS WITH UNKNOWN ILLNESS APPEAR.
- DECEMBER 5-15: THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT INFLUX OF AFFECTED INDIVIDUALS INTO HOSPITALS WITH 1,200 SICK, 300 DEAD, AND 400 HOSPITALIZED IN ICU.
- DECEMBER 8: HEALTH DEPARTMENTS, THE CDC, THE FDA, AND THE USDA BEGIN PURSUING EPIDEMIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS.
- DECEMBER 30: A CONTAMINATED PRODUCT TRACE IS MADE TO GROUND BEEF AND ORANGE JUICE PRODUCTION PLANTS. DECONTAMINATION OF PLANTS COMMENCES.
- JANUARY 5: NO NEW CASES OF ILLNESS ARE REPORTED.

SECONDARY HAZARDS/EVENTS –

AS A RESULT OF NEWS OF THE CONTAMINATED FOOD PRODUCTS, THERE IS GENERAL PUBLIC CONCERN REGARDING FOOD SAFETY, AND THE “WORRIED WELL” ARE TAXING MEDICAL AND LABORATORY FACILITIES. THE PUBLIC FLOODS INTO MEDICAL FACILITIES SEEKING PRESCRIPTION DRUGS TO PREVENT OR RECOVER FROM SICKNESS. IN ADDITION, GROUND BEEF AND ORANGE JUICE SALES PLUMMET, AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN THESE TWO INDUSTRIES RISES DRAMATICALLY.

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KEY IMPLICATIONS:

THE ATTACK RESULTS IN 300 FATALITIES, 400 HOSPITALIZATIONS, AND 1,200 ILLNESSES. OVERALL PROPERTY DAMAGE IS MODERATE, AND DUE ONLY TO DECONTAMINATION OF AFFECTED FACILITIES. HOWEVER, PROPERTY AND FACILITY DISRUPTION (DOWNTIME) ARE SIGNIFICANT DUE TO DECONTAMINATION OF AFFECTED FACILITIES.

SERVICE DISRUPTION IS SIGNIFICANT IN GROUND BEEF AND ORANGE JUICE INDUSTRIES, AND SOME MODERATE DISRUPTION OCCURS IN OTHER FOOD INDUSTRIES DUE TO THE PUBLIC'S CONCERN ABOUT FOOD SAFETY IN GENERAL.

ALTHOUGH DIRECT FINANCIAL IMPACT IS SIGNIFICANT, INITIAL ECONOMIC IMPACT ON THE GENERAL ECONOMY IS RELATIVELY LOW. HOWEVER, THE LONG-TERM FINANCIAL IMPACT ON THE BEEF AND ORANGE JUICE MARKETPLACE AND ASSOCIATED BUSINESSES COULD BE SIGNIFICANT, AND OTHER FOOD INDUSTRIES' INCOME IS LIKELY TO BE NEGATIVELY AFFECTED BY THE PUBLIC'S OVERALL PERCEPTION OF UNSAFE FOOD. THE SOCIETAL IMPACT OF ATTACKS ON THE FOOD SUPPLY GENERATES DEMANDS FOR INCREASED, COSTLY, FEDERALLY DIRECTED FOOD SECURITY PROGRAMS AND OTHER MEASURES TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE ATTACKS.

ANTHRAX MAY RESULT IN FATALITY AND SERIOUS LONG-TERM ILLNESS.

MISSION AREAS ACTIVATED:

PREVENTION/DETERRENCE/PROTECTION – AVOIDING THE ATTACK IS CONTINGENT ON THE PREVENTION OF INFILTRATION OF TWO DIFFERENT FOOD PRODUCTION SYSTEMS. DETERRENCE AND PROTECTION REQUIRE RAPID DISEASE DIAGNOSIS, AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES TO ASSURE FOOD SAFETY.

EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT/DIAGNOSIS – DETERMINING CAUSE OF ILLNESS AND TRACKING THE CONTAMINATED SOURCE IS CRITICAL.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT/RESPONSE – DISEASE OUTBREAKS IN THREE CITIES SPREAD THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, WHICH TESTS COORDINATION OF RESOURCES.

INCIDENT/HAZARD MITIGATION – ONCE DISEASE OUTBREAK OCCURS, DECISIONS MUST BE MADE REGARDING MEAT AND JUICE SUPPLIES AND PRODUCTION.

PUBLIC PROTECTION – PUBLIC PROTECTION WILL REQUIRE TESTING ALERT AND WARNING MECHANISMS, PROVIDING PUBLIC INFORMATION AND EDUCATION, AND COORDINATING HUMAN AND VETERINARY SERVICES.

VICTIM CARE – VICTIM CARE WILL REQUIRE DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT OF AFFECTED POPULATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF PROPHYLAXIS FOR POTENTIALLY EXPOSED POPULATIONS.

INVESTIGATION/APPREHENSION – EPIDEMIOLOGY WILL BE CRITICAL TO TRACE THE SOURCE OF CONTAMINATION. INVESTIGATION OF CRIME AND APPREHENSION OF SUSPECTS WILL BE NEEDED.

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RECOVERY/REMEDIATION – CONTAMINATED FOODSTUFFS REQUIRE DISPOSAL. PLANTS AND SITES WHERE ANTHRAX WAS DISPERSED MAY NEED TO BE DECONTAMINATED.

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ANNEX 14: BIOLOGICAL ATTACK – FOREIGN ANIMAL DISEASE (FOOT & MOUTH DISEASE)

**RDSTF SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT EMERGENCY CONTACT REGISTRY
REGIONAL**

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

STATE AGENCY CONTACTS

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

FEDERAL AGENCY CONTACTS

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CASUALTIES	NONE
INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGE	HUGE LOSS OF LIVESTOCK
EVACUATIONS/DISPLACED PERSONS	NONE
CONTAMINATION	NONE
ECONOMIC IMPACT	HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
POTENTIAL FOR MULTIPLE EVENTS	YES
RECOVERY TIMELINE	MONTHS

ALTHOUGH THIS SCENARIO DEPICTS AN INTENTIONAL ATTACK ON THE U.S. LIVESTOCK INDUSTRY, THE ACCIDENTAL IMPORTATION OF CERTAIN DISEASES IS ALSO A HAZARD.

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SCENARIO OVERVIEW:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION –

FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE IS AN ACUTE INFECTIOUS VIRAL DISEASE THAT CAUSES BLISTERS, FEVER, AND LAMENESS IN CLOVEN-HOOFED ANIMALS SUCH AS CATTLE AND SWINE. PREGNANT ANIMALS OFTEN ABORT AND DAIRY CATTLE MAY DRY UP. IT SPREADS RAPIDLY AMONG SUCH ANIMALS AND CAN BE FATAL IN YOUNG ANIMALS. THE DISEASE IS NOT CONSIDERED A HUMAN THREAT.

IN THIS SCENARIO, MEMBERS OF THE UNIVERSAL ADVERSARY (UA) ENTER THE UNITED STATES TO SURVEY LARGE OPERATIONS IN THE LIVESTOCK INDUSTRIES. THE UA TARGETS SEVERAL LOCATIONS FOR A COORDINATED BIOTERRORISM ATTACK ON THE AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRY. APPROXIMATELY TWO MONTHS LATER, UA TEAMS ENTER THE UNITED STATES AND INFECT FARM ANIMALS AT SPECIFIC LOCATIONS.

THE U.S. LIVESTOCK TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM IS HIGHLY EFFICIENT AND MOVEMENTS ARE RAPID AND FREQUENT. ALTHOUGH THE INITIAL EVENT WILL BE LOCALIZED AT TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES IN SEVERAL STATES, AS THE BIOLOGICAL AGENT MATURES AND THE LIVESTOCK ARE TRANSPORTED, THE GEOGRAPHICAL AREA WILL WIDEN TO INCLUDE SURROUNDING STATES WHERE THE LIVESTOCK ARE DELIVERED.

TIMELINES/EVENT DYNAMICS –

THE FOREIGN ANIMAL DISEASE (FAD) IS INITIALLY DETECTED USING CLINICAL SIGNS AND VETERINARY MEDICAL DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION. OVER A PERIOD OF APPROXIMATELY 2 WEEKS, FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL ANIMAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS PUT IN PLACE SURVEILLANCE, DETECTION, CONTAINMENT, REMEDIATION, AND DISPOSAL PROTOCOLS. THIS IS FOLLOWED BY SURVEILLANCE, DETECTION, CONTAINMENT, REMEDIATION, AND DISPOSAL PROTOCOLS CONTINUE UNTIL TESTING CONFIRMS THE FAD IS ERADICATED.

SECONDARY HAZARDS/EVENTS –

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES REGARDING CONTAMINATED LAND AND EQUIPMENT MUST BE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED AND ADDRESSED. DISPOSAL OF CARCASSES OF CULLED ANIMALS MUST BE DONE IN AN ENVIRONMENTALLY CONSCIOUS AND EXPEDITIOUS MANNER.

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KEY IMPLICATIONS:

THERE ARE NO HUMAN FATALITIES OR INJURIES. HOWEVER, MASSIVE NUMBERS OF AFFECTED LIVESTOCK ARE DISPOSED OF BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES HAS A NATIONAL POLICY NOT TO VACCINATE. PROPERTY DAMAGE WILL BE LIMITED TO LAND MASS REQUIRED FOR DISPOSAL OF EUTHANIZED LIVESTOCK (BURIAL).

ALL TRANSPORTATION INTO AND OUT OF THE AFFECTED AREAS WILL BE SEVERELY LIMITED TO PREVENT FURTHER DISPERSION OF THE FAD TO UNAFFECTED AREAS. BOTH COMMERCIAL AND PRIVATE/PERSONAL TRAVEL WILL BE LIMITED.

THE EXTENT OF ECONOMIC IMPACT WILL DEPEND ON THE ABILITY TO LIMIT THE GEOGRAPHICAL SPREAD OF THE OUTBREAK. A GREAT ECONOMIC IMPACT WILL BE REALIZED IN MANY SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO AGRICULTURE. LONG-TERM ISSUES WILL BE CENTERED MOSTLY ON FOREIGN TRADE.

ECONOMIC FACTORS WILL INCLUDE THE VALUE OF THE AFFECTED LIVESTOCK THAT MUST BE DISPOSED OF; THE COST OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO IDENTIFY, CONTAIN, AND ERADICATE THE FAD; THE COST OF DISPOSAL AND REMEDIATION; THE LOSS OF REVENUE SUFFERED BY THE COMMERCIAL TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY; THE LOSS OF REVENUE SUFFERED BY THE RETAIL INDUSTRY DUE TO PUBLIC PERCEPTION THAT THE FAD POSES A DISEASE RISK; THE LOSS OF EXPORT MARKETS IMMEDIATELY UPON CONFIRMATION THAT THE FAD EXISTS; AND THE COST TO RENEW THE LIVESTOCK LOST TO EUTHANASIA.

THE INEVITABLE DEVELOPMENT AND UTILIZATION OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES TO INCLUDE RAPID DETECTION, IMPROVED TRADITIONAL VACCINES/ADVANCED MOLECULAR VACCINES, AND NEW THERAPEUTICS (INCLUDING ANTIVIRAL AGENTS AND OTHER NOVEL BIOMEDICAL APPROACHES) WILL LEAD TO A PHYSIOLOGICAL "HARDENING" OF THE U.S. FARM ANIMAL POPULATION AGAINST FADS, THEREBY MAKING THEM UNATTRACTIVE TARGETS OF BIO-TERRORISM. ALTHOUGH PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACTS WILL BE REALIZED, HUMAN HEALTH ISSUES WILL NOT BE A CONSIDERATION IF A FARM ANIMAL DISEASE-CAUSING AGENT IS USED.

MISSION AREAS ACTIVATED:

PREVENTION/DETERRENCE/PROTECTION – THE FULL FORCE OF THE AGRICULTURAL DISEASE PROTECTION SYSTEM WILL BE CHALLENGED IN ORDER TO PREVENT OR DETECT FURTHER ATTACKS.

EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT/DIAGNOSIS – INVESTIGATIONS USING EPIDEMIOLOGICAL TRACE-BACK, MICROBIAL FORENSICS, AND OTHER APPROACHES WILL BE UTILIZED TO DETERMINE THE SOURCE OF THE AGENT AND IDENTITY OF THE PERPETRATORS.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT/RESPONSE – IF THE SCOPE OF THE OUTBREAK GROWS, THE ABILITY TO EFFECTIVELY CONDUCT INTRASTATE AND INTERSTATE COMMAND AND CONTROL ACTIVITIES, AS WELL AS THE ABILITY TO SUCCESSFULLY ALLOCATE RESOURCES, WILL BE A

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CHALLENGE. STATES WOULD HAVE A NEED FOR CONTAINMENT, FEDERAL FUNDING AND PERSONNEL, AND THE USE AND AVAILABILITY OF THE NATIONAL GUARD. FEDERAL MOBILIZATION BASED ON THE NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN. EVOKING THE STAFFORD ACT WOULD BE CONSIDERED.

INCIDENT/HAZARD MITIGATION – THE HALT OF NATIONAL MOVEMENT OF SUSCEPTIBLE ANIMALS MAY BE NECESSARY. EQUITABLE INDEMNIFICATION AND WHEN TO BEGIN RECONSTITUTION OF THE HERDS LEADING TO ECONOMIC RECOVERY WILL BE A MAJOR CONSIDERATION.

PUBLIC PROTECTION – INFORMATION MUST BE PROVIDED IN ORDER TO COMBAT THE PUBLIC'S FEAR AND THE SPREAD OF MISINFORMATION ABOUT THE DISEASE.

VICTIM CARE – IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO EUTHANIZE AND DISPOSE OF INFECTED AND EXPOSED ANIMALS.

INVESTIGATION/APPREHENSION – INVESTIGATION AND APPREHENSION WILL ENTAIL A CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, INVOLVING LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AGRICULTURAL EXPERTS.

RECOVERY/REMEDIATION – RANCHES, FEEDLOTS, TRANSPORTATION MODES, AND OTHER LOCATIONS WILL REQUIRE DECONTAMINATION AND CLEANUP. CLEANING AND DISINFECTING ARE TOOLS USED TO IMPEDE THE SPREAD OF PATHOGENIC MICROORGANISMS. ALL PREMISES SHOULD BE CLEANED AND DISINFECTED UNDER SUPERVISION OF A REGULATORY ANIMAL HEALTH EMPLOYEE.

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Annex 15: Cyber Attack

**RDSTF SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT EMERGENCY CONTACT REGISTRY
 REGIONAL**

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

STATE AGENCY CONTACTS

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

FEDERAL AGENCY CONTACTS

Name	AGENCY	CELL PHONE	PAGER	AGENCY PHONE	E-MAIL

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CASUALTIES	NONE DIRECTLY
INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGE	CYBER
EVACUATIONS/DISPLACED PERSONS	NONE
CONTAMINATION	NONE
ECONOMIC IMPACT	MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
POTENTIAL FOR MULTIPLE EVENTS	YES
RECOVERY TIMELINE	WEEKS

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SCENARIO OVERVIEW:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION –

IN THIS SCENARIO, THE UNIVERSAL ADVERSARY CONDUCTS CYBER ATTACKS THAT AFFECT SEVERAL PARTS OF THE NATION'S FINANCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE OVER THE COURSE OF SEVERAL WEEKS. SPECIFICALLY, CREDIT-CARD PROCESSING FACILITIES ARE HACKED AND NUMBERS ARE RELEASED TO THE INTERNET, CAUSING 20 MILLION CARDS TO BE CANCELLED; AUTOMATED TELLER MACHINES (ATMs) FAIL NEARLY SIMULTANEOUSLY ACROSS THE NATION; MAJOR COMPANIES REPORT PAYROLL CHECKS ARE NOT BEING RECEIVED BY WORKERS; AND SEVERAL LARGE PENSION AND MUTUAL FUND COMPANIES HAVE COMPUTER MALFUNCTIONS SO SEVERE THAT THEY ARE UNABLE TO OPERATE FOR MORE THAN A WEEK. INDIVIDUALLY, THESE ATTACKS ARE NOT DANGEROUS – BUT COMBINED, THEY SHATTER FAITH IN THE STABILITY OF THE SYSTEM. CITIZENS NO LONGER TRUST ANY PART OF THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND FOREIGN SPECULATORS MAKE A RUN ON THE DOLLAR.

TIMELINES/EVENT DYNAMICS –

SEVERAL YEARS ARE NEEDED FOR PREPARATION. THE ATTACK IS EXECUTED OVER A FEW WEEKS TO ENSURE EXTENDED PRESS COVERAGE AND UNDERMINE CONFIDENCE IN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM. HOWEVER, THERE ARE NO SECONDARY HAZARDS/EVENTS.

KEY IMPLICATIONS:

NO FATALITIES, SIGNIFICANT INJURIES, OR PROPERTY DAMAGE ARE EXPECTED. HOWEVER, SIGNIFICANT DISRUPTIONS ACROSS MANY OR MOST SECTORS OF THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY DO OCCUR. THE GREATEST IMPACT OF THIS EVENT WILL BE ON THE ECONOMY.

MISSION AREAS ACTIVATED:

PREVENTION/DETERRENCE/PROTECTION – THE STRENGTH OF PRIVATE SECTOR FINANCE COMPANIES WILL BE TESTED IN REGARD TO PREVENTION, DETERRENCE, AND PROTECTION.

EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT/DIAGNOSIS – THE ATTACK WILL BE DIFFICULT TO RECOGNIZE. INITIALLY, FAILURES MAY BE MISTAKEN FOR NORMAL MALFUNCTIONS, AND ANALYSIS WILL HAVE TO BE PERFORMED TO LINK FAILURES ACROSS MANY PARTS OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT/RESPONSE – EMERGENCY RESPONSE WILL BE SPLIT BETWEEN (1) TECHNICALLY BRINGING SYSTEMS BACK ONLINE AND INSTITUTING BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROCESS, AND (2) CONTROLLING THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF THE SITUATION TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE AND PREVENT PANIC.

INCIDENT/HAZARD MITIGATION – NONE.

PUBLIC PROTECTION – NONE.

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VICTIM CARE – CITIZENS AND INVESTORS WILL LOOK FOR GOVERNMENT ASSURANCES THAT THEIR LOSSES WILL BE MADE WHOLE.

INVESTIGATION/APPREHENSION – USING INTELLIGENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT SOURCES AND METHODS, THE INVESTIGATORS WILL NEED TO DETERMINE THE LIKELY TECHNICAL SOURCE AND THE IDENTITY OF THE PERPETRATORS.

INVESTIGATION/APPREHENSION – INVESTIGATION IS DEPENDENT ON DISEASE SURVEILLANCE, ALTHOUGH THE CURRENT SYSTEM HAS DISTINCT LIMITATIONS.

RECOVERY/REMEDIATION – NOT REQUIRED.

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ANNEX 16 - THE JIC TOOL KIT

FIRST 48 HOURS CHECKLIST

CRITICAL FIRST STEPS AFTER VERIFICATION

Notification

1. ENSURE YOUR LEADERSHIP IS AWARE OF THE EMERGENCY AND THAT THEY KNOW YOU ARE INVOLVED. ☐
2. USE YOUR CRISIS PLAN'S NOTIFICATION LIST TO ENSURE ALL OF THE COMMUNICATION CHAIN OF COMMAND IS AWARE AND KNOW YOU ARE INVOLVED. ☐
3. GIVE LEADERSHIP YOUR FIRST ASSESSMENT OF THE EMERGENCY FROM A COMMUNICATIONS PERSPECTIVE AND INFORM THEM OF THE NEXT STEPS YOU ARE TAKING. ☐

Coordination

1. CONTACT LOCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL PARTNERS NOW. ☐
2. IF POTENTIAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, CONTACT FBI COUNTERPART NOW. ☐
3. SECURE SPOKESPERSON AS DESIGNATED IN THE PLAN. ☐
4. INITIATE ALERT NOTIFICATION AND CALL IN EXTRA COMMUNICATION STAFF, PER THE PLAN. ☐
5. CONNECT WITH THE JOINT INFORMATION CENTER-MAKE YOUR PRESENCE KNOWN. ☐

Media

1. BE FIRST: PROVIDE A STATEMENT THAT YOUR AGENCY IS AWARE OF THE EMERGENCY AND IS INVOLVED IN THE RESPONSE. (USE THE TEMPLATE FOR PRESCRIPTED, IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO MEDIA INQUIRIES.) ☐
2. BE CREDIBLE: GIVE DIRECTIONS TO MEDIA ABOUT WHEN AND WHERE TO GET UPDATES FROM YOUR AGENCY. ☐
3. BE RIGHT: START MONITORING MEDIA FOR MISINFORMATION THAT MUST BE CORRECTED NOW. ☐

Media

1. TRIGGER YOUR PUBLIC INFORMATION TOLL-FREE NUMBER OPERATION NOW IF YOU ANTICIPATE THE PUBLIC WILL BE SEEKING REASSURANCE OR INFORMATION DIRECTLY FROM YOUR ORGANIZATION. (YOU CAN ADJUST HOURS OF OPERATION AND NUMBER OF CALL MANAGERS AS NEEDED.) ☐
2. USE YOUR INITIAL MEDIA STATEMENT AS YOUR FIRST MESSAGE TO THE PUBLIC. ☐
3. ENSURE YOUR STATEMENT EXPRESSES EMPATHY AND ACKNOWLEDGES THE PUBLIC'S CONCERN ABOUT THE ☐
4. GIVE THE PRE-CLEARED FACTS YOU HAVE, AND REFER THE PUBLIC TO OTHER INFORMATION SITES, AS ☐
5. REMIND THE PUBLIC THAT YOUR AGENCY HAS A PROCESS IN PLACE TO MITIGATE THE CRISIS. ☐
6. START MONITORING PUBLIC CALLS TO CATCH TRENDS OR RUMORS NOW. ☐

Partners/Stakeholders

1. SEND A BASIC STATEMENT TO PARTNERS (THE SAME AS TO THE MEDIA) TO LET THEM KNOW YOU ARE THINKING ABOUT THEM. ☐
2. USE PREARRANGED NOTIFICATION SYSTEMS (PREFERABLY E-MAIL LISTSERV®). ☐
3. ENGAGE LEADERSHIP TO MAKE IMPORTANT FIRST PHONE CALLS, BASED ON YOUR PLAN, TO PARTNERS AND KEY STAKEHOLDERS TO LET THEM KNOW YOUR AGENCY IS RESPONDING. ☐
4. USE THE INTERNAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEM (E-MAIL) TO NOTIFY EMPLOYEES THAT THEIR AGENCY IS INVOLVED IN THE RESPONSE AND THAT UPDATES WILL FOLLOW. ASK FOR THEIR SUPPORT. ☐

Incident Situation Summary

Date and time:

Location:

Nature of incident:

Estimated number of victims:

Potential or critical infrastructure involved:

Evacuation status:

Response status:

Protective measures initiated:

Lead agency:

Incident Verification

IT IS IMPORTANT TO VERIFY THE INITIAL REPORTS OF AN INCIDENT AND TO MAKE SURE THAT YOU HAVE CORRECT INFORMATION. VERIFIED INFORMATION IS A CRITICAL FACTOR IN MAKING APPROPRIATE DECISIONS REGARDING THE INCIDENT.

Have all the facts been received? (to the best of your knowledge?)

Did the information collected come from formal, credible sources such as a local, State, or Federal agency?

Do you have similar reports about the incident from more than one source?

Is the information from different sources consistent?

Is the characterization of the event plausible?

If necessary, was information clarified through subject matter experts?

If you can answer “yes” to these key checkpoints, you have completed the key steps to verifying the situation.

NOTE: VERIFICATION IS NOT A FUNCTION FOR JUST ONE PERSON. IT REQUIRES INPUT FROM A VARIETY OF SOURCES.

Message Development for Emergency Communication

Step 1: Consider the following general factors

1. Target audience(s) (e.g., general public, health providers):
2. Purpose of messages (e.g., give facts/update, respond to media):
3. Method of delivery (e.g., TV interview, press release):

Step 2: Consider the six basic emergency message components

1. Expression of empathy:
2. Clarifying facts

Who:

What:

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Where:

When:

Why:

How:

3. What we don't know:

4. Process to get answers:

5. Statement of commitment:

6. Referrals (for more information):

7. Next scheduled update:

Step 3: Decide what are the three most important message topics for you to cover

1.

2.

3.

Step 4: Develop a complete key message for each of your three message topics

TOPIC 1:

Complete message:

Additional supporting facts (if any):

Soundbite:

TOPIC 2:

Complete message:

Additional supporting facts (if any):

Soundbite:

TOPIC 3:

Complete message:

Additional supporting facts (if any):

Soundbite:

Step 5: Check your messages for the following and revise, if needed

- ☐ Positive action steps
- ☐ Honest/open tone
- ☐ Applied risk communication
- ☐ Test for Clarity
- ☐ Use simple words, short sentences
- ☐ Avoid jargon
- ☐ Avoid humor
- ☐ Avoid extreme speculation
- ☐ Avoid judgmental phrase

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JIC Equipment and Supplies Checklist

Equipment	Location	How to obtain it
Fax machine (preprogrammed for broadcast fax releases to media and partners)		
Computers (on LAN with e-mail Listservs® designated for partners and media)		
Laptop computers		
Printers for every computer		
Copier (and backup)		
Several tables		
Cell phones/pagers/personal data devices and e-mail readers		
Visible calendars, flow charts, bulletin boards, easels		
Designated personal message board		
Small refrigerator		
Paper		
Color copier		
A/V equipment		
Portable microphones		
Podium		
TVs with cable hookup		
VHS VCR		
CD-ROM		
Paper shredder		
Copier toner		
Printer ink		
Paper		
Pens		

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Equipment	Location	How to obtain it
Markers		
Highlighters		
Erasable markers		
FedEx and mail supplies		
Sticky Notes		
Tape		
Notebooks		
Poster board		
Standard press kit folders		
Organized B-roll beta format (keep VHS copies around for meetings)		
Formatted computer disks		
Color-coded everything (folders, inks, etc.)		
Baskets (to contain items not ready to be thrown away)		
Organizers to support your clearance and release system		
Expandable folders (indexed by alphabet or days of the month)		
Staplers (several)		
Paper punch		
Three-ring binders		
Organization's press kit or its logo on a sticker		
Colored copier paper (for door-to-door flyers)		
Paper clips (all sizes)		

Template for Pre-scripted, Immediate Response to Media Inquiries

Use this template if the media is “at your door” and you need time to assemble the facts for the initial press release statement. Getting the facts is a priority. It is important that your organization not give in to pressure to confirm or release information before you have confirmation from your scientists, emergency operations center, etc. The following are responses which give you the necessary time to collect the facts. Use the Template for Press Statement for providing an initial press release statement after the facts are gathered.

NOTE: Be sure you are first authorized to give out the following information.

Date: Time:

Approved by:

Pre-scripted Responses

If on Phone to Media:

- We’ve just learned about the situation and are trying to get more complete information now. How can I reach you when I have more information?
- All our efforts are directed at bringing the situation under control, so I’m not going to speculate about the cause of the incident. How can I reach you when I have more information?
- I’m not the authority on this subject. Let me have (name) call you right back.
- We’re preparing a statement on that now. Can I fax it to you when it’s ready?
- You may check our Web site for background information, and I will fax/e-mail you with the time of our next update.

If in person at incident site or in front of press meeting:

- This is an evolving emergency and I know that, just like we do, you want as much information as possible right now. While we work to get your questions answered as quickly as possible, I want to tell you what we can confirm right now:
- At approximately (time), a (brief description of what happened).
- At this point, we do not know the number of (persons ill, persons exposed, injuries, deaths, etc.).
- We have a (system, plan, procedure, operation) in place for just such an emergency and we are being assisted by (police, FBI, DHS) as part of that plan.
- The situation is (under) (not yet under) control and we are working with (local, State, Federal) authorities to (contain this situation, determine how this happened, determine what actions may be needed by individuals and the community to prevent this from happening again).
- We will continue to gather information and release it to you as soon as possible. I will be back to you within (amount of time, 2 hours or less) to give you an update. As soon as we have more confirmed information, it will be provided.
- We ask for your patience as we respond to this emergency.

Notes: Depending on the incident, immediate protective measures may need to be provided. Consider using an expression of empathy, if appropriate.

TEMPLATE FOR PRESS STATEMENT

If the media is “at your door” and you need time to assemble the facts for this initial press release statement, use the Template for Pre-scripted, Immediate Response to Media Inquiries. Getting the facts is a priority. It is important that your organization not give in to pressure to confirm or release information before you have confirmation from your scientists, emergency operations center, etc.

The purpose of this initial press statement is to answer the basic questions: who, what, where, when. This statement should also provide whatever guidance is possible at this point, express the association and administration’s concern, and detail how further information will be disseminated. If possible, the statement should give phone numbers or contacts for more information or assistance. Please remember that this template is meant only to provide you with guidance. One template will not work for every situation.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

CONTACT: (name of contact)

PHONE: (number of contact)

Date of release: (date)

Headline—Insert your primary message to the public

Dateline (your location)—Describe the current situation in two or three sentences.

Insert a quote from an official spokesperson demonstrating leadership and concern for victims. “ ”

Insert actions being taken.

List actions that will be taken.

List information on possible reactions of the public and ways citizens can help.

Insert a quote from an official spokesperson providing reassurance. “ ”

List contact information, ways to get more information, and other resources.

List information on possible reactions of the public and ways citizens can help.

Insert a quote from an official spokesperson providing reassurance. “ ”

List contact information, ways to get more information, and other resources.

Public Information Emergency Response Call Tracking

Time of call: a.m./p.m.

Nature of call:

Specific information contained in stock materials:

Clarify recommendations
Current status of the incident
Hot topic 1
Hot topic 2

Request for referral:

For more information
For medical attention
Other

Feedback to agency:

Complaint about specific contact with agency
Complaint about recommended actions
Concern about ability to carry out recommended action
Report additional information on incident
Rumor or misinformation verification (briefly describe)

Outcome of Call:

Reassured caller based on scripted information

Referred caller to:

Expert outside the department
Personal doctor or healthcare professional (if health related)
Red Cross or other nongovernment organization
FEMA or State emergency management agency
Other

Action needed:

None

Return call to: Caller's name: Telephone number:

Gender: M / F

Return call urgency:

Critical (respond immediately)
Urgent (respond within 24 hours)
Routine

Call taken by: Date:

FLORIDA STATE WORKING GROUP ON DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS
RECOMMENDATIONS ON RDSFT JOINT INFORMATION GUIDELINES
APPROVED BY THE DOMESTIC SECURITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL: OCTOBER 12, 2005

**ANNEX 17 - FLORIDA CITIZENS PUBLIC OPINION RESULTS ON DISASTER
PREPARATION**


(Information for this section is being prepared by the Federal Alliance for Safe Homes (FLASH). It will be included in this section upon completion in February 2006).

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**ANNEX 19 - MOBILE JOINT INFORMATION CENTER (JIC) DESIGN SCHEMATIC
PROTOTYPE AND RECOMMENDED EQUIPMENT**

NOTE: FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE MOBILE JIC PLEASE CONTACT SGT. CHUCK MULLIGAN, ST. JOHNS COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE. THE DESIGN AND EQUIPMENT SPECIFICATIONS ARE BEING FINALIZED BY THE STATE WORKING GROUP, EQUIPMENT COMMITTEE.

DESIGN SCHEMATIC



MOBILE JOINT INFORMATION CENTER (MJIC) EQUIPMENT SPECIFICATIONS

(NOTE: THE EQUIPMENT LISTED BELOW IS FOR THE ST. JOHNS COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE MOBILE JIC WHICH IS THE FIRST MOBILE PLATFORM TO BE BUILT. THE EQUIPMENT LIST IS BEING REVIEWED AND VALIDATED BY THE STATE WORKING GROUP EQUIPMENT AND INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS COMMITTEES TO APPROVE THE EQUIPMENT FOR STATEWIDE USE. ALL PRICES WERE VALID AS OF SEPTEMBER 2005 AND SHOULD BE USED FOR ESTIMATION PURPOSES ONLY).

*** TRAILER PACKAGE-** 36' GOOSENECK TRAILER WELLS CARGO PROPOSAL = \$45,604.55

[HTTP://WWW.WELSCARGO.COM/WELLS/MODEL.HTML?MODEL=16](http://www.wellscargo.com/wells/model.html?model=16)

INSURANCE: \$355 LIABILITY AND \$492.00 DAMAGE

MAINTENANCE: \$300.00 PER YEAR

STRIPPING OF TRAILER- \$ 800.00

*** PRIMARY MOVER-** FORD F350 4 WHEEL DRIVE CREW CAB ESTIMATED COST \$37,000

CHEVY C3500 4 WHEEL DRIVE CREW CAB \$35,000

INSURANCE: \$560.00 LIABILITY AND \$492.00 DAMAGE

MAINTENANCE: \$600.00 PER YEAR

(PRIMARY MOVER TO BE PURCHASED IN UPCOMING FUNDING CYCLE)

*** LED EMERGENCY LIGHTS- 16 LIGHTS AROUND TRAILER \$1,600.00**

***PHONE SYSTEM**

-ASLYN COMMUNICATIONS, SCOTT VAUGHN (951) 300-2157

SX5E WIRELESS INTEGRATED TRANSCEIVERS \$467.00 EA. (3) = \$1401.00

NORTEL SWITCH \$950.00

3 WATT PHONE AMPLIFIER \$265.00

RACK SYSTEM \$482.00

ROOF MOUNT ANTENNA \$75.00

[HTTP://WWW.ASLYN.COM/TELULAR.HTML](http://www.aslyn.com/TELULAR.HTML)

PHONES- 6 @ \$160.00 EA. TOTAL \$960.00

PX HEADSETS- \$150.00 EA. TOTAL: \$900.00

T-MOBILE SERVICE: \$79.99 WHEN ACTIVE/ \$30.00 PER MONTH WHEN SUSPENDED.

(POOLING PLAN FOR 3 TRANSCEIVER LINES INCLUDES 1000 MINUTES SHARED, NIGHTS/WEEKENDS).

[HTTP://WWW.T-MOBILE.COM/BUSINESS/PLANS/ENTERPRISE.ASP](http://www.t-mobile.com/BUSINESS/PLANS/ENTERPRISE.ASP)

*** SATELLITE SYSTEM (3 OPTIONS)**

-(MOUNTED ANT. SYSTEM)- S2, SAT ONLY-MANUAL TUNE \$1200

-(MOUNTED ANT. OPT # 2)- S3 AUTO TUNE \$1699.00

-(PORTABLE ANTENNA)- \$50.00/ TRI-POD-\$49.95/ SAT FINDER \$125.00 INSTALLATION - \$149.00

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- SERVICE PROVIDERS AND FEES- DIRECT TV- 1-888-388-4249
"OFFICE PACKAGE" \$29.99 PER (\$5.00 FOR EA. ADD. RECEIVER) TOTAL: \$34.99 (WHEN ACTIVE)
(NO ACTIVATION FEES AND NO CHARGE WHEN IN SUSPENDED MODE)
- (LOCALIZED INSTALLATION) ALL SYSTEMS SATELLITE (904) 641- 3474
RECEIVERS-50.00 EA. (2) @ \$100.00
- * **SATELLITE PHONE/RADIO-** (STATE EOC SYSTEM)
 - LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS 1-850-212-1069/ DOUG MYERS \$4000.00
 - \$50.00 ACTIVATION FEE- \$69.00 MONTHLY- \$1.19 PER MINUTE
- * **WIRELESS INTERNET/ T-MOBILE-** WIRELESS CARD \$199.00
(ONLY IF AGENCY DOES NOT POSSESS TAC-PAC) (ALWAYS CONNECTED/NO DIAL-UP)
\$29.99 PER MONTH UNLIMITED USE.
[HTTP://WWW.T-MOBILE.COM/BUSINESS/PRODUCTS/PRODUCT_LIST.ASP?CLASS=DATA](http://www.t-mobile.com/business/products/product_list.asp?class=data)
- * **4 FLAT SCREEN TV'S-** SHARP 13" LCD TV \$449.00/ \$50.00 IN MOUNTING AND WIRING PER UNIT. TOTAL: \$2000.00
[HTTP://WWW.BESTBUY.COM/SITE/OLSPAGE.JSP?ID=1077630669270&SKUId=6578615&PRODUCTCATEGORYID=PCMCAT31800050026&TYPE=PRODUCT](http://www.bestbuy.com/site/olspage.jsp?id=1077630669270&skuId=6578615&PRODUCTCATEGORYID=PCMCAT31800050026&TYPE=PRODUCT)
- * **4 VCR/DVD PLAYER/RECORDERS-** SHARP PROGRESSIVE SCAN DVD/VCR RECORDER \$349.00 EA. \$1000.00 MOUNTING, SWITCHES AND WIRING PER UNIT TOTAL: \$1796.00
[HTTP://WWW.BESTBUY.COM/SITE/OLSPAGE.JSP?ID=1089890861034&SKUId=6780129&TYPE=PRODUCT](http://www.bestbuy.com/site/olspage.jsp?id=1089890861034&skuId=6780129&TYPE=PRODUCT)
- * **AM/FM STEREO-**
KENWOOD AM/FM/CD SIRIUS COMPATIBLE STEREO = \$159.99
[HTTP://WWW.BESTBUY.COM/SITE/OLSPAGE.JSP?ID=1072284520278&SKUId=6254974&PRODUCTCATEGORYID=CAT03066&TYPE=PRODUCT](http://www.bestbuy.com/site/olspage.jsp?id=1072284520278&skuId=6254974&PRODUCTCATEGORYID=CAT03066&TYPE=PRODUCT)
SPEAKERS-3 PAIR OF PIONEER 3-WAY 6 1/2" \$239.97 \$150.00 WIRING/ANTENNA
TOTAL: \$389.97
[HTTP://WWW.BESTBUY.COM/SITE/OLSPAGE.JSP?ID=1051826174054&SKUId=5264162&PRODUCTCATEGORYID=CAT03076&TYPE=PRODUCT](http://www.bestbuy.com/site/olspage.jsp?id=1051826174054&skuId=5264162&PRODUCTCATEGORYID=CAT03076&TYPE=PRODUCT)
- * **MARINE BAND- STANDARD ECLIPSE \$139.95 (WEST MARINE)**
ANTENNA SETUP- TESCO 26204 \$50.00
- * **VHF-** KENWOOD TK 7180K 500 CHANNEL \$560.00
ANTENNA SETUP- TESCO 26204 \$50.00
- * **UHF-** KENWOOD TK8180K 500 CHANNEL \$575.00
ANTENNA SETUP- TESCO 26204 \$50.00
- * **800 MHz-** KENWOOD TK 980 \$600.00
ANTENNA SETUP- TESCO 75068 \$50.00

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* **SHORTWAVE-** HAM RADIO OUTLET 1-800-444-7927- YAZU 8900, PART # FT8900R
\$419.95

ANTENNA SETUP- CR8900A \$99.95 PLUS CONVERTER \$12.95

* **CB- \$100.00**

ANTENNA SETUP- TESCO 27733 \$50.00

MOUNTING HARDWARE FOR ALL RADIOS- 8 TESCO MOUNTS #492471 @ \$11.24 EA. = \$89.92

8 TESCO RAIN CAPS #27812 @ \$1.91 EA= \$15.28

2 POWER SUPPLIES #33143 @ \$244.21 = \$488.42

* **PORTABLE FRS RADIOS-** MOTOROLA TALK-ABOUT T7200 FRS RADIO

\$119.99 PAIR @ (5 SETS) \$599.95

[HTTP://COMMERCE.MOTOROLA.COM/CGI-](http://commerce.motorola.com/cgi-bin/ncommerce3/ProductDisplay?PRRFNBR=248014&PRMENBR=126&TWOWAY_CGRFNB)

[BIN/NCOMMERCE3/PRODUCTDISPLAY?PRRFNBR=248014&PRMENBR=126&TWOWAY_CGRFNB](http://commerce.motorola.com/cgi-bin/ncommerce3/ProductDisplay?PRRFNBR=248014&PRMENBR=126&TWOWAY_CGRFNB)
[R=9&ZIPCODE=](http://commerce.motorola.com/cgi-bin/ncommerce3/ProductDisplay?PRRFNBR=248014&PRMENBR=126&TWOWAY_CGRFNB)

* **PODIUM-** DISPLAYS TO GO 1-800-572-2194 ADJUSTABLE PODIUM \$940.00 SHIPPING
VARIES UPON LOCATION...\$70.00 TO ST AUGUSTINE. TOTAL: \$1010.00

[HTTP://WWW.DISPLAYS2GO.COM/SUB4.ASP?ID=1869](http://www.displays2go.com/sub4.asp?id=1869)

* **MULT. Box & Mic.-** BROADCAST QUALITY AUDIO/VIDEO MULT BOX \$913.50,

MICROPHONE SM57LC \$99.00

MICROPHONE CABLE \$17.46.

[HTTP://WWW.RCICUSTOM.COM/INDEX2.HTM](http://www.rcicustom.com/index2.htm)

* **FAX/COPIER/SCANNER/PRINTER-** CAPITAL OFFICE PRODUCTS 1-800-552-1340

#PAN-KX-FLB756 \$389.00

* **PANASONIC RUGGED LAPTOP COMPUTER-** \$5000.00

(ONLY IF AGENCY DOES NOT POSSESS TAC-PAC)

[HTTP://WWW.308SYSTEMS.COM/ASSETS/PDF/TACPAK-CIVILIAN-TECH-SPECS.PDF](http://www.308systems.com/assets/pdf/tacpak-civilian-tech-specs.pdf)

* **2 ADDITIONAL DESKTOP COMPUTERS-** INTEL PENTIUM 4 EXTREME EDITION \$1008.00 EA.

15" FLAT SCREEN SCREENS \$281.00 TOTAL: \$2578.00

* **2 10x 10 TENT- QUICK SHADE TENT/ WAL-MART** \$137.00 EA. \$274.00

[HTTP://WWW.WALMART.COM/CATALOG/PRODUCT.GSP?PRODUCT_ID=2579244&CAT=55558&](http://www.walmart.com/catalog/product.gsp?product_id=2579244&cat=55558&type=1&dept=4125&path=0%3A4125%3A4128%3A55558)
[TYPE=1&DEPT=4125&PATH=0%3A4125%3A4128%3A55558](http://www.walmart.com/catalog/product.gsp?product_id=2579244&cat=55558&type=1&dept=4125&path=0%3A4125%3A4128%3A55558)

* **ROLLING OFFICE CHAIRS-** CAPITAL OFFICE PRODUCTS 1-800-552-1340 #SAF3455BL

\$139.00 EA. 5 @ TOTAL: \$695

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*** 10 FOLDING CHAIRS- CAPITAL OFFICE PRODUCTS 1-800-552-1340 #ICE64003
\$38.00 EA. TOTAL: \$380.00**

*** 2 FOLDING TABLES- CAPITAL OFFICE PRODUCTS 1-800-552-1340 #ICE65453
\$84.00 EA. TOTAL: \$168.00**

*** US/FL. FLAG SET- WORLD OF FLAGS (904) 824-7736 \$359.00**

*** ICS PIO VESTS- 10 ROYAL BLUE WITH YELLOW REFLECTIVE STRIPE. SAFETY STORE
ITEM# SPF1A \$46.95 EA \$469.50
[HTTP://WWW.SAFETYSTORE.COM/SAFETYVESTS.ASP](http://www.safetystore.com/safetyvests.asp)**

STATIONS

#1 COMMUNICATIONS/RADIOS, PHONE

#2 PLANNING/ICS-EOC LIAISON- COMPUTER (MDC), PHONE.

#3 PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS- COMPUTER, PHONE.

#4 MEDIA SUPPORT- LAPTOP FROM TAC-PAC W/WIRELESS INTERNET, PIO RADIO, PHONE

#5 SUPPORT-LOGISTICS/LOG- LAPTOP, PHONE (SHARED WITH DIRECTOR)

#6 JIC DIRECTOR, PHONE (SHARED WITH LOGISTICS)

RESOURCE AREA- PRINTER/COPIER/FAX, (PHONE LINE)

NOTES: TOTAL PRICE OF EQUIPMENT ITEMS= \$27,582.79


***THE LAPTOP FROM THE TAC-PAC GRANT (ST JOHNS ACQUIRED) IS NOT INCLUDED NOR IS
THE WIRELESS CARD NEEDED FOR WIRELESS INTERNET \$5200.00 ADD ON.**

**TOTAL WITH SAID ALLOWANCES \$73,187.34 NOT INCLUSIVE OF RECURRING COSTS OF
APPROXIMATELY \$4,500.00 DEPENDING ON JURISDICTIONAL EXPENSES DIFFERENCES.**

ANNEX 20 - RDSTF MULTI-AGENCY COORDINATING GROUP (MAC) PROTOCOL

Florida Regional Multi-Agency Coordination Groups

Standard Operations Guide



APPROVED BY DSOC APRIL 20, 2005

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REGIONAL MULTI-AGENCY COORDINATION GROUPS

DEFINITION OF GROUPS

A REGIONAL MULTI-AGENCY COORDINATION (MAC) GROUP IS COMPRISED OF THE REGIONAL DOMESTIC SECURITY TASK FORCE (RDSTF) DISCIPLINE LEADERSHIP, USUALLY CONSISTING OF THE TASK FORCE CO-CHAIRS REPRESENTING THE LAW ENFORCEMENT, FIRE RESCUE, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, AND HEALTH/MEDICAL DISCIPLINES. THE MAC GROUP OR THEIR DESIGNEES WILL BE ORGANIZED IN AN INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM (ICS) STRUCTURE CONSISTENT WITH THE NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (NIMS), AND WILL COORDINATE WITH THE LOCAL EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER(S) (EOCs) TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO THE LOCAL AREA INCIDENT COMMANDER(S). MAC GROUP MEMBERS WILL INCLUDE RDSTF PARTNERS WHO ARE NOT RESPONDING TO OR DIRECTLY IMPACTED BY THE INCIDENT. THE MAC GROUP MAY LOCATE AT AN INDEPENDENT LOCATION OR WITHIN AN EOC IN CONSULTATION WITH LOCAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT. THE MAC GROUP COORDINATOR WILL BE THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (FDLE) SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (SAC) OR DESIGNEE. THE MAC GROUP WILL BE IDENTIFIED BY THE RDSTF REGION NUMBER (I.E., REGION 3 MAC GROUP).

INTENT AND PURPOSE

THE REGIONAL MAC GROUP PROVIDES A FORWARD COORDINATION ELEMENT FOR THE STATE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (SEOC) TO PERFORM THE FOLLOWING MINIMUM FUNCTIONS:

- ACTIVATE AND OPERATE IN SUPPORT OF THE INCIDENT,
- ASSESS THE SITUATIONAL IMPACT AND NEED FOR RESOURCES,
- REPORT SITUATIONAL AWARENESS TO THE SEOC,
- COORDINATE THE REGIONAL RESPONSE EFFORT, AND
- DEPLOY REGIONAL ASSETS TO AUGMENT LOCAL RESOURCES IN COORDINATION WITH LOCAL EOCs.

THE MAC GROUP, IN CONJUNCTION WITH LOCAL EMERGENCY MANAGERS, WILL EVALUATE AVAILABLE RESOURCES IN THE AFFECTED AREA AND COORDINATE THE REQUEST AND DEPLOYMENT OF IN-REGION ASSETS. IF THE EVENT EXCEEDS THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL, THE MAC GROUP SHALL COORDINATE REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL OUT-OF-REGION RESOURCES WITH THE LOCAL EOC AND THE STATE EOC. THE MAC GROUP IS NOT DESIGNED TO REPLACE TACTICAL INCIDENT COMMAND OR FUNCTION AS AN INCIDENT MANAGEMENT TEAM (IMT).

DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY

ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE COMMISSIONER OF FDLE AND DIRECTOR OF DIVISION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, THE STATE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER MAY INITIATE A

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MISSION-TASKING MESSAGE AND SUBSEQUENT GOVERNOR-ISSUED EXECUTIVE ORDER TO EMPOWER A REGIONAL MAC GROUP WITH TASKING AUTHORITY IN THE EVENT OF A TERRORIST ACT. THE MAC GROUP WILL HAVE IMMEDIATE AUTHORITY TO ASSESS NEEDS AND DEPLOY IN-REGION ASSETS AS NECESSARY. ALL RESOURCE TASKING WILL BE PERFORMED IN COORDINATION WITH LOCAL EOCs USING THE SEOC'S RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.

Mission Statement

THE MISSION OF THE MAC GROUP IS TO FUNCTION AS A REGIONAL COORDINATION ENTITY TO SUPPORT LOCAL INCIDENT COMMAND IN COORDINATION WITH THE LOCAL EOC(S) AND THE STATE EOC, BY ASSISTING WITH THE DEPLOYMENT OF REGIONAL RESOURCES NEEDED TO PREVENT, PREPARE FOR, OR RESPOND TO AN EVENT INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD), AND TO PREVENT OR MITIGATE ADDITIONAL ATTACKS.

THE GROUP WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR:

tracking of tactical resource availability
tactical information gathering and sharing (situational awareness);
resource deployment and coordination
coordination of regional public information and education


RECOMMENDED MAC GROUP STAFFING

STAFFING WILL BE DEPENDENT UPON THE NATURE AND MAGNITUDE OF THE EVENT AND MAY INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

- RDSTF LEADERSHIP OR THEIR DESIGNEE - FUNCTIONS AS THE REGIONAL MAC GROUP COORDINATOR.
- DESIGNATED RDSTF LIAISON(S) WILL RESPOND TO THE INCIDENT SCENE(S) AND TO THE COUNTY EOC(S) AS APPROPRIATE.
- THE REGIONAL PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER OR A DESIGNEE SHALL BE AVAILABLE TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO THE MAC GROUP COORDINATOR AND COORDINATE THE RELEASE OF INFORMATION WITH THE INCIDENT COMMANDER.
- PERSONNEL FROM EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, FDLE, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AGRICULTURE, FIRE, HEALTH/MEDICAL, HOSPITALS, EDUCATION, THE REGIONAL PLANNING COUNCIL (RPC) OR LOCAL EMERGENCY PLANNING COUNCIL (LEPC), AND OTHER APPROPRIATE DISCIPLINES, AS NEEDED, WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR STAFFING THE OPERATIONS, PLANNING, LOGISTICS AND FINANCE/ADMINISTRATION SECTIONS OF THE MAC GROUP.

NOTE: THE RDSTF RESPONSE PLAN SHOULD IDENTIFY AT LEAST 3 REPRESENTATIVES FOR EACH COMPONENT. THE CONTACT LIST SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO THE FDLE INVESTIGATIONS AND FORENSIC SCIENCE PROGRAM OFFICE FOR INCLUSION IN THE COMMISSIONER'S RED BOOK SEVERE RESPONSE GUIDE.

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RECOMMENDED REGIONAL MAC GROUP SUPPORT

PERSONNEL FROM EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND EM-DEPLOYED STATE LIAISON OFFICERS WILL PROVIDE TECHNICAL (I.E. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM), ANALYTICAL, AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT FOR THE REGIONAL MAC GROUP. STAFF SUPPORT FROM ALL REGIONAL DISCIPLINE LEADERSHIP ENTITIES WILL BE SPECIFIED IN EACH REGIONAL RESPONSE PLAN. THE REGIONAL MAC GROUP SHOULD BE LOCATED AT AN APPROPRIATELY EQUIPPED FACILITY CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING REGIONAL MAC GROUP OPERATIONS.

ANALYST AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT STAFF DUTIES WILL INCLUDE:

- REGIONAL RESOURCE AVAILABILITY, DEPLOYMENT AND TRACKING UTILIZING THE SEOC'S RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. STAFF WILL ENSURE THAT MESSAGES ARE CLEARLY STATED.
- MAINTAINING AN EVENT LOG AND TIME LINE TO ASSIST THE REGIONAL MAC GROUP COORDINATOR WITH SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, DECISION-MAKING, AND COMMUNICATION DURING THE EVENT. INFORMATION AND PLANNING ANALYSTS WILL MAINTAIN AN EVENT LOG AND PROVIDE INFORMATION REGARDING RESOURCE DEPLOYMENT AND AVAILABILITY TO ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSOLIDATED INCIDENT ACTION PLANS (IAPs) AND SITUATION REPORTS (SIT REPS).
- COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AMONG THE REGIONAL MAC GROUP, RDSTF INVESTIGATION AND INTELLIGENCE UNIT, FDLE OFFICE OF STATEWIDE INTELLIGENCE, AND THE JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF).
- THREATCOM MESSAGING – ADVISEMENT/UPDATE OF EVENTS AND SHARING OF TACTICAL INFORMATION.

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- PREPARE BRIEFS FOR LEADERSHIP REGARDING THE EVENTS AND OTHER INFORMATION OBTAINED.

REGIONAL ASSET DEPLOYMENT PHILOSOPHY

REGIONAL ASSETS WILL BE DEPLOYED, AS NEEDED, TO AUGMENT LOCAL RESPONSE CONSISTENT WITH DIRECTION PROVIDED BY THE STATE'S COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN (CEMP).


THE MAC GROUP IN CONJUNCTION WITH LOCAL EOCs WILL MONITOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF LOCAL ASSETS OR THOSE REQUESTED THROUGH MUTUAL AID IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING PLANS.

THE MAC GROUP WILL ALSO COORDINATE DEPLOYMENT OF IN-REGION ASSETS WITH SUPPORT OF LOCAL EOCs IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING PLANS.

REQUESTS FOR OUT-OF-REGION ASSETS MUST BE COORDINATED THROUGH THE SEOC.

ALL RESOURCE REQUESTS TO THE STATE EOC MUST ORIGINATE FROM ONE SOURCE TO BE DETERMINED BY THE REGIONAL MAC GROUP IN CONSULTATION WITH LOCAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT.

REQUEST FLOW:



REGIONAL MAC GROUP ACTIVATION

A REGIONAL MAC GROUP MAY BE ACTIVATED IN ANY OF THE FOLLOWING WAYS:

Through order by State Command in conjunction with an Executive Order by the Governor, or

In advance of an event or incident to monitor and disseminate information (criminal intelligence and situational awareness) and to coordinate preparatory actions.

At a monitoring, partial activation, or full activation level as determined by the Regional MAC Group Coordinator, or designee, or as directed by the Commissioner of FDLE.

Upon actual or imminent attack.

A Regional MAC Group from an unimpacted region may be sent to an impacted region to provide full or partial staffing as mission-tasked by the SEOC.

REGIONAL MAC GROUP NOTIFICATION CHECK LIST:

Local Incident Commander requests assistance.

Local EOC and/or County Warning Point notified according to existing protocol.

County Warning Point (9-1-1 center) notifies State Warning Point.

State Warning Point contacts Emergency Support Function 16 (FDLE).

ESF 16 will activate as directed by the SEOC and will verify that the FDLE SAC or designee of the RDSTF has been notified.

The FDLE SAC will activate the Regional MAC Group to deploy to a predetermined location.

Notification of Regional MAC Group activation will be issued by the SEOC.

Regional MAC Group Coordinator will notify the Regional WMD Team Coordinators to be on stand-by or to deploy.

Governor's Executive Order may follow after deployment.

REGIONAL MAC GROUP - MINIMUM LEVELS OF EQUIPMENT

Regional MAC Groups will respond to WMD and other events as quickly as possible with their complements of RDSTF issued equipment and other personal equipment that may be required.

FLORIDA STATE WORKING GROUP ON DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS
RECOMMENDATIONS ON RDSFT JOINT INFORMATION GUIDELINES
APPROVED BY THE DOMESTIC SECURITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL: OCTOBER 12, 2005

REGIONAL MAC GROUP – MINIMUM LEVELS OF TRAINING

ALL REGIONAL MAC GROUP MEMBERS, LIAISONS, AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL WILL BE REQUIRED TO RECEIVE THE FOLLOWING LEVELS OF TRAINING AS APPROPRIATE FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS:

- NIMS AWARENESS COURSE (IS-700)
- NRP IS-800
- INTERMEDIATE INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEMS (I.E. I-100 – 300, OR APPROPRIATE)
- IS-230 PRINCIPLES OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
- G-191 EOC/ICS INTERFACE COURSE
- SEOC RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
- DISCIPLINE-SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF ROLES AND RESOURCES OF THE REGIONAL DOMESTIC SECURITY TASK FORCE AND THE ROLE OF THE REGIONAL MAC GROUP